#FDIC – Page 3 – Federal Financial Analytics

25 07, 2023

FedFin Analysis: U.S. Merger Policy

Arezou Rafikian2023-07-25T17:18:51-04:00July 25th, 2023|The Vault|

Building on a request for comment, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have now proposed specific revisions to U.S. merger policy that significantly redirect the manner in which M&A transactions – even if only for minority positions – will be considered. Although this is only a draft statement, it tracks much of what President Biden laid out in his 2021 executive order on U.S. competition policy and actions since then by the DOJ and the FTC. As a result, the guidelines are more of a roadmap providing clarity than a new approach unless the final version differs substantively in any major way or future Administrations adopt a different policy. Near-term U.S. merger policy makes it considerably more difficult to finalize horizontal, vertical, and even minority holdings, a challenge likely to be particularly acute in U.S. financial services where government agencies believe there is …

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20 07, 2023

FedFin on: Senate Banking Kicks Deposit-Insurance Reform Down the Road

Arezou Rafikian2023-07-21T17:03:13-04:00July 20th, 2023|The Vault|

In the wake of today’s Senate Banking deposit-insurance reform hearing, it seems certain that there will be no legislation in the near term and most likely in this Congress to increase FDIC-insurance thresholds. Although the FDIC recommended a new approach to transaction accounts in its policy review following recent bank failures (see Client Report DEPOSITINSURANCE119), Senators on both sides of the aisle demurred. Chairman Brown (D-OH) made it clear that any change in FDIC-coverage limits is conditioned on final, tougher bank regulations, essentially telling banks that successfully opposing new rules means keeping FDIC coverage as is….

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

18 07, 2023

FedFin on: MMF Redemption Fees, Liquidity-Risk Mitigation

Arezou Rafikian2023-07-19T16:52:22-04:00July 18th, 2023|The Vault|

The SEC has significantly revised its proposed MMF-reform standards, eliminating a controversial swing-pricing approach to reduce first-mover advantage in favor of new redemption fees at institutional prime and tax-exempt funds. These and most other funds now also come under stiff new liquidity requirements, which may combine to impose new and costly disciplines that may enhance the relevant appeal of bank deposits without early-redemption risk. Changes in MMF liquidity requirements may also alter demand for commercial paper, municipal obligations, bank debt, and ….

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

10 07, 2023

Karen Petrou: The Bankruptcy of Bank-Merger Policy

Eliza Allen2023-07-10T14:18:07-04:00July 10th, 2023|The Vault|

On Wednesday, a Senate Banking subcommittee will consider bank-merger policy, surely providing a platform for its chair, Sen. Warren’s pronounced views opposing all but the smallest bank mergers and maybe not even those. Many other senators are not as adamant, but even pro-business Republicans – see J.D. Vance – think bank mergers beyond the itty-bitty are at best problematic. The politics of this debate is obvious; the substance not so much. As with many other questions, bank-merger policy is best set with a keen understanding of recent, objective research and what it actually says about concentration as it occurs outside the gaze of those fearful only of still bigger big banks.

That there is undue market power in a financialized economy that brings a raft of woes is all too clear. I thus hoped that Assistant Attorney General Kanter’s remarks last month would be a meaningful update of the Department of Justice’s anachronistic 1995 policy. It helped, but only a bit because Mr. Kanter focused principally on enforcement, leaving “broader” questions solely to the banking agencies.

They in turn have long promised a transparent merger policy, but it’s still deal-by-deal, case-by-case, crisis-by-crisis. More than a few mid-sized banks will wither away as deliberations continue because the sheer uncertainty and delays of most bank mergers undermine their economic value, particularly at a time of high interest rates, slow or no growth, tough new rules, and withering competition.

Recent antitrust research does not substantiate easy, blanket assertions about the benefits or …

3 07, 2023

Karen Petrou: The Unintended Consequence Of Capital Hikes Isn’t Less Credit, It’s More Risk

Eliza Allen2023-07-03T12:08:54-04:00July 3rd, 2023|The Vault|

As was evident throughout Chairman Powell’s most recent appearances before HFSC and Senate Banking, conflict between capital and credit availability characterizes what is to come of the “end-game” capital rules set for imminent release. The trade-off is said to be between safer banks and a sound economy, but this is far too simple. As we’ve seen over and over again as capital rules rise, credit availability stays the same or even increases. What changes is who makes the loans and what happens to borrowers and the broader macro framework, which in the past has been irrevocably altered. The real trade-off is thus between lending from banks and the stable financial intermediation this generally ensures and lending from nonbanks and the risks this raises not just to financial stability, but also to economic equality.

