The Vault – Federal Financial Analytics

25 09, 2023

Karen Petrou: How to Right the Raft of New Rules

William Cross2023-09-25T09:28:19-04:00September 25th, 2023|The Vault|

What struck me most about the HFSC hearing at which I testified last week was how lukewarm Democrats are to the new rules unless they feel compelled to defend the White House or core political objectives. When the partisan spotlight dimmed, more than a few Democrats said that the rules might have both small and even significant perverse consequences. Given that GOP-led repeal of the rules is impossible and court overturn is at best a lengthy process, hard work to get the rules more to the middle is essential. Even if large banks still think the rules are bad, they’ll be better and that’s all to the good.

What’s the how-to? In short, it’s a concerted campaign to fix the most problematic technical confusions in the massive body of new rules – these are manifest and manifold, focusing hard on obvious flaws and saving raging debates such as those over how big banks should be for another day. I think this approach is best not only because it avoids political landmines, but also because it works.

In the mid-2000s, a group of custody banks with which we worked laid out numerous unintended consequences in the Basel II approach to operational risk-based capital. By the time this landed in the final Basel III rules, it wasn’t great, but it was a lot, lot better in terms of actually capitalizing real risk at savings mounting to billions in what would have been unnecessary regulatory capital.

My testimony lays out a road-map of …

18 09, 2023

FedFin on: Large-IDI Resolution Plans

Arezou Rafikian2023-09-19T18:09:58-04:00September 18th, 2023|The Vault|

Although a pending FDIC/FRB proposal imposes a raft of new requirements for resolution plans from IDIs with over $100 billion in assets, the FDIC has also issued a freestanding proposal doing the same, also setting information-filing standards for IDIs below $100 billion but above $50 billion. Aspects of the resolution-plan filing standards for large covered IDIs (CIDIs) echo and in some cases allow reliance on aspects of the joint rule with the Fed, but the FDIC notes that this rule is, as required by the Dodd-Frank Act, focused on financial stability. Its own IDI resolution rules now and as proposed instead address how the FDIC is to meet its own statutory requirements (e.g., least-cost resolution). The NPR mandates many new planning or filing requirements to achieve its goals, most notably adding new severability standards that may require new inter-affiliate or -branch firewalls that reduce operating efficiencies and, when it comes to broker-dealer or other entities, lead to indirect resolution requirements not mandated by functional regulators.

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

11 09, 2023

Karen Petrou: The PCA Cure for Much That Ails New Banking Rules

Eliza Allen2023-09-11T09:40:05-04:00September 11th, 2023|The Vault|

It’s a cliché, but it’s also true that one can’t beat something with nothing, especially in Washington. This is an axiom well worth remembering when it comes to all of the new capital and resolution rules befalling the nation’s biggest banks. I don’t think they need to be beaten back in their entirety – much in the proposals fixes vital flaws. But the agencies have done a remarkably poor job conjuring the impact of each of these sweeping proposals, let alone their cumulative impact in the context of all the other rules and the grievous supervisory lapses that contributed to recent failures no matter all the rules that could well have sufficed if enforced. Thus, the most obvious problems with this new construct are opacity, complexity, and most importantly reasonable doubts that, even with all these sharpened arrows, supervisors will still fail to draw their bows and then fire early and often. All too much in the new rules is false science, as even a cursory read of the impact analyses makes painfully clear. Instead of setting standards on lofty, unproven models, safeguards should rely on an engineering axiom: use warning lights that force prompt and corrective action. Think of the ground warning in an airplane followed by urgent “pull-up” commands and then go to work on the banking dashboard with clear, enforceable rules and new PCA thresholds forcing supervisory action and accountability.

The need for new PCA triggers is even more urgent than I thought when I first outlined…

7 09, 2023

FedFin on: Living-Will Requirements

Arezou Rafikian2023-09-07T16:39:01-04:00September 7th, 2023|The Vault|

In conjunction with proposing a new long-term debt (LTD) requirement for categories II, III, and IV banks, the Fed and FDIC are pursuing other ways to enhance resolvability. Among these is new guidance for large domestic and foreign banking organizations that requires U.S. banking organizations and foreign banking organization (FBO) intermediate holding companies (IHCs) along with all their insured depositories when any is over $100 billion to file resolution plans. These are also redesigned to make the plans much closer in substance to those mandated for GSIBs.

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

6 09, 2023

FedFin on: Long-Term Debt Requirements

Arezou Rafikian2023-09-07T16:38:46-04:00September 6th, 2023|The Vault|

Building on an advance notice of proposed rulemaking, the banking agencies have issued several proposals to enhance the resolvability of large banking organizations not covered by stringent GSIB standards. Among these is a proposal mandating long-term debt (LTD) to increase regional-bank total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) and, the agencies believe, reduce resolution costs and/or increase the FDIC’s options, thus avoiding the systemic designation and costly resolutions that occurred for regional banks earlier this year. The LTD requirements for category II, III, and IV banking organizations do not go as far as those mandated for GSIBs, based instead exclusively on a “capital-refill” construct in which eligible LTD is issued in amounts the agencies believe sufficient to provide enough capital-equivalent funding to achieve the proposal’s expected results.

