Eliza Allen, Author at Federal Financial Analytics

6 11, 2023

Karen Petrou: How Regulators Unwittingly Run Roughshod Over the Public Good

Eliza Allen2023-11-06T15:47:01-05:00November 6th, 2023|The Vault|

Friday’s American Banker included a Kyle Campbell article quoting me reiterating some points in my recent testimony about the need for cumulative-impact analyses of the raft of pending rules. This led others to suggest ulterior motives, arguing that calls for cumulative-impact analyses are fig-leaves dangling over efforts to gut the rules. While advocates do not often argue for analytical purity when obscurity suits them, the absence of analytical rigor is nonetheless an abrogation of the public good by public officials. Setting rules based on airy assertions that it will all come right in the end since there most likely won’t be financial crises or at least new financial crises like the old financial crises ensures that this regulatory round will have at least as much wreckage as those that came before.

The public good when it comes to financial policy is best measured by careful consideration of something wholly absent in all of the agencies’ thinking: economic equality. In its absence, the nation will suffer from still-worse political acrimony, an even worse public-health crisis, growing populations of Americans without fundamental financial security, and even higher odds for still more devastating financial crises. How do I know this? Look at American financial policy since at least 2000 and see what happened.

The Fed is particularly high-handed when it comes to public-good rationales not just for its rules, but also for its still more vital monetary-policy responsibilities. The Fed cloaks itself with the “dual” mandate of “maximum employment” and “price stability” even …

30 10, 2023

Karen Petrou: How to Prevent Open Banking From Turning Into the Wild West

Eliza Allen2023-11-13T15:44:38-05:00October 30th, 2023|The Vault|

There are so many rules coming from so many directions at U.S. financial institutions that spotting key strategic challenges or opportunities is harder than ever. That more and more of these rules are longer than 1,000 pages makes C-suite impact considerations still harder to highlight. In the midst of this morass, one proposal from the CFPB on consumer-data rights may be easy to overlook, but this seemingly-petite 299-page rule is at least as consequential as the thousands of capital and CRA pages getting all the not-so-love.

Why? Quite simply, consumer data are the currency of commerce in general and retail finance in particular. The stratospheric ascent of data-driven companies such as Amazon are indisputable proof that competitors who control data quickly control consumers, mobilizing ever more powerful network effects that then crush all but the most nuanced niche providers. The CFPB is right that banks no more deserve exclusive provenance over consumer data than tech-platform companies, but requiring banks to give these data away as the Bureau plans means the crown jewels of each retail franchise are now out on the shop counter for free.

Companies far better able to make astute use of these data than all but a few banks will quickly find ways to persuade consumers to give personal information to them unless the final data rights standard has considerably more consumer protection built in than the proposal. I know it sounds odd to say that a CFPB proposal is light on consumer protections, but so it …

23 10, 2023

Karen Petrou: Why the New CRA Rules Won’t Serve Communities Any Better Than the Old CRA Rules

Eliza Allen2023-10-23T12:03:22-04:00October 23rd, 2023|The Vault|

On Tuesday, the banking agencies will release the final version of their 679-page proposal to rewrite the Community Reinvestment Act. Regrettably, much of the proposal reflected the worst of false-science staff seeking complex new models defining subjective goals combined with certainty-loving compliance officers and lawyers who just want to be told the number they need to hit, not if the number makes any sense. Unsurprisingly, there were hundreds of comment letters in which banks generally said the agencies should ease up and community groups urged still more stringent standards. But the story doesn’t end with this unremarkable line-up– in just the last few months, two major bank trade associations and one often-virulently anti-bank advocacy group agreed on one crucial thing: anything close to what the agencies proposed won’t work.

There are of course sharp differences between what banks and public advocates want in a new CRA rule, but what unites them is the over-arching understanding that the new approach is a cumbersome exercise remote from the reality confronting both banks and borrowers in the least-served urban and rural communities. Banks complain – often with good reason as I showed in my book on economic inequality – that risk-based capital rules over-estimate the risk of lending to many community-focused borrowers. The new capital proposals would ameliorate some of this in their “enhanced” risk weightings, but these weightings actually don’t count for much of anything since the proposed “higher-of” standards applies current, higher weightings.

