#Fed

13 01, 2025

Karen Petrou: Bowman’s Most Important Regulatory Recommendation

2025-01-13T12:42:41-05:00January 13th, 2025|The Vault|

Although bankers have long paid keen attention to FRB. Gov. Bowman’s regulatory thinking, public attention was sparse until last week.  In the wake of Michael Barr’s resignation and speculation that Ms. Bowman might take his place as supervisory vice chair, her regulatory thinking finally got the widespread attention her monetary-policy views have long enjoyed.  And a good thing too.  In a speech last week, she not only reiterated comments about how best to redesign bank regulation and supervision, but also made another, unnoticed point:  redesigning these key planks of financial stability need not be the blood sport they have sadly become.

Remarking on a striking change over the past year or so, Gov. Bowman rightly calls out the “adversarial” nature of recent banking-policy deliberations.  This is doubtless in part because she is clearly still miffed that Mr. Barr did not engage in Board-wide collaboration, but adversarial combat extends to the Administration, Hill, and the interest groups that influence them.  The press too also takes this tone, with the New York Times just last week touting new thinking about bank regulation as a big-bank triumph.

That big banks definitely wanted much of what they may now get is indisputable, but some of what they want also made sense.  We know all too well that asymmetric regulation that pushes banks out of otherwise-profitable businesses gives unregulated nonbanks an unbeatable market edge that powers the migration of key intermediation functions and infrastructure beyond regulatory reach.  This isn’t necessarily all that bad for …

6 01, 2025

Karen Petrou: Oval Office Bluster at a Time of Fed Confusion

2025-01-06T09:08:37-05:00January 6th, 2025|The Vault|

There is no doubt after last year’s last-minute debacle that U.S. fiscal policy is in still tinier tatters.  But, unnoticed so far is the still greater danger of confused fiscal policy combined as it now is with feckless monetary policy.  An economy resting on fiscal- and monetary-policy disarray is an economy at grave risk that sure-and-certain volatility will break through fragile guardrails.  Strained financial systems could then quickly compound the inflationary pressures likely from Trump trade and fiscal policy along with an array of supply-chain and employment risks.  And these are just the slow-burning hazards.  What happens if the financial system is shocked?

Although there has long been much about Fed policymaking that strains credulity, global financial markets have looked to the Fed as to a star in the East.  After 2008, markets had so much faith in the Fed that it was rightly dubbed “the only game in town” in a highly-influential 2016 book.  Now, though, investors and traders are increasingly fearful that, while the game based on Fed actions is still being played with its usual ferocity, there’s no longer an umpire or safety net.

Like adolescents suddenly facing the fact that parents are far from infallible, markets have had a rude, hard awakening in 2024’s last quarter.  Much has been written in recent weeks about the Fed’s steadfast assertion that it’s “data-driven” even as its decisions veer wildly from easing to tightening and back again.  That a stalwart Democratic economist recently endorsed longstanding Republican calls for …

16 12, 2024

Karen Petrou: The Likely Banking-Agency Rewrite

2024-12-16T09:09:18-05:00December 16th, 2024|The Vault|

Will the Trump Administration and an agreeable Congress really make sense of U.S. bank regulation? I’m not sure that what they do will indeed make sense, but there’s so little sense in the current system that I’m confident they’ll have no qualms about vaunting the institutional barricades that have thwarted due-process reformers since a Senate Banking chair proposed to create a “Federal Banking Commission” in the early 1980s.  Little in the U.S. regulatory colossus is in as much need of creative disruption as banking; the tricky bit will be to ensure that tearing down the current framework doesn’t leave it in ruins.

One reason for decades of inaction is the federalist structure of U.S. bank regulation, which allows for choice among a federal, state, or hybrid (state member) charter.  Whatever is done to federal bank regulation and federal charters, there is no way Congress will even try to redesign the state-based option.  It might expand preemption, but that’s as far as even this group of radicals will go because Congress will not allow each Member’s state to lose much in the federal reform many of them otherwise want.

Congress will also tread softly on one political demand:  that from small banks for a regulator more likely to listen to their pleas.  Right now, that’s the FDIC, which owes its supervisory role over the decades to small banks despite numerous grievous FDIC mistakes along with the agency’s tunning inability to resolve banks bigger than a bread box.

New leadership may remove …

13 11, 2024

FedFin Assessment: The Fate of the Federal Reserve

2024-11-14T15:45:31-05:00November 13th, 2024|The Vault|

In a recent client brief, we provided our forecast of what might happen to Federal Reserve independence, process, powers, and personnel under either a Harris or Trump presidency.  This is of course no longer an either/or matter, with this report thus reviewing and, where needed, updating our initial assessment of what Mr. Trump could do to the central bank even where Chair Powell says he can’t.  Sherrod Brown’s defeat makes the Fed particularly vulnerable in the Senate, where Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) stands a strong chance of becoming the Banking Committee’s ranking Democrat.  She and incoming chair Tim Scott (R-SC) will agree on a lot about the Fed, especially if Sen. Rick Scott – a frequent Warren ally on the Fed front – becomes Majority Leader….

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

8 11, 2024

FedFin Assessment: Are Crypto’s Wins the Banks’ Losses?

