#charter

20 10, 2025

Karen Petrou: Say Bye-Bye to the Banking/Commerce Barrier

Shane Smith2025-10-20T09:11:24-04:00October 20th, 2025|The Vault|

In his comments last week about stablecoins, FRB Gov. Barr worried aloud about cracks in the banking/commerce barrier. How quaint. This barrier has been crumbling for years, but two decisions last week knocked it down. The big issue these days isn’t keeping commercial firms out of banking – give it up, they’re in. Instead, the big question is whether this nation also wants relationship-focused, regulated banks insulated from conflicts of interest and buffered against market shocks. If it does, then traditional banks need new powers, fast.

The most impermeable barrier between banking and commerce was supposedly erected in the 1956 Bank Holding Company Act along with the narrow set of permissible BHC powers allowed in 1970. These laws sought to keep insurance and commercial firms from controlling insured depositories much as the Glass-Steagall Act did in 1933 when it came to securities firms. However, Sears Roebuck took advantage of gaping loopholes, opening a bank in the early 1980s. Congress did little but legitimize these charters, allowing a class of “nonbank banks” in 1987 and broadening bank/nonbank affiliation in 1999.

FDIC Acting Chair Hill has now made it clear that he will go even farther. Next time a bank fails, look for a private-equity company or other nonbank to pick up the pieces. Mr. Hill stated that the FDIC will now not only cotton to these acquisitions, but even facilitate them with “seller financing” and a pre-qualification program akin to one established in 2024 by the OCC.

Would these nonbank owners …

21 10, 2024

Karen Petrou: Competitiveness in a Cold, Cruel World

Eliza Allen2024-10-21T12:04:19-04:00October 21st, 2024|The Vault|

When I gave a talk last week about bank-merger policy, I was asked an important question: if I’m right about the franchise-value challenges facing most U.S. banks, then why is banking here doing so much better than in other advanced, market-oriented nations? The answer in part is that, in a pond full of ugly ducklings, a scrawny mallard with just a few more feathers looks a lot better. But, it’s more complicated than that. The reasons why make it clear that, if bank-merger policy remains implacably set against economies of scale and scope, then only a very few, very big birds and more than a few nonbirds will own the waters.

As in any comparative analysis, the first step to judging U.S. banks versus those in other nations is to define which banks are being compared. Most other nations have very few, very big banks often considered national-champion charters dedicated as much to supporting their sovereign governments as to placating shareholders. As our recent merger-policy paper details, national champions are insulated from market discipline because they are almost always expressly too big to fail. Credit Suisse was an exception to this rule, but only because it failed so fast and Switzerland was so unready for resolution that it could do nothing more than fold one national champion into another, UBS.

For all the talk of TBTF banks in the U.S. and the benefits the very biggest enjoy during flight-to-safety situations, none are yet a national champion, and a good thing …

18 03, 2024

Karen Petrou: The OCC Blesses a Buccaneer Bank

Shane Smith2024-03-18T09:03:04-04:00March 18th, 2024|The Vault|

In a column last week, Bloomberg’s Matt Levine rightly observed that only a bank can usually buy another bank. He thus went on to say that a SPAC named Porticoes ambitions to buy a bank are doomed because Porticoes isn’t a bank. Here, he’s wrong – Porticoes in fact was allowed last December to become a unique form of national bank licensed to engage in what is often, if unkindly, called vulture capitalism. This is another OCC charter of convenience atop its approvals leading to NYCB’s woes, and thus yet another contradiction between the agency’s stern warnings on risk when it pops up in existing charters versus its insouciance when it comes to new or novel applications.

According to the OCC’s charter approval, the Porticoes bank has no other purpose than serving as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Porticoes Capital LLC, a Delaware limited-liability company formed to be a proxy for a parent holding company. The parent holdco is “expected” to enter into binding commitments for the capital needed to back its wholly-owned bank plans to acquire a failed bank or even banks. This is essentially a buy-now, pay-later form of bank chartering, a policy even more striking because funding commitments for the holdco then to downstream – should they materialize – are more than likely to come from private-equity investors who may or may not exercise direct or indirect control.

Based on the OCC’s approval, it seems that Porticoes’s new charter can buy another bank without capital, pre-approval from …

1 02, 2023

FedFin on: State Member Bank Powers

Arezou Rafikian2023-02-01T16:54:12-05:00February 1st, 2023|The Vault|

In conjunction with rejecting an uninsured crypto bank’s application for Federal Reserve membership, the Federal Reserve issued a policy statement conforming state member bank powers only to those authorized for national banks even if the state member is an uninsured depository institution. While it is possible for state member banks to gain greater powers following Fed deliberations, the new approach sharply limits the ability of states to empower uninsured charters not only focused on cryptoasset activities, but….

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