#CAMELS – Page 2 – Federal Financial Analytics

19 05, 2023

DAILY051923

Eliza Allen2023-05-19T17:03:07-04:00May 19th, 2023|2- Daily Briefing|

Bowman Strengthens Stand Against New Rules, Possible Supervisory Overkill

In case anyone doubted her meaning last week, FRB Gov. Bowman today repeated her strong opposition to the regulatory rewrites spelled out in what at first seemed the Fed’s but is now apparently only Vice Chairman Barr’s report (see Client Report REFORM221). Ms. Bowman also reiterates her call for an independent study, continued tailoring, and improved supervision.

Bills To Reduce Regulatory Independence Advance

As anticipated at his last hearing, HFSC Financial Institutions Subcommittee Chairman Barr (R-KY) has now formally introduced three regulatory transparency bills. We will shortly provide clients with in-depth analyses of these bills, which we expect quickly to proceed to mark-up on largely party-line votes.

Warren Pounces On Reports Of Treasury-Bond Assessment Proposal

Sen. Warren (D-MA) yesterday sent a strongly-worded letter to FDIC Chairman Gruenberg demanding that the FDIC reject reported big bank plans to replenish the DIF with at-par Treasury bonds rather than the proposed special assessment (see FSM Report DEPOSITINSURANCE120).

BIS’s Carstens Dismisses Crypto, Calls For Tighter Non-bank Controls

In a wide-ranging speech today, BIS General Manager Agustín Carstens sharply criticized cryptocurrencies and called for greater regulation of the nonbank sector to avert a systemic financial crisis.

Daily051923.pdf…

15 05, 2023

M051523

Eliza Allen2023-05-15T11:52:42-04:00May 15th, 2023|6- Client Memo|

How An Ill-Designed Special Assessment Is Sure To Scramble The Structure Of Federal Deposit Insurance

As our forthcoming in-depth analysis will detail, the FDIC’s proposed special assessment raises a raft of policy problems not contemplated by the FDIC despite a steep price tag warranting careful thought at a time of financial instability and recessionary risk. The FedFin analysis will detail the proposal, what the FDIC thinks, and what the proposal might do to whom, but here’s my opinion: the FDIC’s decision to allocate blame for SVB and Signature’s failures to a select group of surviving larger banks is a politically-expedient violation of the principal of insurance and a terrible precedent for the future of federal deposit coverage.

M051523.pdf…

15 05, 2023

Karen Petrou: How An Ill-Designed Special Assessment Is Sure To Scramble The Structure Of Federal Deposit Insurance

Eliza Allen2023-05-15T11:52:36-04:00May 15th, 2023|The Vault|

As our forthcoming in-depth analysis will detail, the FDIC’s proposed special assessment raises a raft of policy problems not contemplated by the FDIC despite a steep price tag warranting careful thought at a time of financial instability and recessionary risk. The FedFin analysis will detail the proposal, what the FDIC thinks, and what the proposal might do to whom, but here’s my opinion: the FDIC’s decision to allocate blame for SVB and Signature’s failures to a select group of surviving larger banks is a politically-expedient violation of the principal of insurance and a terrible precedent for the future of federal deposit coverage.

First problem: the FDIC assigns blame to a large group of bigger banks even though its own analysis of the SVB and SBNY failures points to a different underlying reason for the systemic designation. In the proposal, the FDIC targets large holdings of uninsured deposits even though both its post-mortem and the Fed’s of the two systemic failures cites bad management as the most important cause of death. Both agencies do note the new risks posed by social-media runs that hastened the banks’ passing, but each also makes it clear that these new-age runs are an endemic challenge to bank resilience, not a risk unique to SVB and Signature or other banks with large amounts of uninsured deposits. The FDIC proposal contains no explanation of why uninsured-depositories are the systemic rescue’s fall guys even though these deposits aren’t the cause of the two bank failures and the risks …