2024-11-08T14:57:19-05:00November 8th, 2024|The Vault|

One of the more striking results of the election is the enormous win crypto firms got for their $135 million of Congressional-campaign spending: victories so far in every race it entered.  Much of this is due not just to crypto’s lure; instead, it reflects choices based not only on a candidate’s crypto sentiments, but also on the opponent’s vulnerability.  As a result, at least some of crypto’s luster could fade when Congress gets back to work.  However, Donald Trump campaigned on a pro-crypto platform, endorsing legislation such as the Lummis (R-WY) bill to create a “strategic reserve” for bitcoins…

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

3 10, 2024

FedFin on: FHLB Advance Availability

2024-10-03T14:41:22-04:00October 3rd, 2024|The Vault|

The FHFA has issued an advisory bulletin (AB) building on its 2023 over-arching plan for FHLB reform and bank-regulatory efforts to clarify and constrain FHLB lending to troubled IDIs which received considerable “lender-of-second-resort” FHLB funding during the 2023 crisis. FHFA says that this bulletin does nothing more than “memorialize” longstanding FHFA standards; in fact, it makes significant changes and is likely to require at least some Home Loan Banks to improve member-related credit-risk management by no longer solely counting on collateral and contacting an IDI’s primary regulator, the FDIC, or a Reserve Bank to confirm that ….

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

23 09, 2024

Karen Petrou: The New Bank-Regulatory Paradigm We Need

2024-09-23T11:58:35-04:00September 23rd, 2024|The Vault|

On Friday, we posted a client alert to a new Federal Reserve study that, to put it succinctly, overturns received wisdom about what makes banks fail.  It is a paradigm-busting analysis based on solid, validated, empirical evidence, not on the models notoriously replete with assumptions that suit a researcher’s fancy or whomever backs the work.  This study’s main finding is that, even before the advent of federal deposit insurance, bank failure is due to and reliably predicted by growing bank insolvency – not illiquidity – at otherwise-solvent banks and generally not even by runs at very weak banks.  Depositors and, worse, supervisors are demonstrably slow to catch on to emerging risk, with depositors understandably subject to information asymmetries and supervisors inexcusably distracted, confused, or even captive.  Policy should not be based on one study, but this one study warrants immediate attention backed as it is by many others and replete with damning data analyzed with a straightforward methodology using records going back to 1986.  Now would be a very good time to take heed – banking agencies in 2024 are building yet another regulatory edifice to compensate for yet another round of critical supervisory lapses.  This may well prove as doomed as its predecessors unless regulators stop blaming banks after failure for bad behavior well within supervisory sight and reach long before indisposition turned terminal.

Importantly, I am not saying that this study proves there is no need for capital or liquidity regulation just as our new merger-policy study does …

16 09, 2024

Karen Petrou: What’s Next for the Capital Rewrite

2024-09-16T11:24:36-04:00September 16th, 2024|The Vault|

Few, if any, regulatory agencies are omniscient.  More than a few think they are, but more often than not regulators who fail quickly to see the error of at least some of their ways are regulators who lose a lot more than they might otherwise have lost.  Which brings us to the capital proposal and what next befalls this troubled standard after Michael Barr’s belated recognition that something had to give.

In the near term, we’ll see action by the FRB, FDIC, and OCC to clear a revised proposal along with the Fed’s quantitative impact survey for another round of public comment.  I have to believe Fed Vice Chair Barr cleared the revisions he previewed last week with his allies at the OCC and FDIC and is confident that the Fed board will mostly agree with him up to the point of issuing a reproposal, if no further.  As a result, a reproposal Mr. Barr said will amount to about 450 pages will soon be upon us.

Is this the last word?  Having relearned humility the hard way, Mr. Barr promises it is not.  What else might have to change to get a final U.S. version of Basel’s end-game standards across the goal line?

I would guess a lot more than would have been the case had the Fed and other tough-rule advocates more quickly recognized policy and political reality.  One key, if seemingly-technical, point on which to give is the pesky “output floor.”  Basel imposed the output floor because …

19 08, 2024

Karen Petrou: What the Fed Must Do to Make Monetary Policy Work

2024-08-19T09:22:53-04:00August 19th, 2024|The Vault|

Later this week, monetary-policy disciples – at least those who agree with the Fed – will gather around the campfire atop Jackson Hole to ponder the question set before them:  whether monetary-policy transmission has been effective and, since it’s awesomely obvious it hasn’t, what might be done about that.  The plan is clearly to float trial balloons in the clear mountain air to see if the Fed’s thinking about the new plan slated for 2025 is any better than that which lay behind its disastrous 2019 monetary-policy rewrite.  Those allowed into these August precincts will have much of value to say this time around much as they sought to do the last time the Fed asked for all their views.  Odds are, though, that Jackson Hole will not consider three non-econometric phenomena that lie behind recent policy misfires:  economic inequality, NBFI migration, and the strong counter-cyclical impact of Fed supervisory policy.

Why do these matter so much?

First to economic inequality.  The last time the Fed rewrote its monetary-policy model, it deigned to consider economic inequality, but promptly dismissed any reasons to worry.  There were, though, lots of them.

The 2019 inequality exercise suffered from the same problem as most Fed models:  reliance on representative-agent, not heterogeneous data showing distributional disparities.  This approach thus reaffirmed blithe convictions that anything that keeps employment high and inflation in check is good for lower-wealth and -income households because it’s good for everyone else.  See my book for why that’s grievously wrong and recent …

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