#mortgage finance – Page 3 – Federal Financial Analytics

27 09, 2023

DAILY092723

Eliza Allen2023-09-27T16:36:21-04:00September 27th, 2023|2- Daily Briefing|

FinCEN Bows to BOI Pressure

Responding to bipartisan concerns, FinCEN today issued an NPR to extend the beneficial ownership information (BOI) report filing deadline from thirty to ninety days for companies created or registered in 2024.

Chopra Considering Refi, Point Rules

The CFPB today released its annual report on residential mortgage lending, finding that mortgage applications, originations, and affordability declined significantly in 2022 while costs, loan denials, HELOC originations, and the percentage of cash-out refinances all increased.

HFSC GOP Presses Gensler on Banking-Reg Cumulative Impact

During Chairman Gensler’s as-always contentious HFSC hearing today, Rep. Barr (R-KY) asked if the SEC is in consultation with the Federal Reserve regarding the combined CRE effects of recent SEC proposals and the Basel III endgame standards (see Client Report CAPITAL234).

Carstens Says Law Must Catch Up To CBDC

BIS General Manager Agustín Carstens today emphatically called for rapid development of clear CBDC legal frameworks based on defined rights and obligations for privacy, AML compliance, and user choice.

Daily092723.pdf…

14 09, 2023

CAPITAL235

Eliza Allen2023-09-14T14:23:57-04:00September 14th, 2023|5- Client Report|

GOP Blasts Basel End-Game Regs, Dems Seek a Few Changes

With HFSC Chairman McHenry (R-NC) leading the way, GOP Members of the panel’s Financial Institutions Subcommittee today blasted the banking agencies’ end-game proposal (see Client Report CAPITAL234). Republicans were unanimous in joining leadership’s attack on the proposal’s process and substance, pointing to what they called incomplete impact analyses, an inexplicably short comment period, and adverse macroeconomic and regional-bank implications. Democrats led by Ranking Member Waters (D-CA) were more restrained and in some cases supported the proposal, but concerns were also noted with specific provisions (e.g., re the treatment of certain mortgage and securitization assets) and the interface with the pending CRA final rule. We continue to expect the banking agencies to hold firm to the proposal in broad terms and make minimal, if any, changes to the comment deadline. However, pressure from Republicans and the industry could well force renewed and what many would consider improved impact analyses designed not only to allay political opposition, but also the courts if litigation challenges the final rule.

CAPITAL235.pdf…

8 08, 2023

FedFin on: Say It’s Simple

Arezou Rafikian2023-08-09T14:19:41-04:00August 8th, 2023|The Vault|

Our most recent analysis of the inter-agency capital proposal focuses on significant changes to the rules for securitization and credit-risk transfer positions. In short, super-traditional securitizations have an easier path to the secondary market, but GSEs still beat banks. Complex ABS face often-formidable obstacles, as does CRT given or taken by banks.

The full report is available to subscription clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here.…

8 08, 2023

GSE-080823

Eliza Allen2023-08-08T13:46:46-04:00August 8th, 2023|4- GSE Activity Report|

Say It’s Simple

Our most recent analysis of the inter-agency capital proposal focuses on significant changes to the rules for securitization and credit-risk transfer positions. In short, super-traditional securitizations have an easier path to the secondary market, but GSEs still beat banks. Complex ABS face often-formidable obstacles, as does CRT given or taken by banks.

GSE080823.pdf…

4 08, 2023

Al080723

Eliza Allen2023-08-04T16:31:21-04:00August 4th, 2023|3- This Week|

A Crushing Capital Burden

No, we’re not talking about the proposals – enormous, complex, and in some cases ill-drafted and confusing though they are. We’re talking about how much work it’s taking to go beyond the top-line analyses and section-by-section repeats we’re seeing in so many releases to give you in-depth, strategy, and market-focused analyses of what key parts of the rules say and how they’ll redefine banking as we and the financial system know it. There’s much not to love about the current construct, but the complexity of the new capital framework makes it stunningly difficult not just for us, but we fear also for the regulators, to know if the new framework will prove a Frankenstein. When we finish our read of all the proposals’ sections and that for GSIBs, we’ll release a final, bottom-line strategic conclusion. Until then, it’s critical to understand each key part of the rule and how it defines individual business lines and the markets that depend on them.

Al080723.pdf…

4 08, 2023

FedFin on: Credit-Risk Capital Rewrite

Arezou Rafikian2023-08-04T13:41:04-04:00August 4th, 2023|The Vault|

In this report, we proceed from our assessment of the proposed regulatory capital framework to an analysis of the rules governing credit risk. In addition to eliminating the advanced approach, the proposal imposes higher standards for some assets than under the old standardized approach (SA) via new “expanded” requirements. As detailed here, many expanded risk weightings are higher than current requirements either due to specific risk-weighted assessments (RWAs) or definitions and additional restrictions. This contributes to the added capital costs identified by the banking agencies in their impact assessment, suggesting that lower risk weightings in the expanded approach reflected the reduced risks described in the proposal for other assets and will ultimately have little bearing on regulatory-capital requirements and thus ….