3 04, 2023

REFORM219

Eliza Allen2023-04-03T11:07:12-04:00April 3rd, 2023|5- Client Report|

FedFin Forecast: Probable Changes to Bank Supervision, Regulation, Law

With Thursday’s White House announcement, we know that the Administration will do its best to support Fed and FDIC efforts to color recent events as a failure of Republican-led rulemaking, not also one of agency supervisory acumen, speed, and even competence. So far, key Democrats are instead pursuing a two-track strategy: complaining mightily about Trump-era rules but also joining with Republicans to cite an array of supervisory lapses they want quickly remediated by new standards, new rules, and – if need be – also by new law. Indeed, on Friday, Democrats made it clear that they want considerably more from the Administration than the fixes on which the agencies prefer to focus. Given how much is in motion and how much could advance, this report details FedFin’s forecast for near-term action in each of these arenas, focusing on matters with broad industry impact rather than specific SVB/Signature- enforcement issues. We thus provide forecast for immediate supervisory actions, those Congress will demand, new rules (tailoring and beyond), and the few legislative initiatives we believe have a reasonable chance of passage and Presidential approval.

REFORM219.pdf…

20 03, 2023

Karen Petrou: Three Fast, Urgent Fixes to U.S. Bank Supervision and One Major Change to End Bailouts

Eliza Allen2023-03-20T11:35:24-04:00March 20th, 2023|The Vault|

In the wake of recent bank failures, much has rightly been said about how supervisors failed to act even though warning claxons blared. Nothing that happened to Silvergate, SVB, or Signature is due to forces beyond supervisory control, but there are deep, structural weaknesses in how banks have long been supervised. How long? I went back to my 2001 Senate Banking testimony about what was then the largest-ever failure to find that many of the lessons that should have been learned never sunk in.

Given that this hearing was in 2001, a good deal of what I said about bank capital requirements was about Basel I and is thus long out of date. However, one key point isn’t: the capital triggers used to spark prompt corrective action (PCA) were and are an unduly-simplistic way to identify the need for rapid supervisory intervention.

Silvergate, SVB, and Signature were all “well” capitalized right up to the brink of collapse because each of the banks in its own way arbitraged the capital rules to enormous – and obvious – advantage. Nothing in law or rule bars bank supervisors from stepping in well before PCA ratios sink but nothing seems to stir supervisors to do so. 1991’s PCA requirements were an important advance at the time, but it was outdated only a decade later. Now, it’s a dangerous supervisory distraction.

What else noted in 2001 remains an urgent fix? Over two decades ago, I urged the FDIC to reinstate the high-growth early-warning system it …

20 03, 2023

M032023

Eliza Allen2023-03-20T11:35:13-04:00March 20th, 2023|6- Client Memo|

Three Fast, Urgent Fixes to U.S. Bank Supervision and One Major Change to End Bailouts

In the wake of recent bank failures, much has rightly been said about how supervisors failed to act even though warning claxons blared. Nothing that happened to Silvergate, SVB, or Signature is due to forces beyond supervisory control, but there are deep, structural weaknesses in how banks have long been supervised. How long? I went back to my 2001 Senate Banking testimony about what was then the largest-ever failure to find that many of the lessons that should have been learned never sunk in.

m032023.pdf…

18 11, 2022

DAILY111822

Eliza Allen2022-11-18T16:59:14-05:00November 18th, 2022|2- Daily Briefing|

GAO Study Hikes Pressure on SEC Process

Adding to the Chairman Gensler’s woes, the GAO today released a report finding that the SEC Division of Enforcement did not document its work reviewing staff procedure assessments, hindering future internal reviews. Republicans have been harshly critical of SEC procedures and processes, as well as of the Commission’s enforcement-focused approach to cryptoassets. The GAO’s finding adds fuel to a campaign sure to gain force next year, recommending as it does that the Division Director ensure that information is collected and reported in its memorandum as required by Dodd-Frank.

Fed Study Endorses Bank Supervision

A new Fed staff study uses their unique access to bank examination reports from banks with less than $10 billion in assets to evaluate the extent to which supervisory reports and associated CAMELS ratings predict bank outcomes. Looking at reports from 2004 through 2016 and thus capturing the great financial crisis, the study concludes that ratings for capital, assets, management, and earnings are effective even after controlling for factors including the ratings themselves. Ratings are also associated with bank improvement in areas censured in earlier supervisory reports. The analytical method is textual – i.e., based on a reading of supervisory reports then run through various models to determine impact.

Daily111822.pdf…