moral hazard

6 10, 2025

Karen Petrou: Preserving the Public Good Along with Revising Deposit-Insurance Coverage

Shane Smith2025-10-06T09:27:42-04:00October 6th, 2025|The Vault|

Although HFSC’s hearing this week is cancelled due to the shut-down, there is no doubt that Congress will give careful consideration to proposals from mid-sized banks seeking a lot more deposit insurance for selected accounts. But this doesn’t mean Congress will also advance this proposal unchanged or unaccompanied. Last week’s letter from Chair Scott to Acting FDIC Chair Hill makes it clear that the Senate Banking Committee head is carefully and correctly thinking through not just which banks win or lose with FDIC-coverage changes, but also what these policies mean to the public good. In short, it’s a lot.

Sen. Scott focuses on three important questions about the second-order effects of coverage change: what might happen to depositor behavior, what rules might need to change to offset unintended consequences, and whether statutory change is needed to limit moral hazard. How FDIC coverage changes for whom drives answers to each of these questions, but several over-arching effects are clear.

First, limiting added FDIC coverage to banks based on certain asset-size thresholds ensures that banks without added protection will not roll over and cough up more insurance premiums. They’ll do what they can to avoid costs unaccompanied by benefit. The largest banks are thus likely to reduce higher-cost domestic deposits and replace them with FHLB advances, wholesale deposits, and global funding. If they substitute these for higher-cost retail and small-business deposits, as seems more than likely, then big banks are also likely to increase their reliance on short-term assets that accord with …

Karen Petrou: The Fed Has Given Itself Nothing But Bad Choices

Shane Smith2025-04-14T09:13:54-04:00April 14th, 2025|The Vault|

Much has been written of late about the pickle in which the Fed finds itself due to the President’s quixotic trade war. The Fed is indeed facing a dilemma setting monetary policy, but it confronts a Rubik’s Cube trying also to ensure financial stability. The reason: the more the Fed fights inflation, the less it can secure the financial system and the more it is forced to secure the financial system, the less able it will be to conduct monetary policy. This vise results from the Fed’s huge portfolio, yet another example of why the Fed should have reduced its portfolio as quickly as possible after both 2008 and 2020. Since it didn’t, it now has only bad choices if Treasury-market illiquidity turns toxic.

This negative feedback loop is the result not only of the Fed’s cumbersome trillions, but also of its unwillingness to make another hard decision: meaningful action to address identified systemic risks. Had the Fed heeded its own warnings going back to 2020, it might have done something to reduce Treasury-market dependence on high-risk, leveraged hedge funds. To be fair, the Fed cannot directly regulate hedge funds and the SEC lacks prudential authority, but both agencies had lots of ways to curtail systemic risk long before basis-trading hedge funds came to hold at least $1 trillion in assets.

So far, hedge-fund deleveraging is proceeding in a reasonably-ordered way, but risks such as these have a bad habit of cascading. Jamie Dimon already anticipates this, but he …

Karen Petrou: Why Regulators Will be Flat-Footed if Bad Now Turns Soon to Worse

Shane Smith2025-04-07T09:15:06-04:00April 7th, 2025|The Vault|

One of the comforts with which bank regulators will doubtless console themselves after last week’s market rout is that the largest U.S. banks have the capital not only to withstand this, but also the probable, profound consequences of the President’s punitive tariffs. However, because U.S. regulators mismeasure capital resilience, this confidence is misplaced. Using the economic-capital approach I recently endorsed shows that, while U.S. banks still are strong, they are not fortresses.

FedFin recently analyzed two new studies demonstrating that geopolitical risk is hard on bank solvency. To this, one of course can say that there’s no real-world need for exhaustive studies of dozens of countries over decades – common sense buttressed by history makes this all too clear. These hard lessons and the data that describe them do, though, make clear that it’s more than worth revisiting the United States after the Smoot-Hawley tariffs to get a sobering idea of the negative feedback loop between geopolitical risk, macroeconomic hazards, bank vulnerability, and – back to the beginning, geopolitical risk. Any talk of the 1930s is alarmist and also inapplicable in numerous respects, but it is the most pertinent example of geopolitical risk over the past century and thus demonstrates the need now to be very, very careful – not something this White House appears to be good at.

Economic-capital measures are a more robust platform to assess bank resilience than regulatory capital and are thus of particular pertinence at this dangerous moment. Regulatory-capital measurements are so complex and often …