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

28 08, 2023

Karen Petrou: What Happens When a Bank’s Parent Goes Up in Smoke

Arezou Rafikian2023-08-28T12:31:01-04:00August 28th, 2023|The Vault|

I recently bemoaned the Fed’s failure before and after SVB’s collapse to demand source-of- strength backstops from the parent holding company. That these would have materially reduced the FDIC’s cost and thus that of the large banks picking up this tab is still more obvious by the fact that it took the Justice Department to bar big pay-outs to the parent company’s executives. Clearly, there’s still money to be made, just not for anyone else. However, the source-of-strength question takes on still more immediate importance in light of the highly worrisome case of Hawaii Electric. It owns American Savings Bank (ASB), a $9.6 billion insured depository. Some parent-company investors somehow think ASB will bail out the beleaguered Maui electric utility, redefining who is the source of strength. ASB can’t, but that doesn’t mean the insured depository is safe and sound. Without downstreamed parent-company cash in hand to protect it from the utility’s travails, the insured depository and thus the FDIC are sure to suffer.

Yet another formidable post on the Bank Reg Blog lays out the history of how it came to be that an public utility owns an insured depository. Barriers between banking and commerce that Congress didn’t close for BHCs in 1956 were shuttered in 1970 and 1987, leaving only industrial loan companies and unitary thrift holding companies (i.e., parent companies such as Hawaii Electric) as the only ones allowed to own insured depositories. Unitary thrifts were prospectively barred in 1999 and several large grandfathered ones did themselves …

22 08, 2023

FedFin on: GSIB Surcharge

Arezou Rafikian2023-08-23T10:19:58-04:00August 22nd, 2023|The Vault|

As anticipated in the wake of recent bank failures, the FRB has proposed a significant revision to the current rules calculating systemic-risk scores that lead to GSIB designation. These indicators are used not only for GSIB designation or a higher surcharge, but also for categorizing U.S. and foreign banks for other purposes and thus would also bring some banking organizations into categories subject to very strict prudential standards. The Board estimates that the overall impact of the changes to the surcharge and risk-scoring methodology are small and, regardless, warranted to enhance systemic resilience and consistency. It also estimates that the interaction of this new approach with certain liquidity and TLAC standards is generally minimal. However, the Fed has not assessed the relationship of scoring revisions to one way to calculate the GSIB charges, nor does the Board assess the cumulative impact of all of the changes proposed here in concert with its sweeping revisions to U.S. capital rules for all banking organizations with assets over $100 billion. It is also unclear how these changes in concert with all the others interact with the stress capital buffer applicable to large U.S.-domiciled banking organizations…

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

17 08, 2023

FedFin Assessment: What the Agencies Think the Rules Will do and Why Much of That is Wrong

Arezou Rafikian2023-08-23T10:13:25-04:00August 17th, 2023|The Vault|

FedFin Assessment: What the Agencies Think the Rules Will do and
Why Much of That is WrongWith this report, we conclude our assessment of the regulatory-capital proposal with analysis of what the sum total of the credit (see FSM Report CAPITAL231), operational (see FSM Report OPSRISK22), and market (see FSM Report CAPITAL233) rules could do in the real world of banks, nonbanks, foreign banks, and complex market interconnections. Our first assessment of the proposal’s framework (see FSM Report CAPITAL230) provided the agencies’ quantitative-impact statement (QIS). Here, we evaluate the QIS, expand on the agencies’ qualitative conclusions, and add our own assessment of what might actually happen in the face of these sometimes-contradictory capital incentives….

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

16 08, 2023

FedFin on: Market-Risk Capital Standards

Arezou Rafikian2023-08-17T10:02:39-04:00August 16th, 2023|The Vault|

In this analysis, we turn to one of the costliest aspects of the proposed rewrite of U.S. regulatory-capital standards: the market-risk framework. This aspect of the proposal would significantly rewrite current U.S. market-risk rules to reflect the “fundamental review of the trading book” (FRTB) regime the Basel Committee crafted in 2018. However, unlike the global rules, the U.S. approach would largely dispense with reliance on internal models in a manner generally consistent with the overall decision to eschew models; even where models are allowed for market risk, they are strictly constrained. These standards thus would raise current market risk-based capital (MRBC) requirements by as much as seventy percent, with much of this falling on category I and II banks no longer allowed to use their current, largely models-based methodologies….

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

14 08, 2023

Karen Petrou: Why The Operational-Risk Capital Rules Make No Sense

Eliza Allen2023-08-14T10:41:30-04:00August 14th, 2023|The Vault|

While there are many risks for which regulatory capital is a vital panacea, operational risk is not among them. The proposed approach to these capital standards makes it still more clear that regulators don’t trust themselves or banks and thus deploy the only tool they seem to know – ever-higher capital – no matter the cost and, more important, the risk. In fact, the best way to address operational risk is to spend money, not put it in a capital piggybank regulators can shake to hear coins rattle when they worry even though getting the coins out in a hurry will prove devilishly difficult.

The reason why regulatory capital doesn’t do diddly for operational-risk absorption is self-evident when one understands what constitutes operational risk. It’s essentially what God does to banks (natural disasters), what people do to banks (fraud), and what banks do to themselves (fragile systems) and to others (endangering consumers or markets at ultimate legal cost).

None of these risks is meaningfully reduced with more capital and, even if it were, the way the new rules work frustrates the way it might. As our in-depth analysis of the proposed operational risk-based capital (ORBC) rules makes clear, regulators want banks to look back as long as ten years to see how many operational losses they booked, measure business volume over the past three years, ramp up these sums via mysterious “scaling factors,” and then somehow discern what operational risk will be in coming years and how much shareholder …