Karen Petrou: The GSEs’ Guarantee Gauntlet
The Wall Street Journal last week described Bill Pulte’s recent mortgage-fraud allegations as ill-advised “political lawfare.” Thus it is, but it’s also an unfortunate distraction from a high-priority decision within Mr. Pulte’s legal remit: ending the GSEs’ conservatorship. If FHFA and the Administration do not tread carefully, they will do a lot of damage not just to the mortgage market, but also to the President’s mid-term hopes and long-term legacy.
The GSEs matter this much not just because a liquid, affordable mortgage market matters so much. It’s also because the GSEs issue $7.7 trillion in debt obligations, or almost a third of Treasury’s $29 trillion. The type of federal backstop afforded to the GSEs or assumed by markets determines how much Fannie and Freddie must pay to attract investors. How much the agencies pay also affects how much Treasury must pay to do the same. Because Treasury obligations float the U.S. Government’s boat, the cost of agency debt matters even more.
As we noted in a FedFin report last week, the GSEs federal guarantee comes in four flavors: explicit, “effective,” implicit, and none to speak of. Privateers refer the last flavor, but markets will assume the GSEs still enjoy an implicit guarantee no matter what anyone says, so the real flavors on offer are only the first three.
Because the GSEs are in conservatorship, they now have what FHFA has long called the “effective” guarantee – i.e., they are almost as good as full-faith-and-credit USG obligations, but not quite that …