The agencies in fact acknowledge as much …

10 10, 2023

Karen Petrou: The Urgent Financial Reform the Fed and FDIC Hope we Forget

Eliza Allen2023-10-10T11:29:16-04:00October 10th, 2023|The Vault|

Even after the great financial crisis in 2008, the repo meltdown of 2019, a financial-market bailout of unprecedented proportions in 2020, and three bank failures so far this year, the FDIC and Fed are no closer than they were in 2007 to knowing what to do if a medium-size bank fails, a nonbank barrels down on the banking system, or critical financial-infrastructure flickers. Bond markets are back on the brink and geopolitical risk have become a still-greater concern. The agencies may think new capital and resolution rules are an iron dome allowing them to forego agency repair, but history – see the Gaza Strip – provides no comfort – as I hope we don’t have to learn again, fortifications aren’t enough in the absence of effective surveillance and rapid response.

The hard truth is the banking agencies after 2008 did what politicians and lawyers know best: they identified gaps in the law that the agencies self-defensively said barred them from preventing a crisis, asking for and then getting a new rulebook without also meaningfully addressing and then correcting their own structural weaknesses. And so it goes again. Thinking dominated by lawyers and politicians – for every successful public leader is a politician no matter his or her nominal independence – is writing lots and lots more rules. Some fix gaps found in the old law and rule, many pave over problems that could have been fixed under old law and rule, and some are as counter-productive as we’ve noted in …

29 09, 2023

Karen Petrou: How a Shut-Down Stokes Systemic Risk

Eliza Allen2023-09-29T11:41:22-04:00September 29th, 2023|The Vault|

Although there’s been some talk of what a government shut-down does to the SEC, there’s lots, lots more to worry about. Risks are out there, risks that should be taken very, very seriously by the Members of Congress who seem to think that more chaos stokes their political fortunes. Perhaps it does, but it could well do a lot of damage to their finances, not to mention those of all the voters who might well bear a reasonable grudge.

Where’s the systemic scary place? Or, better said, places? Some are right in front of us; others lurk in the closet waiting to pounce.

What worries me the most in the immediate future is the ability of bad actors to exploit what could be lightly- or even unguarded portals into critical financial market infrastructure. There are of course many, many bad actors out there with the sophistication and/or state sponsorship quickly to test and then attack critical points in the payment, settlement, and clearing systems and/or the grids on which they rely.

As I discussed on Tuesday, not all providers of critical financial market infrastructure are under the hopefully-eagle eyes of the federal banking agencies which, funded outside federal appropriations, will remain open. Some fall under the SEC or CFTC, agencies that will be hobbled, and some critical providers are wholly outside the regulatory perimeter. Even if their nodes of market access seem small, disruption has a bad habit of migrating at lightning speed. Even if power outages are …

11 09, 2023

Karen Petrou: The PCA Cure for Much That Ails New Banking Rules

Eliza Allen2023-09-11T09:40:05-04:00September 11th, 2023|The Vault|

It’s a cliché, but it’s also true that one can’t beat something with nothing, especially in Washington. This is an axiom well worth remembering when it comes to all of the new capital and resolution rules befalling the nation’s biggest banks. I don’t think they need to be beaten back in their entirety – much in the proposals fixes vital flaws. But the agencies have done a remarkably poor job conjuring the impact of each of these sweeping proposals, let alone their cumulative impact in the context of all the other rules and the grievous supervisory lapses that contributed to recent failures no matter all the rules that could well have sufficed if enforced. Thus, the most obvious problems with this new construct are opacity, complexity, and most importantly reasonable doubts that, even with all these sharpened arrows, supervisors will still fail to draw their bows and then fire early and often. All too much in the new rules is false science, as even a cursory read of the impact analyses makes painfully clear. Instead of setting standards on lofty, unproven models, safeguards should rely on an engineering axiom: use warning lights that force prompt and corrective action. Think of the ground warning in an airplane followed by urgent “pull-up” commands and then go to work on the banking dashboard with clear, enforceable rules and new PCA thresholds forcing supervisory action and accountability.

