Securitization and Systemic Risk
A new Fed staff study uses models to conclude that government-backed mortgage securitization exacerbates financial crises, contradicting conventional wisdom that – GSE blow-ups notwithstanding – properly-regulated GSEs create a liquid, diversified asset pool for an otherwise illiquid, risky asset class. However, our read of the study leads us to side with conventional wisdom.
Basel Head Backs U.S. End-Game
In an FT interview today, the Basel Committee’s chair, Pablo Hernández de Cos, unsurprisingly endorsed the U.S. end-game proposal, indirectly but firmly rebutting assertions that it is at variance with global norms.
The Shape of Liquidity Rules to Come
Previewing the construct of what may soon be the anticipated inter-agency proposal addressing liquidity-risk lessons-learned, Acting Comptroller Hsu today argued that the liquidity coverage ratio’s treatment of retail depositors (see FSM Report LIQUIDITY17) does not address likely depositor herding as they run for the exit.
Rounds, Sinema Press for SIFI-Designation Rollback
Senate Banking Committee Member Rounds (R-SD) alongside Sen. Sinema (I-AZ) introduced S.3601, legislation to codify 2019 standards (see FSM report SIFI35) adding significantly more obstacles to systemic designation compared to FSOC’s new approach (see FSM report SIFI36).
Steele’s Good-Bye Presses for More Tough Standards
In his last speech in office, Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions Graham Steele today called for reassessment of the treatment of unrealized gains or losses not just under the capital rules, but also in the liquidity standards (where they are in fact to some degree now captured).
House Democrats Damn Capital Proposal With Faint Praise
In this report, we begin our assessment of Congressional end-game comment letters.
Senate Letters Slam Capital Proposal’s Tax-Equity Risk Weight Changes
Here, we turn to several Senate letters on the end-game proposal.
A new FRB-NY study confirms that 83% of loans from 2000-2022 went to first-time homebuyers, compared to 56% for the GSEs and 57% for private lenders. FHA loans of course have very high LTVs and low scores, with scores improving after 2008 when the PLS market stopped adversely selected FHA even though over half of FHA loans still have scores under 680. FHA sustainability has varied based on these and other factors, but 21.8% of borrowers from 2011-2016 still lost their homes.
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FHA’s Mission and Mishaps
A new FRB-NY study confirms that 83% of loans from 2000-2022 went to first-time homebuyers, compared to 56% for the GSEs and 57% for private lenders. FHA loans of course have very high LTVs and low scores, with scores improving after 2008 when the PLS market stopped adversely selected FHA even though over half of FHA loans still have scores under 680. FHA sustainability has varied based on these and other factors, but 21.8% of borrowers from 2011-2016 still lost their homes.
More for Mortgages?
As our reports on the Senate and House hearings with bank regulators made clear, our prediction that the agencies would compromise on mortgage risk-based capital requirements will prove itself in the final standards. However, it’s far from clear if the compromise the agencies think will satisfy Congress will do much beyond directly addressing concerns that the proposal adversely affects LMI loans.
GOP Blasts Basel End-Game Regs, Dems Seek a Few Changes
With HFSC Chairman McHenry (R-NC) leading the way, GOP Members of the panel’s Financial Institutions Subcommittee today blasted the banking agencies’ end-game proposal (see Client Report CAPITAL234). Republicans were unanimous in joining leadership’s attack on the proposal’s process and substance, pointing to what they called incomplete impact analyses, an inexplicably short comment period, and adverse macroeconomic and regional-bank implications. Democrats led by Ranking Member Waters (D-CA) were more restrained and in some cases supported the proposal, but concerns were also noted with specific provisions (e.g., re the treatment of certain mortgage and securitization assets) and the interface with the pending CRA final rule. We continue to expect the banking agencies to hold firm to the proposal in broad terms and make minimal, if any, changes to the comment deadline. However, pressure from Republicans and the industry could well force renewed and what many would consider improved impact analyses designed not only to allay political opposition, but also the courts if litigation challenges the final rule.
In this report, we proceed from our assessment of the proposed regulatory capital framework to an analysis of the rules governing credit risk. In addition to eliminating the advanced approach, the proposal imposes higher standards for some assets than under the old standardized approach (SA) via new “expanded” requirements. As detailed here, many expanded risk weightings are higher than current requirements either due to specific risk-weighted assessments (RWAs) or definitions and additional restrictions. This contributes to the added capital costs identified by the banking agencies in their impact assessment, suggesting that lower risk weightings in the expanded approach reflected the reduced risks described in the proposal for other assets and will ultimately have little bearing on regulatory-capital requirements and thus ….
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Credit-Risk Capital Rewrite
In this report, we proceed from our assessment of the proposed regulatory capital framework to an analysis of the rules governing credit risk. In addition to eliminating the advanced approach, the proposal imposes higher standards for some assets than under the old standardized approach (SA) via new “expanded” requirements. As detailed here, many expanded risk weightings are higher than current requirements either due to specific risk-weighted assessments (RWAs) or definitions and additional restrictions. This contributes to the added capital costs identified by the banking agencies in their impact assessment, suggesting that lower risk weightings in the expanded approach reflected the reduced risks described in the proposal for other assets and will ultimately have little bearing on regulatory-capital requirements and thus on the overall ability of banks to expand into lower-risk areas and compete more effectively with nonbanks and foreign banks. Big banks forced to abandon certain activities may expand others receiving capital discounts in the new rules, increasing their footprint in traditional banking in ways that may increase industry consolidation.
We’ve much more to do to determine the strategic and policy impact of the new credit-, market-, and operational-risk capital rules singly and collectively – a complex task given the 1,089-page rulemaking made harder by some extremely-arcane language that may either mask what the agencies mean or differ from what they meant to mean. Still, several conclusions about mortgage finance are clear: the rules would be less demanding than those at present for many mid-LTV loans, the GSEs’ risk weighting continue to give them a considerable advantage over bank originators and securitizes, and MI lost the limited luster the banking agencies were forced to concede in 2013.
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Capital Winners – GSEs – and Losers – MI
We’ve much more to do to determine the strategic and policy impact of the new credit-, market-, and operational-risk capital rules singly and collectively – a complex task given the 1,089-page rulemaking made harder by some extremely-arcane language that may either mask what the agencies mean or differ from what they meant to mean. Still, several conclusions about mortgage finance are clear: the rules would be less demanding than those at present for many mid-LTV loans, the GSEs’ risk weighting continue to give them a considerable advantage over bank originators and securitizes, and MI lost the limited luster the banking agencies were forced to concede in 2013.