FedFin on: Elimination of the Mortgage Payment Tax Deduction
The long list of budget options for reconciliation released by House Budget includes two with direct GSE impact as well as one – elimination of the mortgage-payment tax deduction – that would pack a major punch across the sector and is sure to be as vigorously opposed as usual. The list thus also includes a less painful and less deficit-beneficial reduction in the principal amount eligible for payment deductions from $750,000 to $500,000….
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Karen Petrou: Will There Also be a Financial Firestorm?
I live two short blocks from Rock Creek National Park, one of D.C.’s hidden wonders. As befits a national park, Rock Creek is very large and densely wooded, but no one has thought much about fire hazard until last summer’s drought led to some significant brush fires. I thus asked a forestry professor next to whom I happened to be seated waiting for a plane if those of us living near Rock Creek Park should worry. Instantly and unequivocally, his answer was emphatically, “Yes.” I’m still not sure what I or any of us now at risks we never contemplated can do, but I’m even less sure that what can clearly be done to reduce financial-system risk due to natural disasters will be done until after it’s too late.
Is risk really this frightening? A report last week from the Financial Stability Board lays out what it believes to be plausible, yet-severe scenarios demonstrating that the extent to which property insurers and reinsurers are able to absorb natural-disaster risk determines whether a disaster leads to systemic financial risk. In the U.S., this is a thin reed.
We know that the National Flood Insurance Program is woefully unable to address the scale of recent hurricanes and inundations. A treasury study last Friday shows that private insurance is in at least as much disarray. Homeowners in the highest climate-risk zip codes pay premiums about eighty percent higher than those in the lowest-risk codes and have far, far higher non-renewal rates. Fifteen of the nineteen largest California P&C insurers reduced or terminated California homeowners insurance as of 2023, with this number likely a good deal worse a year later when the January 2025 fires hit. Not so coincidentally, my home insurance costs went way up last summer.
The FSB’s severe scenario is thus […]
Karen Petrou: Bowman’s Most Important Regulatory Recommendation
Although bankers have long paid keen attention to FRB. Gov. Bowman’s regulatory thinking, public attention was sparse until last week. In the wake of Michael Barr’s resignation and speculation that Ms. Bowman might take his place as supervisory vice chair, her regulatory thinking finally got the widespread attention her monetary-policy views have long enjoyed. And a good thing too. In a speech last week, she not only reiterated comments about how best to redesign bank regulation and supervision, but also made another, unnoticed point: redesigning these key planks of financial stability need not be the blood sport they have sadly become.
Remarking on a striking change over the past year or so, Gov. Bowman rightly calls out the “adversarial” nature of recent banking-policy deliberations. This is doubtless in part because she is clearly still miffed that Mr. Barr did not engage in Board-wide collaboration, but adversarial combat extends to the Administration, Hill, and the interest groups that influence them. The press too also takes this tone, with the New York Times just last week touting new thinking about bank regulation as a big-bank triumph.
That big banks definitely wanted much of what they may now get is indisputable, but some of what they want also made sense. We know all too well that asymmetric regulation that pushes banks out of otherwise-profitable businesses gives unregulated nonbanks an unbeatable market edge that powers the migration of key intermediation functions and infrastructure beyond regulatory reach. This isn’t necessarily all that bad for big banks – as earnings since massive regulatory changes have made clear, they know how to find new ways to make more than a buck even if forced out of once-key businesses. Smaller banks without economies of scale and scope are far less fortunate, as often also are consumers and even […]
Karen Petrou: Oval Office Bluster at a Time of Fed Confusion
There is no doubt after last year’s last-minute debacle that U.S. fiscal policy is in still tinier tatters. But, unnoticed so far is the still greater danger of confused fiscal policy combined as it now is with feckless monetary policy. An economy resting on fiscal- and monetary-policy disarray is an economy at grave risk that sure-and-certain volatility will break through fragile guardrails. Strained financial systems could then quickly compound the inflationary pressures likely from Trump trade and fiscal policy along with an array of supply-chain and employment risks. And these are just the slow-burning hazards. What happens if the financial system is shocked?
Although there has long been much about Fed policymaking that strains credulity, global financial markets have looked to the Fed as to a star in the East. After 2008, markets had so much faith in the Fed that it was rightly dubbed “the only game in town” in a highly-influential 2016 book. Now, though, investors and traders are increasingly fearful that, while the game based on Fed actions is still being played with its usual ferocity, there’s no longer an umpire or safety net.
Like adolescents suddenly facing the fact that parents are far from infallible, markets have had a rude, hard awakening in 2024’s last quarter. Much has been written in recent weeks about the Fed’s steadfast assertion that it’s “data-driven” even as its decisions veer wildly from easing to tightening and back again. That a stalwart Democratic economist recently endorsed longstanding Republican calls for bright-line monetary-policy rules is just the latest evidence of desperation for predictability in the absence of certainty.
Despair derives only in part from the Fed’s wild policy swings. Underlying the meeting-to-meeting ups and downs is a knowledge chasm. The rates the Fed sets are supposed to ease or tighten policy in […]
FedFin on: A Half-Empty Privatization Glass
Markets are getting very excited by ongoing Trump transition rhetoric about GSE privatization and a Friday CBO study refining its 2020 scenarios to conclude that release-and-recapitalization could proceed more quickly and prove less costly than four years ago suggested. That said, CBO remains cautious about what would happen if recap/release actually began, standing by its earlier, conservative view of budgetary implications and systemic impact. One little-noticed conclusion of note for those favoring privatization for free-market reasons: if privatized GSEs can’t sustain GSE volume, CBO concludes (we think rightly) that …
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Karen Petrou: The Likely Banking-Agency Rewrite
Will the Trump Administration and an agreeable Congress really make sense of U.S. bank regulation? I’m not sure that what they do will indeed make sense, but there’s so little sense in the current system that I’m confident they’ll have no qualms about vaunting the institutional barricades that have thwarted due-process reformers since a Senate Banking chair proposed to create a “Federal Banking Commission” in the early 1980s. Little in the U.S. regulatory colossus is in as much need of creative disruption as banking; the tricky bit will be to ensure that tearing down the current framework doesn’t leave it in ruins.
One reason for decades of inaction is the federalist structure of U.S. bank regulation, which allows for choice among a federal, state, or hybrid (state member) charter. Whatever is done to federal bank regulation and federal charters, there is no way Congress will even try to redesign the state-based option. It might expand preemption, but that’s as far as even this group of radicals will go because Congress will not allow each Member’s state to lose much in the federal reform many of them otherwise want.
Congress will also tread softly on one political demand: that from small banks for a regulator more likely to listen to their pleas. Right now, that’s the FDIC, which owes its supervisory role over the decades to small banks despite numerous grievous FDIC mistakes along with the agency’s tunning inability to resolve banks bigger than a bread box.
New leadership may remove some of the curse now hovering over the FDIC, but I doubt it will save the agency as is. A likely alternative is two federal banking agencies governing rules and supervision for all banks and their holding companies under a threshold such as $50 billion, removing these banks from the OCC’s and Fed’s […]