Karen Petrou: The Madness of a Model and its Unfounded Policy Conclusion
As the pending U.S. capital rules head into their own end-game, there is finally a good deal of talk about an issue long neglected in both public discourse and banking-agency thinking: the extent to which higher bank capital rules accelerate credit-market migration. Simple assertions that more capital means less credit are, as I’ve noted before, simplistic. One must consider how banks reallocate credit exposures to optimize capital impact and, still more importantly, how the credit obligations banks decide to leave behind take a hike. Now comes a new paper the Financial Times touts concluding that, thanks to shadow banks, “we can jack up capital requirements more.” Maybe, but not judging by this study’s design. Even with considerable charity, it can be given no better than the “very creative” grade which kind primary-school teachers accord nice tries.
The paper in question is by Bank of International Settlements staff. It looks empirically – or so it says – at what it calls the U.S. banking sector’s share since the 1960s of what it lugubriously calls “informationally-sensitive loans.” It documents a lot of numbers said to demonstrate lower bank lending share, using a model founded on both erroneous data and wild leaps to conclude in a fit of circular reasoning that more nonbank lending explains why there is less bank lending. In the study’s words, “intermediaries themselves have adjusted their business models.” What might have led banks to decades of technological intransigence and strategic indolence is neither clearly explained nor verified.
What else is wrong? For starters, the paper’s definition of banks – more than a bit fundamental to conclusions about banks – is at best perplexing. U.S. banks are defined to include credit unions – which of course operate under wildly-different capital rules – and foreign-bank “offices” even though branches […]
Karen Petrou: The Unintended Consequences of Blocking the Credit-Card Merger
There is no doubt that the banking agencies have approved all too many dubious merger applications along with charter conversions of convenience. However, the debate roiling over the Capital One/Discover merger harkens to an earlier age of thousands more prosperous small banks all operating strictly within a perimeter guarded by top-notch consumer, community, and prudential regulators. Whether this ever existed is at best uncertain. What is for sure is that all this nostalgia for a halcyon past will hasten a future dominated by GSIBs and systemic-scale nonbanks still operating outside flimsy regulatory guardrails.
The best way to demonstrate this awkward certainty is to run a counter-factual – that is, think about what the world would look like if opponents of the Capital One/Discover deal get their way. Would we quickly see a return to card competition housed firmly within a tightly-regulated system? Would the payment system be loosed from Visa and Mastercard’s grip? Would merchants see the dawn of a new era of itsy-bitsy interchange fees? Would card rates plummet and rewards stay splendiferous? I very much doubt it. Space here does not permit a detailed assessment of the analytics underlying my conclusions, so let’s go straight to each of them.
First, banning the CapOne/Discover deal would not ensure robust card competition under strict bank regulation. JPMorgan’s and American Express’ formidable stakes could grow because credit-card lending is a business dependent on economies of scale and scope vital to capital-efficiency through the secondary market. However, large banks will have a lot more trouble finding these and, even if the rules are modified, overall regulatory costs will make each of them less competitive.
Nonbanks have many ways to enter the regulated banking and payment […]
Karen Petrou: How the OCC Made a Bad Bank Both Bigger and Badder
As I noted last week, the OCC’s proposed bank-merger policy fails to reckon with the strong supervisory and regulatory powers federal banking agencies already have to quash problematic consolidations and concentrations. Here, I turn to one reason why the OCC may not trust these rules: it doesn’t trust itself. A bit of recent history shows all too well why this self-doubt is warranted even though it’s also inexcusable.
I owe my historical recall to the authoritative Bank Reg Blog, which last week looked at the latest on NYCB. This included a troubling reminder of the troubled bank’s merger with Flagstar before it thought it snapped up another great deal from the FDIC via acquiring what was left of Signature Bank.
NYCB first sought approval for the Flagstar acquisition in 2021 when its primary federal regulator was the FDIC. As is often the case with merger applications, this one appeared to go into a dark hole. Unlike many other acquisitions, the banking companies had a go-to Plan B: charter conversion.
NYCB went to the OCC and got rapid approval not just for converting its charter to a national bank, but also then for acquiring Flagstar via a reverse flip that also involved a Flagstar conversion to a national charter. The OCC then readily approved the merger in 2022, just in time for some of the super-rapid growth via the Signature deal both the OCC and FDIC approved even though they should have been well aware that rapid-fire mergers almost always lead to the serious integration problems now all too evident at NYCB along with its fundamental unreadiness to grow so big so fast and dangerous CRE concentrations.
Charter conversions have a very bad record of leading to lowest-common-denominator supervision. This the OCC knew well in 2012 when it emphatically declared that it would not […]
FedFin Daily Alert: CFPB Report Continues Credit Card Attack
Buttressing its controversial credit-card late-fee proposal (see FSM Report CREDITCARD36), the CFPB today issued a report finding that the 25 largest credit card issuers charged interest rates eight to ten percentage points higher than small-and-medium-sized banks and credit unions. The report states that higher rates among large issuers persist across credit scores, with large issuers also more likely to charge annual fees. The report also identifies by name fifteen issuers who reported cards with interest rates above thirty percent. The data come from the first set of results from the updated Terms of Credit Card Plans survey. In a statement alongside the report, Director Chopra stated that the CFPB will be “accelerating its efforts to ensure that consumers can access better rates that can save families billions of dollars per year.” No specific initiatives are named.
Karen Petrou: How to Have Sound Bank-Merger Policy Reflecting Unique Bank Regulation
Chair Powell said a week ago that, thanks to commercial real estate risk, some banks will need to be “closed” or “merged out of existence,” hopefully adding that these will be “smaller banks for the most part.” That this may befall the banking system sooner than Mr. Powell suggested is all too apparent from NYCB’s travails. The OCC’s new merger proposal flies in the face of this hard reality, dooming mergers of size or maybe even small ones until it’s too late. A surprising source – a super-progressive analysis of bank merger policy – makes it clear why the OCC’s approach is not only high-risk, but also ill-conceived.
The paper comes from Saule T. Omarova, President Biden’s nominee to be Comptroller who was forced to withdraw, and the Administration’s most recent Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions, Graham Steele. As befits their longstanding views, the paper presses for stringent bank-merger policy to combat what Justice Brandeis first called the “money trusts.” Ms. Omarova and Mr. Steele say that banks of all sizes are still “money trusts” despite the role of omnipotent private-equity and asset-management firms, but so goes much of their analysis. What’s more interesting in their report and a new petition filed by a like-minded academic is their ground-breaking, hard look at how much of bank regulation is actually intended to curtail undue market power. Taking this into account could lead to sound merger policy without the adverse consequences evident in the OCC’s drop-dead proposal.
There are in fact many safety-and-soundness standards that are also expressly designed to prevent problematic concentration and unfair market advantage. A short list of my own prompted by these papers includes limits on inter-affiliate transactions and anti-tying restraints intended to prevent holding companies from powering up their profits thanks to unique bank privileges and […]
FedFin on: Bank-Merger Policy
Although all of the banking agencies have for years promised a new bank-merger policy, none has proposed one until this OCC rulemaking. It is intended to add certainty and transparency to the manner in which the OCC reviews merger applications or others for charter combinations from national banks and federal savings associations resulting in a federally-chartered depository, but the OCC retains discretion to do as it chooses in this arena given the flexibility built into all the attributes now laid out that may augur OCC disapproval and/or expedited processing. The policy also appears to apply to…
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