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

4 08, 2023

CAPITAL231

Eliza Allen2023-08-04T13:40:43-04:00August 4th, 2023|1- Financial Services Management|

Credit-Risk Capital Rewrite

In this report, we proceed from our assessment of the proposed regulatory capital framework to an analysis of the rules governing credit risk. In addition to eliminating the advanced approach, the proposal imposes higher standards for some assets than under the old standardized approach (SA) via new “expanded” requirements. As detailed here, many expanded risk weightings are higher than current requirements either due to specific risk-weighted assessments (RWAs) or definitions and additional restrictions. This contributes to the added capital costs identified by the banking agencies in their impact assessment, suggesting that lower risk weightings in the expanded approach reflected the reduced risks described in the proposal for other assets and will ultimately have little bearing on regulatory-capital requirements and thus on the overall ability of banks to expand into lower-risk areas and compete more effectively with nonbanks and foreign banks. Big banks forced to abandon certain activities may expand others receiving capital discounts in the new rules, increasing their footprint in traditional banking in ways that may increase industry consolidation.

CAPITAL231.pdf…

31 07, 2023

M073123

Eliza Allen2023-07-31T10:40:52-04:00July 31st, 2023|6- Client Memo|

Two Tenets of the Capital Proposal That Make No Sense No Matter How Much One Might Want to Love The Rest of It

In the wake of the 1,089-page capital proposal, debate is waging on well-trod battlegrounds such as whether the new approach will dry up credit and thus stifle growth. I’ve my own view on this, but my initial read of the proposal points to a still more fundamental issue: some of it makes absolutely no sense even if one agrees with the agencies’ goals. Here, I lay out two bedrock assumptions that contradict the rule’s express intent and will have adverse unintended consequences to boot. God knows what lurks in the details.

M073123.pdf…

31 07, 2023

Karen Petrou: Two Tenets of the Capital Proposal That Make No Sense No Matter How Much One Might Want to Love The Rest of It

Eliza Allen2023-07-31T10:40:41-04:00July 31st, 2023|The Vault|

In the wake of the 1,089-page capital proposal, debate is waging on well-trod battlegrounds such as whether the new approach will dry up credit and thus stifle growth. I’ve my own view on this, but my initial read of the proposal points to a still more fundamental issue: some of it makes absolutely no sense even if one agrees with the agencies’ goals. Here, I lay out two bedrock assumptions that contradict the rule’s express intent and will have adverse unintended consequences to boot. God knows what lurks in the details.

The first “say what” in the sweeping rules results from the new “higher-of” construct. Credit and operational -risk models are entirely gone and market-risk models are largely eviscerated. Instead, big banks must hold the higher of the old, “general” standardized approach (SA) or the new, “expanded” SA. Each of these requirements is set by the agencies – models mostly never allowed. Further, a new “output floor” – different from Basel’s approach to this model’s constraint – is also mandated as yet another safety net preventing anyone gaining any advantage from any possible regulatory-capital arbitrage.

Why then not just demand that big banks use a standardized weighting the agencies think suffices? Must banks be put through the burden of calculating two ratios when they have no ability to arbitrage requisite capital weights? Do the agencies not even trust themselves to set capital standards that are now sometimes higher, sometimes lower as God gives them to know probability of default …

28 07, 2023

Al073123

Eliza Allen2023-07-28T17:05:25-04:00July 28th, 2023|3- This Week|

Few Surprises, Much Consternation

There is little in the new capital framework we did not forecast for new capital rules after the March bank failures (see Client Report REFORM219) and what we missed was later presaged in Vice Chair Barr’s recent speech (see Client Report CAPITAL228). However, as we’ve also said many times, many devils lurk in regulatory-capital details. We know the agencies’ capital-impact bottom line because the FDIC and Fed each outlined this at contentious meetings approving the proposal for public comment. We also know that Republicans really don’t like the rule even if they haven’t read it and that key decision-makers – most notably Chair Powell – are hedging their affirmative votes for releasing the proposal with careful caveats of what they want to see in a final rule. Thus, careful analytics are essential to effective assessments of winners and losers as a result of this complex package, especially if one looks – as FedFin will – at big-picture implications – i.e., those for the economy, financial system, and economic equality – as well as at sector- and institution-specific provisions not just in key asset classes based on specific risk weightings.

Al073123.pdf…