The need for new PCA triggers is even more urgent than I thought when I first outlined…

14 08, 2023

Karen Petrou: Why The Operational-Risk Capital Rules Make No Sense

Eliza Allen2023-08-14T10:41:30-04:00August 14th, 2023|The Vault|

While there are many risks for which regulatory capital is a vital panacea, operational risk is not among them. The proposed approach to these capital standards makes it still more clear that regulators don’t trust themselves or banks and thus deploy the only tool they seem to know – ever-higher capital – no matter the cost and, more important, the risk. In fact, the best way to address operational risk is to spend money, not put it in a capital piggybank regulators can shake to hear coins rattle when they worry even though getting the coins out in a hurry will prove devilishly difficult.

The reason why regulatory capital doesn’t do diddly for operational-risk absorption is self-evident when one understands what constitutes operational risk. It’s essentially what God does to banks (natural disasters), what people do to banks (fraud), and what banks do to themselves (fragile systems) and to others (endangering consumers or markets at ultimate legal cost).

None of these risks is meaningfully reduced with more capital and, even if it were, the way the new rules work frustrates the way it might. As our in-depth analysis of the proposed operational risk-based capital (ORBC) rules makes clear, regulators want banks to look back as long as ten years to see how many operational losses they booked, measure business volume over the past three years, ramp up these sums via mysterious “scaling factors,” and then somehow discern what operational risk will be in coming years and how much shareholder …

1 08, 2023

FedFin on: Capital Winners – GSEs – and Losers – MI

Eliza Allen2023-08-04T09:44:41-04:00August 1st, 2023|The Vault|

We’ve much more to do to determine the strategic and policy impact of the new credit-, market-, and operational-risk capital rules singly and collectively – a complex task given the 1,089-page rulemaking made harder by some extremely-arcane language that may either mask what the agencies mean or differ from what they meant to mean. Still, several conclusions about mortgage finance are clear: the rules would be less demanding than those at present for many mid-LTV loans, the GSEs’ risk weighting continue to give them a considerable advantage over bank originators and securitizes, and MI lost the limited luster the banking agencies were forced to concede in 2013.

The full report is available to subscription clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here.…

1 08, 2023

FedFin Analysis: U.S. Regulatory-Capital Rewrite: Framework

Eliza Allen2023-08-01T16:31:19-04:00August 1st, 2023|The Vault|

In this in-depth report, we begin our analysis of the 1089-page capital proposal released by the U.S. banking agencies not only to make U.S. standards more consistent with Basel’s 2017 “end-game” rules, but also to correct failings in the current capital framework the agencies believed were laid bare by recent bank failures. The new standards rewrite the 2019 “tailoring” rule with regard to application of the toughest capital standards, now covering all BHCs with assets over $100 billion along with their insured depository institutions (IDIs) regardless of size. For smaller BHCs, the most significant impact of the new approach requires recognition of accumulated other comprehensive income (AOCI) unrealized gains and losses related to available-for-sale (AFS) and held-to-maturity (HTM) securities; the agencies recognize this cost but believe the proposed three-year transition reduces any adverse impact.

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

31 07, 2023

Karen Petrou: Two Tenets of the Capital Proposal That Make No Sense No Matter How Much One Might Want to Love The Rest of It

Eliza Allen2023-07-31T10:40:41-04:00July 31st, 2023|The Vault|

In the wake of the 1,089-page capital proposal, debate is waging on well-trod battlegrounds such as whether the new approach will dry up credit and thus stifle growth. I’ve my own view on this, but my initial read of the proposal points to a still more fundamental issue: some of it makes absolutely no sense even if one agrees with the agencies’ goals. Here, I lay out two bedrock assumptions that contradict the rule’s express intent and will have adverse unintended consequences to boot. God knows what lurks in the details.

The first “say what” in the sweeping rules results from the new “higher-of” construct. Credit and operational -risk models are entirely gone and market-risk models are largely eviscerated. Instead, big banks must hold the higher of the old, “general” standardized approach (SA) or the new, “expanded” SA. Each of these requirements is set by the agencies – models mostly never allowed. Further, a new “output floor” – different from Basel’s approach to this model’s constraint – is also mandated as yet another safety net preventing anyone gaining any advantage from any possible regulatory-capital arbitrage.

Why then not just demand that big banks use a standardized weighting the agencies think suffices? Must banks be put through the burden of calculating two ratios when they have no ability to arbitrage requisite capital weights? Do the agencies not even trust themselves to set capital standards that are now sometimes higher, sometimes lower as God gives them to know probability of default …

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