#SVB – Page 2 – Federal Financial Analytics

17 04, 2023

Karen Petrou: Why FDIC Privatization Isn’t a Pipe Dream

Eliza Allen2023-04-17T12:02:05-04:00April 17th, 2023|The Vault|

As night follows day, so proposals to privatize the FDIC have again followed bank failures. While debate over deposit-insurance privatization was, is, and will be an ideological tug of war between free-market conservatives and government safety-net progressives, it’s nonetheless an important option that warrants careful analysis as the FDIC yet again faces huge losses, banks are charged crippling and procyclical premiums, and talk turns to still more federal coverage at still greater risk not just to insured banks, but also to taxpayers. Pure FDIC privatization remains impossible, but target risk transfers warrant careful, but quick consideration.

Privatization was last seriously discussed when Congress rewrote FDIC coverage in 2006. This was a halcyon time when the FDIC was so sanguine about all the rules put in place after the S&L and bank crises that its 2007 study confidently predicted that systemic risk was a thing of the past, uninsured deposits would never again be covered, and the Deposit Insurance Fund more than sufficed for any systemic situation.

Of course, the great financial crisis that began later that same year put the lie to all this happy talk. Privatization proposals now aren’t anywhere near as happy nor do they repeat past assertions that, with FDIC privatization, the nation could also dispense with bank regulation. Instead, and for good reason, talk has now returned to private options because, without them, moral hazard seems sure to be embedded in a financial system that is still more shadowy.

A modern rethink of FDIC privatization must …

11 04, 2023

FedFin Assessment: Top Brainard, Gruenberg Regulatory Rewrites

Arezou Rafikian2023-04-11T16:52:14-04:00April 11th, 2023|The Vault|

In this report, we drill down on prior forecasts (see Client Report REFORM219) of near-term regulatory action to identify the revisions sure to be prioritized as NEC Director Brainard and FDIC Chairman Gruenberg seek to reverse rules finalized over their objections when they were in the minority. Ms. Brainard does not have a direct role dictating what the Fed will do given central-bank independence, but she has a good deal of influence as evidenced most recently by the White House action list. Acting Comptroller Hsu was not casting formal votes over these years, but he was an influential staff leader in this area and clearly has his own list – see for example his efforts on bank merger and resolution policy (see FSM Report RESOLVE48). We expect he will concur with Vice Chairman Barr and Mr. Gruenberg if they all advance the rewrites to the tailoring rules to which Ms. Brainard and Mr. Gruenberg so strongly objected….

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

10 04, 2023

Karen Petrou: Why the Fed is a Repeat Offender

Eliza Allen2023-04-10T17:29:46-04:00April 10th, 2023|The Vault|

As we noted in a recent report, a divided Congress that may not even be able to keep the U.S. Government in business is one unlikely to enact substantive financial reform. Thus, we’re in for yet another episode of political damage control, regulatory excuses, and a few heads on enforcement spikes without meaningful, measurable, and accountable supervisory reform. Been there, done that, had another financial crash, or so my dispiriting read of recent efforts to force post-crash supervisory reform makes all too clear. It’s probably too much to ask that Congress not flit off to the next election before it ensures meaningful regulatory-agency accountability for manifold supervisory lapses, but if it does what it usually does, then we are doomed to more crashes with worse consequences unless it and the White House force the Fed to do what it’s never done before: meaningfully and transparently improve supervisory rigor and enforcement might.

In my memo three weeks ago, I showed how regulators by 2001 had failed to act on the lessons of the 1980s and 1990s before the largest bank failure at the time presaged the great financial crisis hot on its heels. After the GFC, the U.S. convened the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC). When it issued its report in 2011, it drew scathing conclusions not only about all the “light-touch” regulation before the crash, but also supervisory unwillingness or inability to ensure that what rules there were were rules that were obeyed.

Despite this report and …

28 03, 2023

FedFin on: Senate Banking Demands Supervisory Accountability, Transparency, Reform

Arezou Rafikian2023-04-03T12:47:49-04:00March 28th, 2023|The Vault|

Today’s Senate Banking hearing was extremely well-attended by senators on both sides of the aisle clearly looking first to understand what precipitated recent bank failures, who is to blame, and what should be done next. Republicans argued that current law gives the Fed considerable discretion without the need for statutory change. Although FRB Vice Chairman Barr initially sought to emphasize the need for new rules without blaming old ones, he ultimately admitted that the Fed indeed could and can govern risky banking organizations regardless of size….

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

28 03, 2023

FedFin Assessment: Policy Implications of FDIC-Resolution Innovations

Arezou Rafikian2023-04-03T12:48:36-04:00March 28th, 2023|The Vault|

As noted yesterday, the FDIC’s recent rescues have had several unusual features with implications not only for future policy, but also for pending special assessments to replenish the DIF for the $22.5 billion estimated costs to the Deposit Insurance Fund. Analyzed here, new tools – e.g., voluntary liquidation, equity-appreciation rights, lines of credit – have determine the extent to which this estimate holds, how FHLB advances are treated in future resolutions, and the role the FDIC may play in companies that acquire failed IDIs….

