#capital rules – Page 2 – Federal Financial Analytics

22 08, 2023

FedFin on: GSIB Surcharge

Arezou Rafikian2023-08-23T10:19:58-04:00August 22nd, 2023|The Vault|

As anticipated in the wake of recent bank failures, the FRB has proposed a significant revision to the current rules calculating systemic-risk scores that lead to GSIB designation. These indicators are used not only for GSIB designation or a higher surcharge, but also for categorizing U.S. and foreign banks for other purposes and thus would also bring some banking organizations into categories subject to very strict prudential standards. The Board estimates that the overall impact of the changes to the surcharge and risk-scoring methodology are small and, regardless, warranted to enhance systemic resilience and consistency. It also estimates that the interaction of this new approach with certain liquidity and TLAC standards is generally minimal. However, the Fed has not assessed the relationship of scoring revisions to one way to calculate the GSIB charges, nor does the Board assess the cumulative impact of all of the changes proposed here in concert with its sweeping revisions to U.S. capital rules for all banking organizations with assets over $100 billion. It is also unclear how these changes in concert with all the others interact with the stress capital buffer applicable to large U.S.-domiciled banking organizations…

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

22 08, 2023

GSIB22

Eliza Allen2023-08-22T10:19:26-04:00August 22nd, 2023|1- Financial Services Management|

GSIB Surcharge

As anticipated in the wake of recent bank failures, the FRB has proposed a significant revision to the current rules calculating systemic-risk scores that lead to GSIB designation. These indicators are used not only for GSIB designation or a higher surcharge, but also for categorizing U.S. and foreign banks for other purposes and thus would also bring some banking organizations into categories subject to very strict prudential standards. The Board estimates that the overall impact of the changes to the surcharge and risk-scoring methodology are small and, regardless, warranted to enhance systemic resilience and consistency. It also estimates that the interaction of this new approach with certain liquidity and TLAC standards is generally minimal. However, the Fed has not assessed the relationship of scoring revisions to one way to calculate the GSIB charges, nor does the Board assess the cumulative impact of all of the changes proposed here in concert with its sweeping revisions to U.S. capital rules for all banking organizations with assets over $100 billion. It is also unclear how these changes in concert with all the others interact with the stress capital buffer applicable to large U.S.-domiciled banking organizations. Despite the Fed’s conclusions, it seems likely that the total impact will be considerable in light of methodological problems in this proposal as well as those FedFin identified with the impact analysis for the capital rewrite.

GSIB22.pdf…

17 08, 2023

CAPITAL234

Eliza Allen2023-08-17T15:22:40-04:00August 17th, 2023|5- Client Report|

FedFin Assessment: What the Agencies Think the Rules Will do and Why Much of That is Wrong

With this report, we conclude our assessment of the regulatory-capital proposal with analysis of what the sum total of the credit (see FSM Report CAPITAL231), operational (see FSM Report OPSRISK22), and market (see FSM Report CAPITAL233) rules could do in the real world of banks, nonbanks, foreign banks, and complex market interconnections. Our first assessment of the proposal’s framework (see FSM Report CAPITAL230) provided the agencies’ quantitative-impact statement (QIS). Here, we evaluate the QIS, expand on the agencies’ qualitative conclusions, and add our own assessment of what might actually happen in the face of these sometimes-contradictory capital incentives.

CAPITAL234.pdf…

16 08, 2023

CAPITAL233

Max Camateros-Mann2023-08-16T14:21:09-04:00August 16th, 2023|1- Financial Services Management|

Market-Risk Capital Standards

In this analysis, we turn to one of the costliest aspects of the proposed rewrite of U.S. regulatory-capital standards: the market-risk framework. This aspect of the proposal would significantly rewrite current U.S. market-risk rules to reflect the “fundamental review of the trading book” (FRTB) regime the Basel Committee crafted in 2018. However, unlike the global rules, the U.S. approach would largely dispense with reliance on internal models in a manner generally consistent with the overall decision to eschew models; even where models are allowed for market risk, they are strictly constrained. These standards thus would raise current market risk-based capital (MRBC) requirements by as much as seventy percent, with much of this falling on category I and II banks no longer allowed to use their current, largely models-based methodologies. However, banks in category III and IV that do not have significant capital-markets activities would share at least some of this cost because the new approach proposed for equity holdings moves many positions now housed in the more generous banking book into the trading book covered by these market-risk standardized requirements.

