#capital standards

8 08, 2023

FedFin on: Say It’s Simple

2023-08-09T14:19:41-04:00August 8th, 2023|The Vault|

Our most recent analysis of the inter-agency capital proposal focuses on significant changes to the rules for securitization and credit-risk transfer positions. In short, super-traditional securitizations have an easier path to the secondary market, but GSEs still beat banks. Complex ABS face often-formidable obstacles, as does CRT given or taken by banks.

The full report is available to subscription clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here.…

8 08, 2023

GSE-080823

2023-08-08T13:46:46-04:00August 8th, 2023|4- GSE Activity Report|

Say It’s Simple

Our most recent analysis of the inter-agency capital proposal focuses on significant changes to the rules for securitization and credit-risk transfer positions.  In short, super-traditional securitizations have an easier path to the secondary market, but GSEs still beat banks.  Complex ABS face often-formidable obstacles, as does CRT given or taken by banks.

GSE080823.pdf

8 08, 2023

FedFin on: Equity and Securitization Capital Standards

2023-08-08T13:44:33-04:00August 8th, 2023|The Vault|

Based on our analysis of the inter-agency capital proposal’s framework and its credit-risk provisions, FedFin turns now to the proposed approach to equities as well as to that for securitization exposures (i.e., those that are tranched rather than simple secondary-market issuances of packages of loans or other assets backed as needed by a single credit enhancement). The proposal in some cases liberalizes the current, “general” standardized approach (SA), but more often toughens it to account for elimination of the advanced approach…

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

8 08, 2023

CAPITAL232

2023-08-08T10:52:38-04:00August 8th, 2023|1- Financial Services Management|

Equity and Securitization Capital Standards

Based on our analysis of the inter-agency capital proposal’s framework and its credit-risk provisions, FedFin turns now to the proposed approach to equities as well as to that for securitization exposures (i.e., those that are tranched rather than simple secondary-market issuances of packages of loans or other assets backed as needed by a single credit enhancement).  The proposal in some cases liberalizes the current, “general” standardized approach (SA), but more often toughens it to account for elimination of the advanced approach.  This will have particular bearing on significant aspects of category III and IV bank activities (e.g., credit-card securitizations, MMF funding), but all covered banking organizations will see significant capital increases as many activities now permitted within the banking book would need to move to the trading book under the new market-risk rules.  Securitization-related capital standards are generally brought closer to those for underlying assets in simple securitizations, giving banks more balance-sheet flexibility and credit-risk mitigation opportunities if investors accept these structures.  The treatment of equity exposures is generally tightened, sometimes so much as to effectively prohibit certain activities – e.g., non-traditional equity investments in covered funds and BHC subsidiaries.  The new treatment of investment funds will also have significant implications for banks that fund themselves through prime MMFs or sponsor investment funds through equity positions.

CAPITAL232.pdf

4 08, 2023

Al080723

2023-08-04T16:31:21-04:00August 4th, 2023|3- This Week|

A Crushing Capital Burden

No, we’re not talking about the proposals – enormous, complex, and in some cases ill-drafted and confusing though they are.  We’re talking about how much work it’s taking to go beyond the top-line analyses and section-by-section repeats we’re seeing in so many releases to give you in-depth, strategy, and market-focused analyses of what key parts of the rules say and how they’ll redefine banking as we and the financial system know it.  There’s much not to love about the current construct, but the complexity of the new capital framework makes it stunningly difficult not just for us, but we fear also for the regulators, to know if the new framework will prove a Frankenstein.  When we finish our read of all the proposals’ sections and that for GSIBs, we’ll release a final, bottom-line strategic conclusion.  Until then, it’s critical to understand each key part of the rule and how it defines individual business lines and the markets that depend on them.

Al080723.pdf

4 08, 2023

FedFin on: Credit-Risk Capital Rewrite

2023-08-04T13:41:04-04:00August 4th, 2023|The Vault|

In this report, we proceed from our assessment of the proposed regulatory capital framework to an analysis of the rules governing credit risk.  In addition to eliminating the advanced approach, the proposal imposes higher standards for some assets than under the old standardized approach (SA) via new “expanded” requirements.  As detailed here, many expanded risk weightings are higher than current requirements either due to specific risk-weighted assessments (RWAs) or definitions and additional restrictions.  This contributes to the added capital costs identified by the banking agencies in their impact assessment, suggesting that lower risk weightings in the expanded approach reflected the reduced risks described in the proposal for other assets and will ultimately have little bearing on regulatory-capital requirements and thus ….

