#TLAC

7 09, 2023

FedFin on: Living-Will Requirements

Arezou Rafikian2023-09-07T16:39:01-04:00September 7th, 2023|The Vault|

In conjunction with proposing a new long-term debt (LTD) requirement for categories II, III, and IV banks, the Fed and FDIC are pursuing other ways to enhance resolvability. Among these is new guidance for large domestic and foreign banking organizations that requires U.S. banking organizations and foreign banking organization (FBO) intermediate holding companies (IHCs) along with all their insured depositories when any is over $100 billion to file resolution plans. These are also redesigned to make the plans much closer in substance to those mandated for GSIBs.

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

6 09, 2023

FedFin on: Long-Term Debt Requirements

Arezou Rafikian2023-09-07T16:38:46-04:00September 6th, 2023|The Vault|

Building on an advance notice of proposed rulemaking, the banking agencies have issued several proposals to enhance the resolvability of large banking organizations not covered by stringent GSIB standards. Among these is a proposal mandating long-term debt (LTD) to increase regional-bank total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) and, the agencies believe, reduce resolution costs and/or increase the FDIC’s options, thus avoiding the systemic designation and costly resolutions that occurred for regional banks earlier this year. The LTD requirements for category II, III, and IV banking organizations do not go as far as those mandated for GSIBs, based instead exclusively on a “capital-refill” construct in which eligible LTD is issued in amounts the agencies believe sufficient to provide enough capital-equivalent funding to achieve the proposal’s expected results.

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

22 08, 2023

FedFin on: GSIB Surcharge

Arezou Rafikian2023-08-23T10:19:58-04:00August 22nd, 2023|The Vault|

As anticipated in the wake of recent bank failures, the FRB has proposed a significant revision to the current rules calculating systemic-risk scores that lead to GSIB designation. These indicators are used not only for GSIB designation or a higher surcharge, but also for categorizing U.S. and foreign banks for other purposes and thus would also bring some banking organizations into categories subject to very strict prudential standards. The Board estimates that the overall impact of the changes to the surcharge and risk-scoring methodology are small and, regardless, warranted to enhance systemic resilience and consistency. It also estimates that the interaction of this new approach with certain liquidity and TLAC standards is generally minimal. However, the Fed has not assessed the relationship of scoring revisions to one way to calculate the GSIB charges, nor does the Board assess the cumulative impact of all of the changes proposed here in concert with its sweeping revisions to U.S. capital rules for all banking organizations with assets over $100 billion. It is also unclear how these changes in concert with all the others interact with the stress capital buffer applicable to large U.S.-domiciled banking organizations…

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

4 08, 2023

FedFin on: Credit-Risk Capital Rewrite

Arezou Rafikian2023-08-04T13:41:04-04:00August 4th, 2023|The Vault|

In this report, we proceed from our assessment of the proposed regulatory capital framework to an analysis of the rules governing credit risk. In addition to eliminating the advanced approach, the proposal imposes higher standards for some assets than under the old standardized approach (SA) via new “expanded” requirements. As detailed here, many expanded risk weightings are higher than current requirements either due to specific risk-weighted assessments (RWAs) or definitions and additional restrictions. This contributes to the added capital costs identified by the banking agencies in their impact assessment, suggesting that lower risk weightings in the expanded approach reflected the reduced risks described in the proposal for other assets and will ultimately have little bearing on regulatory-capital requirements and thus ….

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

17 04, 2023

Karen Petrou: Why FDIC Privatization Isn’t a Pipe Dream

Eliza Allen2023-04-17T12:02:05-04:00April 17th, 2023|The Vault|

As night follows day, so proposals to privatize the FDIC have again followed bank failures. While debate over deposit-insurance privatization was, is, and will be an ideological tug of war between free-market conservatives and government safety-net progressives, it’s nonetheless an important option that warrants careful analysis as the FDIC yet again faces huge losses, banks are charged crippling and procyclical premiums, and talk turns to still more federal coverage at still greater risk not just to insured banks, but also to taxpayers. Pure FDIC privatization remains impossible, but target risk transfers warrant careful, but quick consideration.

Privatization was last seriously discussed when Congress rewrote FDIC coverage in 2006. This was a halcyon time when the FDIC was so sanguine about all the rules put in place after the S&L and bank crises that its 2007 study confidently predicted that systemic risk was a thing of the past, uninsured deposits would never again be covered, and the Deposit Insurance Fund more than sufficed for any systemic situation.

Of course, the great financial crisis that began later that same year put the lie to all this happy talk. Privatization proposals now aren’t anywhere near as happy nor do they repeat past assertions that, with FDIC privatization, the nation could also dispense with bank regulation. Instead, and for good reason, talk has now returned to private options because, without them, moral hazard seems sure to be embedded in a financial system that is still more shadowy.

A modern rethink of FDIC privatization must …

22 03, 2023

FedFin Assessment: GSIB Rules Set For Post-CS Rewrite

Arezou Rafikian2023-03-22T16:34:58-04:00March 22nd, 2023|The Vault|

In this report, we assess the implications of recent events on two assumptions underlying current U.S. and global policy affecting GSIBs and those considered domestic SIBs: first, all are likely to be well insulated from illiquidity and/or insolvency and, when this is not the case, then orderly resolution without taxpayer bailout can be readily deployed. Credit Suisse’s failure and subsequent, subsidized acquisition is just one of the “Minsky moments” rattling regulators and other policy-makers, with the conclusions drawn from all of them surely to lead to significant reevaluation of each of these assumptions. To be sure, CS was an outlier in terms of idiosyncratic culture-and-control problems, but the Swiss regulatory and resolution system is considered reasonably robust, thus making the bank’s failure…

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.

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20 03, 2023

Karen Petrou: Three Fast, Urgent Fixes to U.S. Bank Supervision and One Major Change to End Bailouts

Eliza Allen2023-03-20T11:35:24-04:00March 20th, 2023|The Vault|

In the wake of recent bank failures, much has rightly been said about how supervisors failed to act even though warning claxons blared. Nothing that happened to Silvergate, SVB, or Signature is due to forces beyond supervisory control, but there are deep, structural weaknesses in how banks have long been supervised. How long? I went back to my 2001 Senate Banking testimony about what was then the largest-ever failure to find that many of the lessons that should have been learned never sunk in.

Given that this hearing was in 2001, a good deal of what I said about bank capital requirements was about Basel I and is thus long out of date. However, one key point isn’t: the capital triggers used to spark prompt corrective action (PCA) were and are an unduly-simplistic way to identify the need for rapid supervisory intervention.

Silvergate, SVB, and Signature were all “well” capitalized right up to the brink of collapse because each of the banks in its own way arbitraged the capital rules to enormous – and obvious – advantage. Nothing in law or rule bars bank supervisors from stepping in well before PCA ratios sink but nothing seems to stir supervisors to do so. 1991’s PCA requirements were an important advance at the time, but it was outdated only a decade later. Now, it’s a dangerous supervisory distraction.

What else noted in 2001 remains an urgent fix? Over two decades ago, I urged the FDIC to reinstate the high-growth early-warning system it …