CAPITAL232.pdf…

16 08, 2023

FedFin on: Market-Risk Capital Standards

Arezou Rafikian2023-08-17T10:02:39-04:00August 16th, 2023|The Vault|

In this analysis, we turn to one of the costliest aspects of the proposed rewrite of U.S. regulatory-capital standards: the market-risk framework. This aspect of the proposal would significantly rewrite current U.S. market-risk rules to reflect the “fundamental review of the trading book” (FRTB) regime the Basel Committee crafted in 2018. However, unlike the global rules, the U.S. approach would largely dispense with reliance on internal models in a manner generally consistent with the overall decision to eschew models; even where models are allowed for market risk, they are strictly constrained. These standards thus would raise current market risk-based capital (MRBC) requirements by as much as seventy percent, with much of this falling on category I and II banks no longer allowed to use their current, largely models-based methodologies….

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

14 08, 2023

GSE-081423

Max Camateros-Mann2023-08-14T16:17:02-04:00August 14th, 2023|4- GSE Activity Report|

Ax the Ops?

As Karen Petrou’s memo today suggests, there are many reasons the new operational-risk framework proposed in the capital rewrite will not only be costly for covered banks but also counterproductive for financial resilience. That said, the agencies are unlikely to rewrite it much unless the politics of the overall proposal takes the course many banks seek to the agencies’ detriment. In this report, we build on our in-depth analysis of the operational risk-based capital (ORBC) proposal to go in-depth on its significant implications for mortgage origination.

GSE-081423.pdf…

14 08, 2023

M081423

Eliza Allen2023-08-14T10:41:39-04:00August 14th, 2023|6- Client Memo|

Why The Operational-Risk Capital Rules Make No Sense

While there are many risks for which regulatory capital is a vital panacea, operational risk is not among them. The proposed approach to these capital standards makes it still more clear that regulators don’t trust themselves or banks and thus deploy the only tool they seem to know – ever-higher capital – no matter the cost and, more important, the risk. In fact, the best way to address operational risk is to spend money, not put it in a capital piggybank regulators can shake to hear coins rattle when they worry even though getting the coins out in a hurry will prove devilishly difficult.

M081423.pdf…

14 08, 2023

Karen Petrou: Why The Operational-Risk Capital Rules Make No Sense

Eliza Allen2023-08-14T10:41:30-04:00August 14th, 2023|The Vault|

While there are many risks for which regulatory capital is a vital panacea, operational risk is not among them. The proposed approach to these capital standards makes it still more clear that regulators don’t trust themselves or banks and thus deploy the only tool they seem to know – ever-higher capital – no matter the cost and, more important, the risk. In fact, the best way to address operational risk is to spend money, not put it in a capital piggybank regulators can shake to hear coins rattle when they worry even though getting the coins out in a hurry will prove devilishly difficult.

The reason why regulatory capital doesn’t do diddly for operational-risk absorption is self-evident when one understands what constitutes operational risk. It’s essentially what God does to banks (natural disasters), what people do to banks (fraud), and what banks do to themselves (fragile systems) and to others (endangering consumers or markets at ultimate legal cost).

None of these risks is meaningfully reduced with more capital and, even if it were, the way the new rules work frustrates the way it might. As our in-depth analysis of the proposed operational risk-based capital (ORBC) rules makes clear, regulators want banks to look back as long as ten years to see how many operational losses they booked, measure business volume over the past three years, ramp up these sums via mysterious “scaling factors,” and then somehow discern what operational risk will be in coming years and how much shareholder …

11 08, 2023

Al081423

Eliza Allen2023-08-11T16:27:33-04:00August 11th, 2023|3- This Week|

The Capital Construct Continued

Even as we stay on watch for new regional-bank resolution rules, and keep you posted on some high-impact events (see below), we’ve been plowing through hundreds of pages of regulatory-capital rewrites. Last week, we built on our in-depth analyses of the overall capital framework (see FSM Report CAPITAL230) and the new approach to credit risk (see FSM Report CAPITAL231) with several new in-depth assessments.

Al081423.pdf…

10 08, 2023

FedFin on: Operational Risk-Based Capital Standards

Arezou Rafikian2023-08-11T16:25:34-04:00August 10th, 2023|The Vault|

Noting that operational risk is present at all banks due to most activities, the U.S. regulatory-capital rewrite would end the current approach to operational risk-based capital (ORBC). This now subjects only categories I and II banks to ORBC and then only to the advanced measurement approach (AMA) premised on each bank’s internal models. Consistent with the overall decision to end internal-model reliance, this section of the proposal subjects categories I, II, III, and IV banks to a new operational-risk standardized approach (SA). This would result in very steep capital requirements based on a bank’s experience over the past ten years compared to various sources of revenue over the past three years, perhaps taking business-model changes over the course of the last three years into account if regulatory standards are met for doing so….

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…