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

4 08, 2023

CAPITAL231

2023-08-04T13:40:43-04:00August 4th, 2023|1- Financial Services Management|

Credit-Risk Capital Rewrite

In this report, we proceed from our assessment of the proposed regulatory capital framework to an analysis of the rules governing credit risk.  In addition to eliminating the advanced approach, the proposal imposes higher standards for some assets than under the old standardized approach (SA) via new “expanded” requirements.  As detailed here, many expanded risk weightings are higher than current requirements either due to specific risk-weighted assessments (RWAs) or definitions and additional restrictions.  This contributes to the added capital costs identified by the banking agencies in their impact assessment, suggesting that lower risk weightings in the expanded approach reflected the reduced risks described in the proposal for other assets and will ultimately have little bearing on regulatory-capital requirements and thus on the overall ability of banks to expand into lower-risk areas and compete more effectively with nonbanks and foreign banks.  Big banks forced to abandon certain activities may expand others receiving capital discounts in the new rules, increasing their footprint in traditional banking in ways that may increase industry consolidation.

CAPITAL231.pdf

31 07, 2023

M073123

2023-07-31T10:40:52-04:00July 31st, 2023|6- Client Memo|

Two Tenets of the Capital Proposal That Make No Sense No Matter How Much One Might Want to Love The Rest of It

In the wake of the 1,089-page capital proposal, debate is waging on well-trod battlegrounds such as whether the new approach will dry up credit and thus stifle growth.  I’ve my own view on this, but my initial read of the proposal points to a still more fundamental issue:  some of it makes absolutely no sense even if one agrees with the agencies’ goals.  Here, I lay out two bedrock assumptions that contradict the rule’s express intent and will have adverse unintended consequences to boot.  God knows what lurks in the details.

M073123.pdf

31 07, 2023

Karen Petrou: Two Tenets of the Capital Proposal That Make No Sense No Matter How Much One Might Want to Love The Rest of It

2023-07-31T10:40:41-04:00July 31st, 2023|The Vault|

In the wake of the 1,089-page capital proposal, debate is waging on well-trod battlegrounds such as whether the new approach will dry up credit and thus stifle growth.  I’ve my own view on this, but my initial read of the proposal points to a still more fundamental issue:  some of it makes absolutely no sense even if one agrees with the agencies’ goals.  Here, I lay out two bedrock assumptions that contradict the rule’s express intent and will have adverse unintended consequences to boot.  God knows what lurks in the details.

The first “say what” in the sweeping rules results from the new “higher-of” construct.  Credit and operational -risk models are entirely gone and market-risk models are largely eviscerated.  Instead, big banks must hold the higher of the old, “general” standardized approach (SA) or the new, “expanded” SA.  Each of these requirements is set by the agencies – models mostly never allowed.  Further, a new “output floor” – different from Basel’s approach to this model’s constraint – is also mandated as yet another safety net preventing anyone gaining any advantage from any possible regulatory-capital arbitrage.

Why then not just demand that big banks use a standardized weighting the agencies think suffices?  Must banks be put through the burden of calculating two ratios when they have no ability to arbitrage requisite capital weights?  Do the agencies not even trust themselves to set capital standards that are now sometimes higher, sometimes lower as God gives them to know probability of default …

27 07, 2023

DAILY072723

2023-07-27T17:47:02-04:00July 27th, 2023|2- Daily Briefing|

FSB Tries to Calm CoCo Confusion

Doubtless responding to the CoCo chaos when Credit Suisse failed, the FSB today issued a report laying out how cross-border crisis-management groups are to handle unallocated TLAC (UTLAC) such as the “alternative Tier 1” bonds popular in the EU.

FDIC 3-2 Vote Presages Knock-Down Basel Battle

As anticipated, the FDIC today voted 3-2 to issue a sweeping rewrite of U.S. regulatory capital requirements.

Divided, Cautious Fed Advances End-Game, GSIB Rewrites

As anticipated, Gov. Bowman today voted against the new capital framework, as did Gov. Waller; as a result, the vote was 4-2.

Stablecoin Bill Advances, Compromises to Come

At a fiery HFSC markup today, Chairman McHenry (R-NC) announced that bipartisan negotiations had broken down largely due to the White House, choosing to proceed to a final package as he remains open to amendment before floor action.

House Republicans Skewer Basel Rules

Hill comment so far in response to the new capital rules is sparse.

Daily072723.pdf

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