FedFin on: DOJ Bank-Merger Policy
In conjunction with final merger-policy statements from the FDIC and OCC, the Department of Justice (DOJ) released “commentary” expanding on how the 2023 guidelines it issued along with the Federal Trade Commission expressly apply to bank mergers. The DOJ’s commentary and that from the other banking agencies revise merger policy last set in 1995. However, the Fed has yet to do so or even clarify how all of these actions affect its approach beyond a statement earlier this year that the FRB was working with other agencies and a more recent answer from Vice Chair Barr that he is content with Fed policy as it stands…
The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…
Karen Petrou: What’s Next for the Capital Rewrite
Few, if any, regulatory agencies are omniscient. More than a few think they are, but more often than not regulators who fail quickly to see the error of at least some of their ways are regulators who lose a lot more than they might otherwise have lost. Which brings us to the capital proposal and what next befalls this troubled standard after Michael Barr’s belated recognition that something had to give.
In the near term, we’ll see action by the FRB, FDIC, and OCC to clear a revised proposal along with the Fed’s quantitative impact survey for another round of public comment. I have to believe Fed Vice Chair Barr cleared the revisions he previewed last week with his allies at the OCC and FDIC and is confident that the Fed board will mostly agree with him up to the point of issuing a reproposal, if no further. As a result, a reproposal Mr. Barr said will amount to about 450 pages will soon be upon us.
Is this the last word? Having relearned humility the hard way, Mr. Barr promises it is not. What else might have to change to get a final U.S. version of Basel’s end-game standards across the goal line?
I would guess a lot more than would have been the case had the Fed and other tough-rule advocates more quickly recognized policy and political reality. One key, if seemingly-technical, point on which to give is the pesky “output floor.” Basel imposed the output floor because …
Karen Petrou: Workers’ Rights and Merger Wrongs
In all the fuss and fury over banking-agency merger policy, many have missed a consequential late-August announcement from other U.S. antitrust authorities laying out how workers’ rights will drive merger approvals. This follows 2023 guidelines from the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission retracting the old price criterion by which consumer welfare has long been judged in favor of policies taken factors such as network effects and “soft” market power fully into account. The guidelines addressed workers’ rights, but the new agreement adds sharp, sharp teeth. Thus, it’s clear that Administration policy is focused on economic justice along with its tough stand on monopolization. Bankers take warning: operational-integration rationales now cut two ways when it comes to merger approval.
To be sure, bankers are used to one economic-justice criterion when it comes to merger approval: those requiring consideration of customer “convenience and needs” based in large part on how this is demanded of them under the Community Reinvestment Act. Banks planning an acquisition thus typically accompany an offer with a massive CRA pledge promising more loans to low-and-moderate individuals and communities, affordable-housing investments, and the like.
This won’t cut it under the pending merger-policy rewrites from the OCC and FDIC, but these proposals generally do not replace CRA-style approval criteria. Instead, they beef them up, with the FDIC’s policy most notably (and dubiously) requiring acquirers to prove that communities not only will be better served, but also better served than if each bank remained independent.
However, the FDIC also …
FedFin on: Deposit Composition and Risk
In conjunction with its proposal to take a far tougher stand on brokered deposits, the FDIC is seeking information on the configuration of U.S. bank deposits that cannot be discerned from current call report data. If these data persuade the FDIC and other agencies to act, then call-report data could be far more extensive and impose greater market discipline, FDIC premiums could be redesigned, pressure would grow for reliance on core deposits and FHLB advances, and FDIC-coverage reform might gain renewed Congressional attention.
The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.
…
Karen Petrou on: How FSOC Enables Systemic Risk
One can and should debate the extent to which nonbank mortgage companies (NBMCs) are as systemically-risky as FSOC says they are. But it’s indisputable that, if FSOC believed what it said, then the paltry and politically-improbable recommendations it announced are proof of only one unhappy conclusion: all FSOC can meaningfully think to do when it sees a systemic risk is figure out how to bail it out. This is certainly what taxpayers have learned the hard way and investors have come to expect. Or, as humorist Dave Barry pointed out after the mid-March systemic deposit bailout, “Eventually the financial community calms down, soothed by the reassuring knowledge that American taxpayers will, as always, step up and cheerfully provide billions of dollars to whichever part of the financial community screwed up this time.”
As we noted in our detailed analysis of FSOC’s report, the Council lays out the rapid-fire growth of NBMCs, the role regulatory arbitrage played in pushing banks to the sidelines of the residential-mortgage business that once defined so many charters, and the direct taxpayer and resulting systemic risk of NBMC liquidity shortfalls. Asked about this at Wednesday’s HFSC hearing, Acting Comptroller Hsu said that NBMC stress could lead to “widespread contagion risk” that could prove “severe.”
