#CCP – Federal Financial Analytics

4 08, 2023

FedFin on: Credit-Risk Capital Rewrite

Arezou Rafikian2023-08-04T13:41:04-04:00August 4th, 2023|The Vault|

In this report, we proceed from our assessment of the proposed regulatory capital framework to an analysis of the rules governing credit risk. In addition to eliminating the advanced approach, the proposal imposes higher standards for some assets than under the old standardized approach (SA) via new “expanded” requirements. As detailed here, many expanded risk weightings are higher than current requirements either due to specific risk-weighted assessments (RWAs) or definitions and additional restrictions. This contributes to the added capital costs identified by the banking agencies in their impact assessment, suggesting that lower risk weightings in the expanded approach reflected the reduced risks described in the proposal for other assets and will ultimately have little bearing on regulatory-capital requirements and thus ….

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

26 04, 2023

FedFin on: Systemic-Risk Determinations

Arezou Rafikian2023-04-26T16:59:28-04:00April 26th, 2023|The Vault|

Rejecting the Trump Administration’s hands-off approach to designating systemically-important nonbank financial institutions or activities and practices, the Biden Administration’s FSOC has bifurcated this construct with one proposal on designating entities and another that lays out an analytical approach to identifying systemic risk that would then guide firm and activity designation as well as Council staff coordination with primary federal regulators leading to new rules, product or service prohibitions/restrictions, or firm-specific supervisory action. If the final framework is as comprehensive as this proposal and FSOC is as actively engaged as its plan requires, then U.S. systemic standards could extend far more widely than is now the case even if firm-specific nonbank designations are few and far between…

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

19 12, 2022

FedFin on: FSOC Targets Usual Suspects but Also Points to Big-BHC, Nonbank Mortgage Systemic Risk

Arezou Rafikian2023-01-03T15:56:33-05:00December 19th, 2022|The Vault|

As promised, this FedFin report provides an in-depth analysis of FSOC’s 2022 annual report, focusing on findings with near-term policy implications. As always, the report is lengthy and includes many observations and market details that provide insight into Treasury and member-agency-staff thought. Much in it reiterates concerns about short-term funding markets, CCPs, and….

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

10 05, 2022

FedFin: Fed is Cautiously Optimistic re U.S. Systemic Risk

Arezou Rafikian2023-02-21T15:48:57-05:00May 10th, 2022|The Vault|

In this report, we assess the new Federal Reserve financial-stability report. Secretary Yellen is also testifying now about systemic risk and sure to get questions on the Fed’s conclusions. We will shortly send you an in-depth report on this hearing, but key to the Fed’s report is a more cautious, but still sanguine outlook. For example, banks are found to be resilient and well-capitalized despite growing Fed concern about indirect risk channels such as asset-market volatility, sanctions-related disruptions to payment…

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

25 04, 2022

Karen Petrou: Why Prime Brokers are Prime Suspects

Arezou Rafikian2023-03-01T16:00:47-05:00April 25th, 2022|The Vault|

Although Ukraine and emerging-market distress were the most frequently discussed topics around last week’s Bank/Fund meetings, two other high-impact issues were also top of mind. One is the end of the international financial order as we’ve known it for decades; I’ll return to this shortly as well as in my forthcoming book. The other to which I now turn is more immediate: commodity-market stress and what regulators will do to avert it if they can. I have heard a lot about a number of options, but I fear that regulators will do what they always do when trouble lurks: double-down on banks under their thumb instead of flexing their muscles to govern nonbanks at the heart of the global financial infrastructure.

In the commodity markets, as in all but the most direct financial-intermediation functions, banks are increasingly risk enablers, not takers. This isn’t because banks are just too darn good; it’s because they are regulated and, after 2010, regulated to the point at which the capital costs of engaging directly in key businesses outweighed the profit potential in financial markets where nonbanks do not face the same costly constraints.

Going back to 2011, we’ve pointed out that asymmetric market regulation leads to rapid risk migration. In market after market, nonbanks have driven prices down to the point where they can still earn comfortable margins, pushing banks saddled by capital, conduct, and risk-management standards to bow out of a market except where legacy assets such as low-cost funding and …

28 03, 2022

Karen Petrou: Why the Fed Might Bail Out the Commodity Market

Eliza Allen2023-03-27T15:57:01-04:00March 28th, 2022|The Vault|

In the midst of chaos, volatility always makes matters worse and this is very much the case with the commodities sector. This has led to growing speculation that central banks will step in should unprecedented price swings show signs of systemic impact. As we noted, we don’t know a central banker that wants to bail out commodities. But none of them wanted to bail out anyone else either. If market stress turns systemic, then central banks will step in. Indeed, they may intervene even if stress seems manageable if they also believe that public welfare is at risk when core commodities go from pricey to prohibitive.

In the U.S., the Fed will resist calls to backstop commodities companies or traders for as long as it can by citing what it believes to be its limited mandate even as it argues that its anti-inflation policies will stabilize markets – just you wait. However, whatever the Fed is able to do about inflation will take time and whatever it does about its portfolio to address inflation will exacerbate commodity-market stress.

Three possible sources of extreme volatility are already on the horizon.

First, there’s the liquidity stress sparked by CCP margin demands. This was the culprit in the letter from energy traders to the European Central Bank and it’s at least as much of a factor in the U.S. The more commodity-market volatility, the higher clearinghouse initial and variation margin demands and the harder it is to post eligible assets already scarce …