#FDIC

27 03, 2023

Karen Petrou: Another SVB Casualty:  U.S. Biomedical Research

2023-03-27T10:27:35-04:00March 27th, 2023|The Vault|

As seems always the case when fear has the banking system in its maw, myths have proliferated that are now also magnified and amplified by viral social media.  One such myth about Silicon Valley Bank has it that most of its depositors were high-wealth, high-tech folk whom the government should never bail out.  In fact, many depositors had no choice but to park all their funds at SVB, a more-then-dubious practice at the bank that almost brought biomedical research to its knees.  Had these depositors been forced to bear losses, treatments and cures for life-threatening and-changing diseases would have stalled, likely for years.  We need not only to prevent future researchers from being put at such risk by a single bank, but also to change the biomedical-funding model from one at the mercy of high-cost equity investors to a stable sector for which lower-cost debt is readily at hand for any researcher with demonstrable ability to repay.  Think what debt funding did for sustainable energy via green bonds and you’ll see what a like-kind model for “biobonds” could do to speed urgently-needed treatments and cures.

The link between SVB and biomedical research is not the stuff of moral-hazard myth, but rather a complex tale of a specialized institution serving a sector that came to hold unique sway over a vital public good:  lengthening life and easing suffering.  Providing banking services to venture capital (VC) is a high-risk business unless a financial institution devotes expensive intellectual capital to the sector and …

24 03, 2023

FedFin Analysis: Whom and What the FDIC and Fed Can Save How

2023-03-24T17:05:38-04:00March 24th, 2023|The Vault|

Recent editorials and other media have often said that the FRB and/or FDIC have powers or taken actions that is not the factual case as we understand it.  Members of Congress also appear sometimes willing to make assertions about what agencies can do now even if it is unclear if there is statutory authority to do so.  We have provided individual clients with key clarifications, but do so now more generally to support strategic and advocacy decision-making.  Of particular importance is the authority the FDIC is said to have or lack related to uninsured deposits; as detailed below, the agency actually has significant authority to do so as well as even to back BHC debt, as long as certain stringent conditions are met.  As detailed in FSM Report RESCUE65, Congress limited both the FDIC and Fed in hopes that….

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

20 03, 2023

FedFin Analysis: Possible Cures for a Viral Run

2023-03-20T16:12:34-04:00March 20th, 2023|The Vault|

Among the most vexing issues in the wake of SVB’s failure is the extent to which social media may have led to the first “viral run,” a run akin to the meme-stock volatility that lead the SEC and others to fear a new form of “flash-crash” risk.  In this report, we assess current policy options related to deposit runs resulting from social media, an issue cited frequently by HFSC Chairman McHenry (R-NC) as a top priority as he begins work on post-SVB financial standards.  We note some remedies – e.g., a ban on deposit-related communication were they permissible under various constitutional and statutory free-speech edicts.

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

20 03, 2023

FedFin on: The Collateral Damage of the Banking Crisis

2023-03-20T14:30:07-04:00March 20th, 2023|The Vault|

In this report, we build on FedFin’s in-depth reports about recent bank failures to detail new risks for all of the innocent bystanders in the U.S. mortgage market along with a not so-innocent bystander:  the Federal Home Loan Banks.  We note also some take-aways FHFA may draw from the crisis with regard to GSE regulation, resolution, and supervision.  In short, things will be different assuming they don’t get worse and then still more of a paradigm shift.

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

20 03, 2023

Karen Petrou: Three Fast, Urgent Fixes to U.S. Bank Supervision and One Major Change to End Bailouts

2023-03-20T11:35:24-04:00March 20th, 2023|The Vault|

In the wake of recent bank failures, much has rightly been said about how supervisors failed to act even though warning claxons blared.  Nothing that happened to Silvergate, SVB, or Signature is due to forces beyond supervisory control, but there are deep, structural weaknesses in how banks have long been supervised.  How long?  I went back to my 2001 Senate Banking testimony about what was then the largest-ever failure to find that many of the lessons that should have been learned never sunk in.

Given that this hearing was in 2001, a good deal of what I said about bank capital requirements was about Basel I and is thus long out of date.  However, one key point isn’t:  the capital triggers used to spark prompt corrective action (PCA) were and are an unduly-simplistic way to identify the need for rapid supervisory intervention.