Could NBMCs be pulled off the brink under current law? In a little-noticed aside, FSOC says no because NBMCs lack the assets that would make viable orderly liquidation by the FDIC under its systemic authority even if the FDIC finally figured out …
FedFin on: Bank Merger Policy
Following its 2022 request for input, the FDIC has released a formal proposal that would redefine the agency’s bank-merger policy into one that will make it difficult for all but the smallest and simplest transactions within its jurisdiction to have the clear prospects for approval usually necessary in non-emergency transactions, subjecting other M&A applications to protracted review with a high likelihood of denial. Strategic alliances involving nonbanks and/or nonbank affiliates and BHCs with nonbank activities may also come under critical FDIC scrutiny, complicating transactions otherwise under the FRB or OCC’s review….
The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…
Karen Petrou: How the FDIC Fails and Why It Matters So Much
Last January, we sent a forecast of likely regulatory action and what I called a “philosophical reflection” on the contradiction between the sum total of rules premised on unstoppable taxpayer rescues and U.S. policy that no bank be too big to fail. Much in our forecast is now coming into public view due to Chair Powell and Vice Chair Barr; more on that to come, but these rules like the proposals are still premised on big-bank blow-outs. I thus turn here from the philosophical to the pragmatic when it comes to bank resolution, picking up on a stunning admission in the FDIC’s proposed merger policy to ponder what’s really next for U.S. banks regardless of what any of the agencies say will result from all the new rules.
Let me quote at some length from the FDIC’s proposed merger policy:
“In particular, the failure of a large IDI could present greater challenges to the FDIC’s resolution and receivership functions, and could present a broader financial stability threat. For various reasons, including their size, sources of funding, and other organizational complexities, the resolution of large IDIs can present significant risk to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF), as well as material operational risk for the FDIC. In addition, as a practical matter, the size of an IDI may limit the resolution options available to the FDIC in the event of failure.”
In short, the FDIC wants to block most big-bank mergers because it can’t ensure orderly resolution of a large insured depository …
Karen Petrou: The OCC Blesses a Buccaneer Bank
In a column last week, Bloomberg’s Matt Levine rightly observed that only a bank can usually buy another bank. He thus went on to say that a SPAC named Porticoes ambitions to buy a bank are doomed because Porticoes isn’t a bank. Here, he’s wrong – Porticoes in fact was allowed last December to become a unique form of national bank licensed to engage in what is often, if unkindly, called vulture capitalism. This is another OCC charter of convenience atop its approvals leading to NYCB’s woes, and thus yet another contradiction between the agency’s stern warnings on risk when it pops up in existing charters versus its insouciance when it comes to new or novel applications.
According to the OCC’s charter approval, the Porticoes bank has no other purpose than serving as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Porticoes Capital LLC, a Delaware limited-liability company formed to be a proxy for a parent holding company. The parent holdco is “expected” to enter into binding commitments for the capital needed to back its wholly-owned bank plans to acquire a failed bank or even banks. This is essentially a buy-now, pay-later form of bank chartering, a policy even more striking because funding commitments for the holdco then to downstream – should they materialize – are more than likely to come from private-equity investors who may or may not exercise direct or indirect control.
Based on the OCC’s approval, it seems that Porticoes’s new charter can buy another bank without capital, pre-approval from …
Karen Petrou: Reflections on Regulatory Failure and a Better Way
Earlier today, we released our 2024 regulatory outlook, a nice summary of which may be found on Politico’s Morning Money. As I reviewed the draft, I realized how much of what the agencies plan is doomed to do little of what has long been needed to insulate the financial system from repeated shock. This is a most wearisome thought that then prompted the philosophical reflection also to be found in this brief. It asks why lots more bank rules do so little for financial resilience yet are always followed by still more rules and then an even bigger bust. I conclude that financial policy should be founded on Samuel Johnson’s observation that, “when a man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully.” That is, redesign policy from one focused on endless, ever-more-complex rules spawning still larger bureaucracies into credible, certain, painful resolutions to concentrate each financial institution’s mind and that of a market that would no longer be assured of bailout or backstop.
We know in our everyday lives that complex rules backed by empty threats lead to very bad behavior. For example, most parents do not get their kids to brush their teeth by issuing an edict reading something like:
It has long been demonstrated that brushing your teeth from top to bottom, tooth-by-tooth, flossing hereafter and using toothpaste meeting specifications defined herein will achieve cleaner teeth, a brighter smile, improved public acceptance of the tooth-bearer, and lower cost to …