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27 05, 2025

Karen Petrou: Making Liquidity Regulation Make Sense

2025-05-27T09:26:04-04:00May 27th, 2025|The Vault|

Although U.S. regulators remain determined to enact each rule as if it relates to no other, researchers have increasingly found that rules have cumulative and often conflicting purposes – see, for example, the sum total of bank rules which empowered nonbank financial intermediaries operating with impunity until they needed trillions in taxpayer backstops in 2020.   Following a seminal Federal Reserve Bank of New York paper on the cumulative consequences – none good – of considering capital and liquidity rules in isolation, a new BIS paper considers the internal contradictions of consequential liquidity regulation and central-bank backstops.  Now, if only bank regulators at home and abroad did the same.

The BIS paper looks at the push-pull evident in liquidity rules founded on expectations that banks should not use central-bank liquidity even though central banking is founded on the concept of providing liquidity to banks under stress.  As all too evident in the 2023 crisis, liquidity compliance cannot ensure banks stand firm in a run, even as the Fed’s discount window opened with all the alacrity of an centuries-old casement.  Solutions posed ever since have suggested stiffening the liquidity standards and ensuring discount-window operability, but each thread of this debate ignores the other.  The BIS paper happily proposes a framework in which the two pillars of bank resilience under liquidity stress are considered together to craft a sensible benign-scenario liquidity rule along with an effective, disciplined backstop that minimizes moral hazard.

The BIS paper rightly is to avoid so stringent a build-up …

24 02, 2025

Karen Petrou: How the White House Could Have Fun with the Fed

2025-02-24T09:11:47-05:00February 24th, 2025|The Vault|

President Trump has an awesome ability to keep even his closest allies perplexed by nonstop announcements that often break precedent, accepted norms, and even the law.  Just as opponents begin to rally against one initiative, the White House launches another, sending dissenters off in a different direction, leaving the actions they initially targeted unchanged or even forgotten. Still, several policy themes are coming through loud and clear through all these different actions that have far-reaching financial-market cumulative impact.  One is the sheer volatility all this chaos creates; another to which I turn here is the President’s sure and certain effort to make the Federal Reserve a tool of the executive branch, going beyond setting interest rates to turn it into America’s sovereign wealth fund.

As we noted, The President’s executive-order barrage includes one demanding a U.S. sovereign wealth fund (SWF).  The tricky bit here is not the lines that would quickly blur between public and private enterprise, an historic U.S. economic principle that won’t slow Mr. Trump down for a minute.  Instead, it’s where the money funding the SWF comes from given the lack of a nationalized commodities enterprise such as Norway’s and the Administration’s hell-bent campaign to reduce the federal deficit.  Solution?  The Fed.

U.S. law is seemingly an obstacle to deploying the Fed as an SWF since it allows the Fed to hold only direct obligations of the U.S. Treasury and its agencies as well as – a Fed sleight of hand in the 2008 crisis – Fannie …

9 12, 2024

Karen Petrou: Do We Need the Financial Stability Oversight Council?

2024-12-09T09:17:27-05:00December 9th, 2024|The Vault|

On Friday, the Biden Administration’s FSOC proved yet again that it deserved Rohit Chopra’s dismissive description as a “book report club.”  As far as we can tell, all it has done for all of the last four years is issue some nice papers about digital assets and the payment system about which nothing was ever done and put forth dutiful annual reports along with two new systemic-designation standards with which it has since done absolutely nothing.  We’ll take our usual look at this year’s annual report, but it will be even less relevant than usual because FSOC is likely to do at least as little in Trump 2.0 as it did with its own recommendations during Trump 1.0.  Given this sorry record, should the Department of Government Efficiency eviscerate the Council?

Sure, why not if all FSOC plans to do is as meaningless as all is town over the past eight years.  Still, Congress wasn’t wrong when it created a Council designed to force communication across super-siloed regulators and to look hard at nonbanks outside their reach.  Indeed, as nonbanks increasingly dominate core intermediation and infrastructure functions, a forward-looking, effective FSOC would be a vital safeguard against market success derived principally from regulatory arbitrage.

Effective system-wide governance is not impossible.  Late last month, the Bank of England showed what can and should be done to address systemic risk.  Using the Bank’s authority to govern across the financial industry, it released a “System-Wide Exploratory Scenario” (SWES), essentially a financial-system wide stress …

25 11, 2024

Karen Petrou: Why the World Needs a Financial Stability Board That Isn’t This Financial Stability Board

2024-11-25T09:04:12-05:00November 25th, 2024|The Vault|

Donald Trump often upends conventional neoliberal wisdom, but one of the seemingly most frightening things the President-Elect espouses is contempt for the global order embodied in bastions such as the Bretton Woods international financial institutions, NATO, the UN, and the World Trade and Health Organizations.  A less-known archetype of right global-order thinking is the Financial Stability Board.  It has so far been spared by Mr. Trump, likely only because it has yet to come to his attention.  Moving out ahead, two House Republicans vying for HFSC Chair are already insisting that each will, Samson-like, pull down the FSB’s banking, insurance, and securities pillars.  Will the global financial system crumble to the lowest common denominator as FSB advocates proclaim?  I doubt it.  Indeed, shaking global financial standard-setters out of their well-stocked echo chamber could actually do global finance a world of good.

Like all the other global-order monuments, the FSB was founded with the very best of intentions.  The 2008 crisis and warning tremors in the late 1990s proved at grave cost how financial earthquakes know no borders.  What better than a new body of global financial standards akin to those that keep cross-border telecommunications humming to protect global banking, insurance, securities, commodities, and payments?  And thus, the G20 brought forth the FSB in 2009.

The FSB promptly did the best it could as quickly as it could not only to ramp up subgroups such as a renewed Basel Committee, but also to tackle the absence of resolution protocols for the …

19 08, 2024

Karen Petrou: What the Fed Must Do to Make Monetary Policy Work

2024-08-19T09:22:53-04:00August 19th, 2024|The Vault|

Later this week, monetary-policy disciples – at least those who agree with the Fed – will gather around the campfire atop Jackson Hole to ponder the question set before them:  whether monetary-policy transmission has been effective and, since it’s awesomely obvious it hasn’t, what might be done about that.  The plan is clearly to float trial balloons in the clear mountain air to see if the Fed’s thinking about the new plan slated for 2025 is any better than that which lay behind its disastrous 2019 monetary-policy rewrite.  Those allowed into these August precincts will have much of value to say this time around much as they sought to do the last time the Fed asked for all their views.  Odds are, though, that Jackson Hole will not consider three non-econometric phenomena that lie behind recent policy misfires:  economic inequality, NBFI migration, and the strong counter-cyclical impact of Fed supervisory policy.

Why do these matter so much?

First to economic inequality.  The last time the Fed rewrote its monetary-policy model, it deigned to consider economic inequality, but promptly dismissed any reasons to worry.  There were, though, lots of them.

The 2019 inequality exercise suffered from the same problem as most Fed models:  reliance on representative-agent, not heterogeneous data showing distributional disparities.  This approach thus reaffirmed blithe convictions that anything that keeps employment high and inflation in check is good for lower-wealth and -income households because it’s good for everyone else.  See my book for why that’s grievously wrong and recent …

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