



FedFin Daily Briefing

Thursday, April 6, 2023

Treasury Reiterates AML/CFT DeFi Concerns

Following on the President's executive order ([see Client Report CRYPTO26](#)) and its own reports ([see FSM Report CRYPTO30](#)), Treasury today released its [DeFi Risk Assessment](#), finding as prior reports have presaged that AML/CFT noncompliance is the sector's primary vulnerability. Indeed, the analysis strongly states that firms must comply with these standards no matter their business model. It also highlights a regulatory gap where DeFi firms not classified as financial institutions under the BSA are exempt from stringent standards, suggesting both statutory and regulatory changes. The report also recommends monitoring DeFi developments, identifying domestic regulatory gaps, coordinating with foreign jurisdictions, and promoting cyber resilience. Treasury seeks comment on how to determine if a DeFi firm is a financial institution, mitigate risks beyond the regulatory perimeter, vary AML/CFT obligations for different DeFi services, and clarify current rules. No deadline for a response is given.

Recent Files Available for Downloading

The following reports and analyses have been sent to retainer clients recently. Copies are also available to retainer clients on the Archives section of Federal Financial Analytics' website: www.fedfin.com or clients may obtain the reports/analyses by e-mailing info@fedfin.com giving the requested item name, firm, and e-mail address. To learn more about *GSE Activity Reports*, click [here](#).

- [UDAP8](#): Following its usual practice of setting standards by edict, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection has laid out an extensive framework that brings a wide range of consumer-finance actions and inactions within the scope of enforcement sanctions governing acts or practices that are not only unfair or deceptive, but also abusive.
- [GSE-040623](#): [FHFA](#), [Fannie](#), and [Freddie](#) yesterday updated the sometimes-controversial equitable-finance [plans](#) FHFA approved last year.
- [GSE-040323](#): We have written from time to time about [covered bonds](#).
- [REFORM219](#): With Thursday's White House [announcement](#), we know that the Administration will do its best to support Fed and FDIC efforts to color recent events as a failure of Republican-led rulemaking, not also one of agency supervisory acumen, speed, and even competence.
- [REFORM218](#): Today's HFSC hearing on recent bank failures was more partisan than yesterday's Senate Banking session ([see Client Report REFORM217](#)).
- [REFORM217](#): Today's Senate Banking hearing was extremely well-attended by Senators on both sides of the aisle clearly looking first to understand what precipitated recent bank failures, who is to blame, and what should be done next.
- [RESOLVE50](#): As [noted yesterday](#), the FDIC's recent rescues have had several unusual features with implications not only for future policy, but also for pending special assessments to replenish the DIF for the \$22.5 billion estimated costs to the Deposit Insurance Fund.

- [RESCUE79](#): Recent editorials and other media have often said that the FRB and/or FDIC have powers or taken actions that is not the factual case as we understand it.
- [GSIB21](#): In this report, we assess the implications of recent events on two assumptions underlying current U.S. and global policy affecting GSIBs and those considered domestic SIBs: first, all are likely to be well insulated from illiquidity and/or insolvency and, when this is not the case, then orderly resolution without taxpayer bailout can be readily deployed.
- [LIQUIDITY33](#): Among the most vexing issues in the wake of SVB's failure is the extent to which social media may have led to the first "viral run," a run akin to the meme-stock volatility that lead the SEC and others to fear a new form of "flash-crash" risk.
- [GSE-032023](#): In this report, we build on FedFin's in-depth reports about recent bank failures to detail new risks for all of the innocent bystanders in the U.S. mortgage market along with a not so-innocent bystander: the Federal Home Loan Banks.
- [REFORM216](#): In this report, we continue our policy postmortem of SVB/SBNY and, now, so much more.
- [DEPOSITINSURANCE118](#): As promised in our first post-SVB impact assessment ([see Client Report RESOLVE49](#)), this report begins a series of analyses of specific policy issues.
- [RESOLVE49](#): As we [noted last night](#), the President concurred with Treasury, the Fed, and FDIC in [deciding](#) that SVB's Friday failure and [imminent runs on Signature Bank](#) and, most likely, others posed a systemic risk.
- [GSE-030923](#): As detailed in our reports earlier this week on Powell's appearance before [Senate Banking](#) and [HFSC](#), much was said about the pending rewrite of big-bank capital standards.
- [FEDERALRESERVE73](#): At today's HFSC hearing, Chairman Powell modulated his hawkish stance just a bit, continuing as he long has done to refuse to take a stand on fiscal policy while advocating for rapid debt-limit action.
- [FEDERALRESERVE72](#): Although Chairman Powell's testimony kept exclusively to monetary policy, today's Senate Banking hearing seemed only to go through the motions set at previous hearings with regard to inflation, growth, and the Fed's long-term objectives.