Silvergate, SVB, and Signature were all “well” capitalized right up to the brink of collapse because each of the banks in its own way arbitraged the capital rules to enormous – and obvious – advantage.  Nothing in law or rule bars bank supervisors from stepping in well before PCA ratios sink but nothing seems to stir supervisors to do so.  1991’s PCA requirements were an important advance at the time, but it was outdated only a decade later.  Now, it’s a dangerous supervisory distraction.

What else noted in 2001 remains an urgent fix?  Over two decades ago, I urged the FDIC to reinstate the high-growth early-warning system it …

17 03, 2023

FedFin Assessment: Future of U.S. Bank Capital, Liquidity, Structural Regulation

2023-03-17T16:50:38-04:00March 17th, 2023|The Vault|

In this report, we continue our policy postmortem of SVB/SBNY and, now, so much more.  Prior reports have assessed the overall political context (see Client Report RESOLVE49) and likely changes to FDIC insurance (see Client Report DEPOSITINSURANCE118), with a forthcoming Petrou op-ed in Barron’s focusing on specific ways to reform federal deposit insurance to protect only the innocent.  In this report, we look at some key regulatory changes likely as the banking agencies reevaluate the regional-bank capital, liquidity, and the IDI/BHC construct.  As noted in our initial assessment and thereafter, we do not expect meaningful legislative action on the Warren, et. al. bill to repeal “tailoring” requirements, but we do expect bipartisan political pressure not just for supervisory accountability (see another forthcoming report), but also regulatory revisions.

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

15 03, 2023

FedFin Assessment: Post-SVB Deposit Insurance Reform

2023-03-15T16:58:47-04:00March 15th, 2023|The Vault|

Cementing prior denouncements of 2018 Dodd-Frank “rollbacks” into legislative action, 17 Democratic senators and 31 House Members today took direct aim at Trump-era banking policy by introducing legislation that would repeal Title IV of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act.  But, while this initiative is gaining considerable attention, its legislative prospects are dim – indeed, even Senate Banking Committee Chairman Brown (D-OH) suggested as much

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.

 …

13 03, 2023

FedFin First Take: Failure Fall-out

2023-03-15T16:50:33-04:00March 13th, 2023|The Vault|

As we noted last night, the President concurred with Treasury, the Fed, and FDIC in deciding that SVB’s Friday failure and imminent runs on Signature Bank and, most likely, others posed a systemic risk.  This determination permits the FDIC to override all the efforts to end the moral hazard feared when uninsured depositors are fully protected in bank resolutions and came with a new Fed facility making it still easier for banks to obtain liquidity from the Federal Reserve.  As we also observed, much effort is being made to assert that none of these backstops is a bailout, a conclusion sure to draw considerable discussion and dissent even from those who concur that the scale of potential run risk Monday morning could not otherwise have been averted.  With this risk hopefully now resolved, much policy and political debate will begin about the Administration’s decision; why Silicon Valley Bank was so vulnerable;…

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

1 02, 2023

FedFin on: State Member Bank Powers

2023-02-01T16:54:12-05:00February 1st, 2023|The Vault|

In conjunction with rejecting an uninsured crypto bank’s application for Federal Reserve membership, the Federal Reserve issued a policy statement conforming state member bank powers only to those authorized for national banks even if the state member is an uninsured depository institution. While it is possible for state member banks to gain greater powers following Fed deliberations, the new approach sharply limits the ability of states to empower uninsured charters not only focused on cryptoasset activities, but….

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

12 01, 2023

FedFin on: Financial-Policy Consequences of Silvergate’s Travails

2023-01-12T11:04:34-05:00January 12th, 2023|The Vault|

Karen Petrou’s memo earlier this week and her comments to the American Banker about Silvergate have sparked many client questions.  In this report, we provide additional context for aspects of this bank’s condition with policy consequences.   High-profile cases such as this have a long history of suddenly shifting long-pending policies; depending on outcomes, this bank’s challenges and those of any other crypto-heavy banks will almost surely do so.  In general, the case already confirms U.S. regulators of the wisdom of additional capital for crypto-exposed banks along the lines recently finalized by global regulators (see FSM Report CRYPTO37).  However, it also raises significant questions about the role of the Federal Home Loan Banks, brokered deposits, resolution policy, and AOCI recognition – and these are just for starters as the bank struggles to stay afloat.

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

Go to Top