As post-2008 history makes clear, banks do not stop lending when capital requirements go up; they stop taking certain balance-sheet risks based on how the sum total of often-conflicting risk-based, leverage, and stress-test rules drives their numbers. That all these rules push and pull banks in often-different directions is at long last known to the Fed based on Vice Chair Barr’s call for a “holistic review”. Whether it plans to do anything about them and their adverse impact on the future of regulated financial intermediation remains to be seen. Until something is done, banks will look across the spectrum of capital rules, spot the highest requirement, and then figure out how best to remain profitable …

27 06, 2023

FedFin on: Failed-Bank Compensation, Resolution

Arezou Rafikian2023-06-27T16:13:11-04:00June 27th, 2023|The Vault|

The Senate Banking Committee has overwhelmingly approved bipartisan legislation to reform executive compensation following larger insured-depository institution (IDI) failures, with parent-company executive compensation also at risk in some circumstances. Unlike previous bipartisan claw-back legislation, this measure is targeted to incentive compensation, not salary, expressly exempts “white knights,” institution-affiliated persons and directors, and gives the FDIC discretion also to allow senior officers to retain affected compensation in certain other circumstances…

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.poor management practice.

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6 06, 2023

FedFin on: Compensation Clawbacks

Arezou Rafikian2023-06-06T16:43:15-04:00June 6th, 2023|The Vault|

Sen. Warren (D-MA) has introduced a revised version of legislation to ensure that both the FDIC and other federal banking agencies can demand that executives and others governing failed banks refund direct and indirect compensation to the federal government. As with Sen. Warren’s prior bill to do so, this bill is bipartisan, now also containing compromise language on several points from the prior bill to increase the odds of enactment. For example, the bill would apply only to those at failed banks with assets over $10 billion, making it more difficult to claw back compensation at smaller banks regardless of the level of compensation or nature of the actions of covered persons….

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

22 05, 2023

Karen Petrou: How to Ensure That Independent Study of Regulatory Mistakes Leads to Near-Term, Meaningful Redress and Reform

Eliza Allen2023-05-22T11:47:33-04:00May 22nd, 2023|The Vault|

Last week, a moderate Senate Democrat was joined by a Republican in yet another letter demanding an independent investigation of regulatory actions related to recent bank failures. But, as the absence of specifics in any of these letters makes clear, it’s a lot easier to call for independent inquiry than to lay out how to conduct one that might make a meaningful difference. Precedent is not encouraging – for example, Congress created a Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission after 2008, but it was an unqualified waste of time and money. Still, we urgently need an independent assessment of what went so wrong combined with another providing near-term, actionable reforms. Having served on one post-crisis national commission that did a bit of good, I recommend separating the forensic inquiry from the one focused on the future, guarding against conflicts without eliminating expertise, and assessing only a few clear questions suitable for practical answers that can be readily accomplished under current law.

The first decision point determines all the rest: whether the independent analysis is to be forensic – who dropped which heavy ball on whose toes – or focused on the future – what we learned and what to do about it. Many of the proposals for an independent commission, including the Congressional letter noted above, want their commission to do both, but none could do so well and asking for this is thus asking for trouble.

A good forensic analysis will reduce the moral hazard enjoyed by federal supervisors long exempt …

15 05, 2023

Karen Petrou: How An Ill-Designed Special Assessment Is Sure To Scramble The Structure Of Federal Deposit Insurance

Eliza Allen2023-05-15T11:52:36-04:00May 15th, 2023|The Vault|

As our forthcoming in-depth analysis will detail, the FDIC’s proposed special assessment raises a raft of policy problems not contemplated by the FDIC despite a steep price tag warranting careful thought at a time of financial instability and recessionary risk. The FedFin analysis will detail the proposal, what the FDIC thinks, and what the proposal might do to whom, but here’s my opinion: the FDIC’s decision to allocate blame for SVB and Signature’s failures to a select group of surviving larger banks is a politically-expedient violation of the principal of insurance and a terrible precedent for the future of federal deposit coverage.

First problem: the FDIC assigns blame to a large group of bigger banks even though its own analysis of the SVB and SBNY failures points to a different underlying reason for the systemic designation. In the proposal, the FDIC targets large holdings of uninsured deposits even though both its post-mortem and the Fed’s of the two systemic failures cites bad management as the most important cause of death. Both agencies do note the new risks posed by social-media runs that hastened the banks’ passing, but each also makes it clear that these new-age runs are an endemic challenge to bank resilience, not a risk unique to SVB and Signature or other banks with large amounts of uninsured deposits. The FDIC proposal contains no explanation of why uninsured-depositories are the systemic rescue’s fall guys even though these deposits aren’t the cause of the two bank failures and the risks …

2 05, 2023

FedFin Analysis: FDIC Presses Targeted Coverage; Open to Excess Coverage, Collateralization, MBRs

Arezou Rafikian2023-05-03T15:32:35-04:00May 2nd, 2023|The Vault|

In this report, we follow our initial assessment of the FDIC’s deposit-insurance reform report with an in-depth analysis of its recommendations and their prospects. Aspects of this report reiterate conclusions initially noted in the agency’s Friday report on Signature Bank’s failure (see Client Report REFORM222), noting in particular the sharp growth of uninsured deposits at larger banks and the growing risk of social-media runs. The new report also states that FedNow is likely to exacerbate run risk which increases if open banking advances.

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…