Shane Smith

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So far Shane Smith has created 248 blog entries.
7 04, 2025

Karen Petrou: Why Regulators Will be Flat-Footed if Bad Now Turns Soon to Worse

2025-04-07T09:15:06-04:00April 7th, 2025|The Vault|

One of the comforts with which bank regulators will doubtless console themselves after last week’s market rout is that the largest U.S. banks have the capital not only to withstand this, but also the probable, profound consequences of the President’s punitive tariffs.  However, because U.S. regulators mismeasure capital resilience, this confidence is misplaced.  Using the economic-capital approach I recently endorsed shows that, while U.S. banks still are strong, they are not fortresses.

FedFin recently analyzed two new studies demonstrating that geopolitical risk is hard on bank solvency.  To this, one of course can say that there’s no real-world need for exhaustive studies of dozens of countries over decades – common sense buttressed by history makes this all too clear.  These hard lessons and the data that describe them do, though, make clear that it’s more than worth revisiting the United States after the Smoot-Hawley tariffs to get a sobering idea of the negative feedback loop between geopolitical risk, macroeconomic hazards, bank vulnerability, and – back to the beginning, geopolitical risk. Any talk of the 1930s is alarmist and also inapplicable in numerous respects, but it is the most pertinent example of geopolitical risk over the past century and thus demonstrates the need now to be very, very careful – not something this White House appears to be good at.

Economic-capital measures are a more robust platform to assess bank resilience than regulatory capital and are thus of particular pertinence at this dangerous moment.  Regulatory-capital measurements are so complex and often …

17 03, 2025

Karen Petrou: A New, Unified Theory of Effective Bank Regulation

2025-03-17T09:13:31-04:00March 17th, 2025|The Vault|

There is one perennial, overlooked, and devastating irony in the vast body of bank capital and liquidity regulation:  the better a bank’s liquidity score, the less regulatory capital it has.  Although liquidity and capital are inexorably linked when it comes to preserving bank solvency, the need to comply with two contradictory standards forces banks to change their business model to meet both ends in the middle at considerable cost to profitability and long-term franchise value.  This is of course a major threat to solvency of which bank regulators are either blissfully unaware or, worse, heedless.  Federal banking agencies have stoutly refused to undertake the essential cumulative-impact analysis we’ve fruitlessly urged on them most recently in Congressional testimony.  A new Federal Reserve Bank of New York study shows not just why they should judge rules by sum-total impact, but also how they could do so and thereby have a much better sense of which banks might actually go broke before they do.

I refer you to the full FRB-NY paper for details.  It crafts an economic-capital construct calculated by netting the net present value of financeable assets versus par liabilities as a baseline measure which can then be tested under various stress scenarios that start with illiquidity and end in insolvency and vice versa.  This leads to a robust measure of survivability that combines the impact of credit risk, liquidity, and the real-world market conditions current rules ignore.  In essence, economic capital is derived from the hard-nosed, real-time factors that wise …

24 02, 2025

Karen Petrou: How the White House Could Have Fun with the Fed

2025-02-24T09:11:47-05:00February 24th, 2025|The Vault|

President Trump has an awesome ability to keep even his closest allies perplexed by nonstop announcements that often break precedent, accepted norms, and even the law.  Just as opponents begin to rally against one initiative, the White House launches another, sending dissenters off in a different direction, leaving the actions they initially targeted unchanged or even forgotten. Still, several policy themes are coming through loud and clear through all these different actions that have far-reaching financial-market cumulative impact.  One is the sheer volatility all this chaos creates; another to which I turn here is the President’s sure and certain effort to make the Federal Reserve a tool of the executive branch, going beyond setting interest rates to turn it into America’s sovereign wealth fund.

As we noted, The President’s executive-order barrage includes one demanding a U.S. sovereign wealth fund (SWF).  The tricky bit here is not the lines that would quickly blur between public and private enterprise, an historic U.S. economic principle that won’t slow Mr. Trump down for a minute.  Instead, it’s where the money funding the SWF comes from given the lack of a nationalized commodities enterprise such as Norway’s and the Administration’s hell-bent campaign to reduce the federal deficit.  Solution?  The Fed.

U.S. law is seemingly an obstacle to deploying the Fed as an SWF since it allows the Fed to hold only direct obligations of the U.S. Treasury and its agencies as well as – a Fed sleight of hand in the 2008 crisis – Fannie …

18 02, 2025

Karen Petrou: The Fed’s Sudden GSIB Jihad

2025-02-18T09:06:45-05:00February 18th, 2025|The Vault|

Even as he stoutly assured Congress last week that the Fed is staunchly apolitical, Chair Powell acknowledged several post-inauguration epiphanies.  These include sudden recognition of the supplementary leverage ratio’s impact on Treasury-market liquidity and the importance of cost-benefit and cumulative regulatory-impact analyses along with disavowal of all things climate risk.  Another Fed U-turn relates to merger policy, but this escaped broad notice.  It shouldn’t have – bank-merger policy is due for a major makeover and that matters.

