Karen Petrou: Why Prime Brokers are Prime Suspects
Although Ukraine and emerging-market distress were the most frequently discussed topics around last week’s Bank/Fund meetings, two other high-impact issues were also top of mind. One is the end of the international financial order as we’ve known it for decades; I’ll return to this shortly as well as in my forthcoming book. The other to which I now turn is more immediate: commodity-market stress and what regulators will do to avert it if they can. I have heard a lot about a number of options, but I fear that regulators will do what they always do when trouble lurks: double-down on banks under their thumb instead of flexing their muscles to govern nonbanks at the heart of the global financial infrastructure.
In the commodity markets, as in all but the most direct financial-intermediation functions, banks are increasingly risk enablers, not takers. This isn’t because banks are just too darn good; it’s because they are regulated and, after 2010, regulated to the point at which the capital costs of engaging directly in key businesses outweighed the profit potential in financial markets where nonbanks do not face the same costly constraints.
Going back to 2011, we’ve pointed out that asymmetric market regulation leads to rapid risk migration. In market after market, nonbanks have driven prices down to the point where they can still earn comfortable margins, pushing banks saddled by capital, conduct, and risk-management standards to bow out of a market except where legacy assets such as low-cost funding and …