#CAMELS – Federal Financial Analytics

11 09, 2023

Karen Petrou: The PCA Cure for Much That Ails New Banking Rules

Eliza Allen2023-09-11T09:40:05-04:00September 11th, 2023|The Vault|

It’s a cliché, but it’s also true that one can’t beat something with nothing, especially in Washington. This is an axiom well worth remembering when it comes to all of the new capital and resolution rules befalling the nation’s biggest banks. I don’t think they need to be beaten back in their entirety – much in the proposals fixes vital flaws. But the agencies have done a remarkably poor job conjuring the impact of each of these sweeping proposals, let alone their cumulative impact in the context of all the other rules and the grievous supervisory lapses that contributed to recent failures no matter all the rules that could well have sufficed if enforced. Thus, the most obvious problems with this new construct are opacity, complexity, and most importantly reasonable doubts that, even with all these sharpened arrows, supervisors will still fail to draw their bows and then fire early and often. All too much in the new rules is false science, as even a cursory read of the impact analyses makes painfully clear. Instead of setting standards on lofty, unproven models, safeguards should rely on an engineering axiom: use warning lights that force prompt and corrective action. Think of the ground warning in an airplane followed by urgent “pull-up” commands and then go to work on the banking dashboard with clear, enforceable rules and new PCA thresholds forcing supervisory action and accountability.

The need for new PCA triggers is even more urgent than I thought when I first outlined…

30 05, 2023

FedFin on: Enforcement Policy

Arezou Rafikian2023-05-30T17:09:49-04:00May 30th, 2023|The Vault|

Following a speech earlier this year by the Acting Comptroller arguing that some banks are “too big to manage” and the furor caused by recent failures, the OCC has significantly revised its enforcement policy. The new framework requires examiners promptly to intervene if any of a bank’s CAMELS scores slips to 3 for unsatisfactory or if the bank is what CFPB Director Chopra would call a “repeat offender” of law, rule, or express supervisory actions or found deficient in practices necessary to ensuring safety and soundness.

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

15 05, 2023

Karen Petrou: How An Ill-Designed Special Assessment Is Sure To Scramble The Structure Of Federal Deposit Insurance

Eliza Allen2023-05-15T11:52:36-04:00May 15th, 2023|The Vault|

As our forthcoming in-depth analysis will detail, the FDIC’s proposed special assessment raises a raft of policy problems not contemplated by the FDIC despite a steep price tag warranting careful thought at a time of financial instability and recessionary risk. The FedFin analysis will detail the proposal, what the FDIC thinks, and what the proposal might do to whom, but here’s my opinion: the FDIC’s decision to allocate blame for SVB and Signature’s failures to a select group of surviving larger banks is a politically-expedient violation of the principal of insurance and a terrible precedent for the future of federal deposit coverage.

First problem: the FDIC assigns blame to a large group of bigger banks even though its own analysis of the SVB and SBNY failures points to a different underlying reason for the systemic designation. In the proposal, the FDIC targets large holdings of uninsured deposits even though both its post-mortem and the Fed’s of the two systemic failures cites bad management as the most important cause of death. Both agencies do note the new risks posed by social-media runs that hastened the banks’ passing, but each also makes it clear that these new-age runs are an endemic challenge to bank resilience, not a risk unique to SVB and Signature or other banks with large amounts of uninsured deposits. The FDIC proposal contains no explanation of why uninsured-depositories are the systemic rescue’s fall guys even though these deposits aren’t the cause of the two bank failures and the risks …

20 03, 2023

Karen Petrou: Three Fast, Urgent Fixes to U.S. Bank Supervision and One Major Change to End Bailouts

Eliza Allen2023-03-20T11:35:24-04:00March 20th, 2023|The Vault|

In the wake of recent bank failures, much has rightly been said about how supervisors failed to act even though warning claxons blared. Nothing that happened to Silvergate, SVB, or Signature is due to forces beyond supervisory control, but there are deep, structural weaknesses in how banks have long been supervised. How long? I went back to my 2001 Senate Banking testimony about what was then the largest-ever failure to find that many of the lessons that should have been learned never sunk in.

Given that this hearing was in 2001, a good deal of what I said about bank capital requirements was about Basel I and is thus long out of date. However, one key point isn’t: the capital triggers used to spark prompt corrective action (PCA) were and are an unduly-simplistic way to identify the need for rapid supervisory intervention.

Silvergate, SVB, and Signature were all “well” capitalized right up to the brink of collapse because each of the banks in its own way arbitraged the capital rules to enormous – and obvious – advantage. Nothing in law or rule bars bank supervisors from stepping in well before PCA ratios sink but nothing seems to stir supervisors to do so. 1991’s PCA requirements were an important advance at the time, but it was outdated only a decade later. Now, it’s a dangerous supervisory distraction.

What else noted in 2001 remains an urgent fix? Over two decades ago, I urged the FDIC to reinstate the high-growth early-warning system it …