In a detailed FedFin analysis of banking-industry competition last year, we looked at current market realities and years of research showing that the dramatic erosion in U.S. bank charters is not due to voracious big-bank gobbling of small-bank charters.  Instead, it’s the result of inexorable technological advances combined with an array of new rules that challenge the ability of all but the very biggest banks to achieve the economies of scale and scope now vital to charter survival.  Many new rules, warranted or not, have also had the inexorable effect of enabling regulatory arbitrage, empowering massive nonbank competitors who easily quash vulnerable companies unable to match technological prowess and network effects.

Sudden Fed policy reversals did not escape Republican notice, with Senate Banking Chair Scott commenting acidly about Fed “flip-flops.”  But, unless Members of Congress make Jay Powell angry – and that’s hard to do in public – nothing the Fed chair says in public is offhand even if it seems that way at the time.  During last week’s hearings, Mr. Powell changed …

10 02, 2025

Karen Petrou: Payment-System Politics and the Havoc It Wreaks

2025-02-10T09:16:53-05:00February 10th, 2025|The Vault|

Any bank that granted even just “read-only” access to its payment services with as few controls as the U.S. Treasury would and should be harshly sanctioned by its supervisors.  Who steps in to ensure the smooth functioning of the multi-trillion Treasury payment system?  Do any of Mr. Musk’s operatives know what would happen if they pulled the wrong plug and disabled critical payments on U.S. debt or to American citizens such as those for Social Security?  And, what if they don’t care if they disrupt payments if they believe this suits a political purpose?

When I wrote my memo last week hoping that these fears are alarmist, we didn’t know then what we know now about unlimited payment system access by a key DOGE warrior since named to head the Fiscal Service and the youth, inexperience, and dubious histories of the payment-system teams.  Do any of them know that payment-system finality is an essential element of payment-system credibility and financial-system stability or do they view the payment system as a video game with a prize for the team member who finds the target that rings the loudest political bell?  Do any of these Trump appointees know that making even a little mistake could be catastrophic in a system handling trillions of dollars in billions of transactions or are they looking for viral moments on encrypted social-media platforms so they become the envy of like-minded young men?

As FedFin noted last week, what Congress and the press took as a pledge …

3 02, 2025

Karen Petrou: Why Playing with Treasury’s Payment System is Playing with Fire

2025-02-03T09:04:54-05:00February 3rd, 2025|The Vault|

In just two weeks, Donald Trump has done something no one ever expected which he may not even intend:  overturning the axiomatic expectation that a full-faith-and-credit obligation of the United States government is the best there is.  Now, the U.S. will honor its commitments only if it still likes them.  Anything that upends financial-market axioms stokes systemic risk and stoking is now so heated that it threatens even the multi-trillion Treasury market on which U.S. prosperity and global financial stability depend.

Is this alarmist?  Yes, but then who would have thought the White House would issue an edict freezing all federal funding or maybe just some federal funding even though more than just some federal funding was frozen?  Who would have thought the U.S. would cease all but a very few foreign-aid payments including those with other sovereign governments no matter which geopolitical or humanitarian interests are sacrificed? Even if some of this was audible on the campaign trail, none of it was thinkable to anyone counting on constitutional checks and balances along with a sound sense by someone in the White House of second-order effects.

It is in this context that one more Trump Administration action is particularly worrisome and why I fear even for the once-sacrosanct promise that the U.S. will not just honor its commitments, but also pay its bills.  Elon Musk’s acolytes at DOGE have now been granted unfettered access to the Treasury payment system.  Why?

Maybe it’s just curiosity or maybe DOGE wants to update …

27 01, 2025

Karen Petrou: Why It is Hard to Damn Debanking

2025-01-27T09:07:41-05:00January 27th, 2025|The Vault|

As we noted last week, one of the next executive orders flying off the resolute desk in the Oval Office is likely to demand an end to debanking.  In sharp contrast to the executive orders eviscerating DEI, the independent banking agencies need not follow a presidential debanking order. This affects their independent safety-and-soundness powers unlike personnel policy subject to the Executive Branch.  But, independent or not, the banking agencies are nothing if not politically aware and at least two of the three agencies are also now politically-aligned with the president.  It’s thus not a question of whether there will be anti-debanking standards, but rather what they do to banks trying to make a buck.

