#NYCB

20 02, 2024

M022024

2024-02-20T09:14:36-05:00February 20th, 2024|6- Client Memo|

How the OCC Made a Bad Bank Both Bigger and Badder

As I noted last week, the OCC’s proposed bank-merger policy fails to reckon with the strong supervisory and regulatory powers federal banking agencies already have to quash problematic consolidations and concentrations.  Here, I turn to one reason why the OCC may not trust these rules:  it doesn’t trust itself.  A bit of recent history shows all too well why this self-doubt is warranted even though it’s also inexcusable.

m022024.pdf

20 02, 2024

Karen Petrou: How the OCC Made a Bad Bank Both Bigger and Badder

2024-02-20T09:01:31-05:00February 20th, 2024|The Vault|

As I noted last week, the OCC’s proposed bank-merger policy fails to reckon with the strong supervisory and regulatory powers federal banking agencies already have to quash problematic consolidations and concentrations.  Here, I turn to one reason why the OCC may not trust these rules:  it doesn’t trust itself.  A bit of recent history shows all too well why this self-doubt is warranted even though it’s also inexcusable.

I owe my historical recall to the authoritative Bank Reg Blog, which last week looked at the latest on NYCB.  This included a troubling reminder of the troubled bank’s merger with Flagstar before it thought it snapped up another great deal from the FDIC via acquiring what was left of Signature Bank.

NYCB first sought approval for the Flagstar acquisition in 2021 when its primary federal regulator was the FDIC.  As is often the case with merger applications, this one appeared to go into a dark hole.  Unlike many other acquisitions, the banking companies had a go-to Plan B: charter conversion.

NYCB went to the OCC and got rapid approval not just for converting its charter to a national bank, but also then for acquiring Flagstar via a reverse flip that also involved a Flagstar conversion to a national charter.  The OCC then readily approved the merger in 2022, just in time for some of the super-rapid growth via the Signature deal both the OCC and FDIC approved even though they should have been well aware that rapid-fire mergers almost always …

9 02, 2024

Al021224

2024-02-09T16:40:01-05:00February 9th, 2024|3- This Week|

Are We Wasting Your Time?

We most assuredly hope not, but watching Congress last week was deeply dispiriting not only when it comes to the most critical issues of the day, but also to essential financial-policy decisions.  Our in-depth reports on Tuesday’s HFSC hearing with Secretary Yellen (see Client Report FSOC30) and Thursday’s Senate follow-up (see Client Report FSOC31) laid out key topics discussed and what was said as we always do.  But what we said about what was said was largely inconsequential because almost nothing of real note was said.  The exception came on Thursday when the Secretary intimated that near-term action may begin to deal with the systemic risk FSOC fears from nonbank mortgage companies.  But even here she was elliptical and no senator made any effort to pin her down.  Instead, they – like their House counterparts and the secretary – reiterated partisan talking points about the economy, inflation, and the debt.  But, reading between the lines in our reports and our other analyses illuminates a remarkable number of likely, meaningful Congressional actions on issues of immediate financial policy import assuming NYCB doesn’t fail and absorb the little bandwidth Congress seems to have for financial policy.

Al021224.pdf

7 02, 2024

DAILY020724

2024-02-07T17:14:25-05:00February 7th, 2024|2- Daily Briefing|

Fed Study: 96 CRA Reforms Had No Impact on Bank LMI Lending, Subprime Crisis

As banks take on the new CRA rule in the courts (see FSM Report CRA32), a new Fed study suggests that prior CRA changes had no meaningful impact on LMI mortgage lending in assessment areas and did not cause the subprime crisis as a prior study asserted.

NYCB’s Prospects, Policy and Political Consequences

After the markets closed, NYCB was up a bit from its lows, but it remains to be seen if this is a “dead-cat bounce” or stabilization. Regardless, the company’s market capitalization is down 57 percent since it surprised markets with unexpectedly-bad results.

Daily020724.pdf

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