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

27 03, 2023

Karen Petrou: Another SVB Casualty: U.S. Biomedical Research

Eliza Allen2023-03-27T10:27:35-04:00March 27th, 2023|The Vault|

As seems always the case when fear has the banking system in its maw, myths have proliferated that are now also magnified and amplified by viral social media. One such myth about Silicon Valley Bank has it that most of its depositors were high-wealth, high-tech folk whom the government should never bail out. In fact, many depositors had no choice but to park all their funds at SVB, a more-then-dubious practice at the bank that almost brought biomedical research to its knees. Had these depositors been forced to bear losses, treatments and cures for life-threatening and-changing diseases would have stalled, likely for years. We need not only to prevent future researchers from being put at such risk by a single bank, but also to change the biomedical-funding model from one at the mercy of high-cost equity investors to a stable sector for which lower-cost debt is readily at hand for any researcher with demonstrable ability to repay. Think what debt funding did for sustainable energy via green bonds and you’ll see what a like-kind model for “biobonds” could do to speed urgently-needed treatments and cures.

The link between SVB and biomedical research is not the stuff of moral-hazard myth, but rather a complex tale of a specialized institution serving a sector that came to hold unique sway over a vital public good: lengthening life and easing suffering. Providing banking services to venture capital (VC) is a high-risk business unless a financial institution devotes expensive intellectual capital to the sector and …

24 03, 2023

FedFin Analysis: Whom and What the FDIC and Fed Can Save How

Arezou Rafikian2023-03-24T17:05:38-04:00March 24th, 2023|The Vault|

Recent editorials and other media have often said that the FRB and/or FDIC have powers or taken actions that is not the factual case as we understand it. Members of Congress also appear sometimes willing to make assertions about what agencies can do now even if it is unclear if there is statutory authority to do so. We have provided individual clients with key clarifications, but do so now more generally to support strategic and advocacy decision-making. Of particular importance is the authority the FDIC is said to have or lack related to uninsured deposits; as detailed below, the agency actually has significant authority to do so as well as even to back BHC debt, as long as certain stringent conditions are met. As detailed in FSM Report RESCUE65, Congress limited both the FDIC and Fed in hopes that….

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

20 03, 2023

FedFin Analysis: Possible Cures for a Viral Run

Eliza Allen2023-03-20T16:12:34-04:00March 20th, 2023|The Vault|

Among the most vexing issues in the wake of SVB’s failure is the extent to which social media may have led to the first “viral run,” a run akin to the meme-stock volatility that lead the SEC and others to fear a new form of “flash-crash” risk. In this report, we assess current policy options related to deposit runs resulting from social media, an issue cited frequently by HFSC Chairman McHenry (R-NC) as a top priority as he begins work on post-SVB financial standards. We note some remedies – e.g., a ban on deposit-related communication were they permissible under various constitutional and statutory free-speech edicts.

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

20 03, 2023

Karen Petrou: Three Fast, Urgent Fixes to U.S. Bank Supervision and One Major Change to End Bailouts

Eliza Allen2023-03-20T11:35:24-04:00March 20th, 2023|The Vault|

In the wake of recent bank failures, much has rightly been said about how supervisors failed to act even though warning claxons blared. Nothing that happened to Silvergate, SVB, or Signature is due to forces beyond supervisory control, but there are deep, structural weaknesses in how banks have long been supervised. How long? I went back to my 2001 Senate Banking testimony about what was then the largest-ever failure to find that many of the lessons that should have been learned never sunk in.

Given that this hearing was in 2001, a good deal of what I said about bank capital requirements was about Basel I and is thus long out of date. However, one key point isn’t: the capital triggers used to spark prompt corrective action (PCA) were and are an unduly-simplistic way to identify the need for rapid supervisory intervention.

Silvergate, SVB, and Signature were all “well” capitalized right up to the brink of collapse because each of the banks in its own way arbitraged the capital rules to enormous – and obvious – advantage. Nothing in law or rule bars bank supervisors from stepping in well before PCA ratios sink but nothing seems to stir supervisors to do so. 1991’s PCA requirements were an important advance at the time, but it was outdated only a decade later. Now, it’s a dangerous supervisory distraction.

What else noted in 2001 remains an urgent fix? Over two decades ago, I urged the FDIC to reinstate the high-growth early-warning system it …

17 03, 2023

FedFin Assessment: Future of U.S. Bank Capital, Liquidity, Structural Regulation

Eliza Allen2023-03-17T16:50:38-04:00March 17th, 2023|The Vault|

In this report, we continue our policy postmortem of SVB/SBNY and, now, so much more. Prior reports have assessed the overall political context (see Client Report RESOLVE49) and likely changes to FDIC insurance (see Client Report DEPOSITINSURANCE118), with a forthcoming Petrou op-ed in Barron’s focusing on specific ways to reform federal deposit insurance to protect only the innocent. In this report, we look at some key regulatory changes likely as the banking agencies reevaluate the regional-bank capital, liquidity, and the IDI/BHC construct. As noted in our initial assessment and thereafter, we do not expect meaningful legislative action on the Warren, et. al. bill to repeal “tailoring” requirements, but we do expect bipartisan political pressure not just for supervisory accountability (see another forthcoming report), but also regulatory revisions.

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…