Wanting debanking doesn’t mean that getting debanking will be easy or inconsequential to the thousands of banks that never consciously debanked a dollar’s worth of deposits.  One of the thorniest debanking problems derives from the fact that banks and other financial companies quite properly make business decisions based on qualitative factors, not just the quantitative ones on which anti-debanking efforts relied.  Some of these qualitative factors are quite simply what makes some bankers better bankers than other bankers when it comes to decisions about whom to serve how based on expectations of future profitability. As history all too often proves, strategic insights are often at least as subjective as quantifiable.

Banks have also long chosen not to serve complex businesses that require costly underwriting and risk-management capacity unless they have the economies of scope and scale …

6 01, 2025

Karen Petrou: Oval Office Bluster at a Time of Fed Confusion

2025-01-06T09:08:37-05:00January 6th, 2025|The Vault|

There is no doubt after last year’s last-minute debacle that U.S. fiscal policy is in still tinier tatters.  But, unnoticed so far is the still greater danger of confused fiscal policy combined as it now is with feckless monetary policy.  An economy resting on fiscal- and monetary-policy disarray is an economy at grave risk that sure-and-certain volatility will break through fragile guardrails.  Strained financial systems could then quickly compound the inflationary pressures likely from Trump trade and fiscal policy along with an array of supply-chain and employment risks.  And these are just the slow-burning hazards.  What happens if the financial system is shocked?

Although there has long been much about Fed policymaking that strains credulity, global financial markets have looked to the Fed as to a star in the East.  After 2008, markets had so much faith in the Fed that it was rightly dubbed “the only game in town” in a highly-influential 2016 book.  Now, though, investors and traders are increasingly fearful that, while the game based on Fed actions is still being played with its usual ferocity, there’s no longer an umpire or safety net.

Like adolescents suddenly facing the fact that parents are far from infallible, markets have had a rude, hard awakening in 2024’s last quarter.  Much has been written in recent weeks about the Fed’s steadfast assertion that it’s “data-driven” even as its decisions veer wildly from easing to tightening and back again.  That a stalwart Democratic economist recently endorsed longstanding Republican calls for …

16 12, 2024

Karen Petrou: The Likely Banking-Agency Rewrite

2024-12-16T09:09:18-05:00December 16th, 2024|The Vault|

Will the Trump Administration and an agreeable Congress really make sense of U.S. bank regulation? I’m not sure that what they do will indeed make sense, but there’s so little sense in the current system that I’m confident they’ll have no qualms about vaunting the institutional barricades that have thwarted due-process reformers since a Senate Banking chair proposed to create a “Federal Banking Commission” in the early 1980s.  Little in the U.S. regulatory colossus is in as much need of creative disruption as banking; the tricky bit will be to ensure that tearing down the current framework doesn’t leave it in ruins.

One reason for decades of inaction is the federalist structure of U.S. bank regulation, which allows for choice among a federal, state, or hybrid (state member) charter.  Whatever is done to federal bank regulation and federal charters, there is no way Congress will even try to redesign the state-based option.  It might expand preemption, but that’s as far as even this group of radicals will go because Congress will not allow each Member’s state to lose much in the federal reform many of them otherwise want.

Congress will also tread softly on one political demand:  that from small banks for a regulator more likely to listen to their pleas.  Right now, that’s the FDIC, which owes its supervisory role over the decades to small banks despite numerous grievous FDIC mistakes along with the agency’s tunning inability to resolve banks bigger than a bread box.

New leadership may remove …

9 12, 2024

Karen Petrou: Do We Need the Financial Stability Oversight Council?

2024-12-09T09:17:27-05:00December 9th, 2024|The Vault|

On Friday, the Biden Administration’s FSOC proved yet again that it deserved Rohit Chopra’s dismissive description as a “book report club.”  As far as we can tell, all it has done for all of the last four years is issue some nice papers about digital assets and the payment system about which nothing was ever done and put forth dutiful annual reports along with two new systemic-designation standards with which it has since done absolutely nothing.  We’ll take our usual look at this year’s annual report, but it will be even less relevant than usual because FSOC is likely to do at least as little in Trump 2.0 as it did with its own recommendations during Trump 1.0.  Given this sorry record, should the Department of Government Efficiency eviscerate the Council?

Sure, why not if all FSOC plans to do is as meaningless as all is town over the past eight years.  Still, Congress wasn’t wrong when it created a Council designed to force communication across super-siloed regulators and to look hard at nonbanks outside their reach.  Indeed, as nonbanks increasingly dominate core intermediation and infrastructure functions, a forward-looking, effective FSOC would be a vital safeguard against market success derived principally from regulatory arbitrage.

Effective system-wide governance is not impossible.  Late last month, the Bank of England showed what can and should be done to address systemic risk.  Using the Bank’s authority to govern across the financial industry, it released a “System-Wide Exploratory Scenario” (SWES), essentially a financial-system wide stress …

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