#Fed – Page 5 – Federal Financial Analytics

22 08, 2023

FedFin on: GSIB Surcharge

Arezou Rafikian2023-08-23T10:19:58-04:00August 22nd, 2023|The Vault|

As anticipated in the wake of recent bank failures, the FRB has proposed a significant revision to the current rules calculating systemic-risk scores that lead to GSIB designation. These indicators are used not only for GSIB designation or a higher surcharge, but also for categorizing U.S. and foreign banks for other purposes and thus would also bring some banking organizations into categories subject to very strict prudential standards. The Board estimates that the overall impact of the changes to the surcharge and risk-scoring methodology are small and, regardless, warranted to enhance systemic resilience and consistency. It also estimates that the interaction of this new approach with certain liquidity and TLAC standards is generally minimal. However, the Fed has not assessed the relationship of scoring revisions to one way to calculate the GSIB charges, nor does the Board assess the cumulative impact of all of the changes proposed here in concert with its sweeping revisions to U.S. capital rules for all banking organizations with assets over $100 billion. It is also unclear how these changes in concert with all the others interact with the stress capital buffer applicable to large U.S.-domiciled banking organizations…

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

25 07, 2023

FedFin Analysis: U.S. Merger Policy

Arezou Rafikian2023-07-25T17:18:51-04:00July 25th, 2023|The Vault|

Building on a request for comment, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have now proposed specific revisions to U.S. merger policy that significantly redirect the manner in which M&A transactions – even if only for minority positions – will be considered. Although this is only a draft statement, it tracks much of what President Biden laid out in his 2021 executive order on U.S. competition policy and actions since then by the DOJ and the FTC. As a result, the guidelines are more of a roadmap providing clarity than a new approach unless the final version differs substantively in any major way or future Administrations adopt a different policy. Near-term U.S. merger policy makes it considerably more difficult to finalize horizontal, vertical, and even minority holdings, a challenge likely to be particularly acute in U.S. financial services where government agencies believe there is …

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

24 07, 2023

Karen Petrou: Three Critical FedNow Questions: FedWhy? FedWhen? FedBetter?

Arezou Rafikian2023-07-24T09:28:43-04:00July 24th, 2023|The Vault|

FedNow went live – or at least got out of bed – on Thursday. This is about ten years after the Board first acknowledged that faster payments would be better payments. Maybe late is better than never given the importance of instant payments, but FedNow’s anti-climactic launch raises three fundamental questions: FedWhy? FedWhen? And, FedBetter?

Let me turn first to FedWhy. The U.S. central bank thinks one of its fundamental civic obligations is controlling the payment system, a conclusion reached more as a result of envy – every other big central bank gets to play with its payment system – than by the private sector’s failure to ensure safe, sound, and speedy payments. Congress knew this in 1980 and the Fed’s payment authority is thus conditional, not that you would know this by looking at the Fed’s various payment offerings and most especially FedNow.

Congress hesitantly allowed the Fed to offer payment services largely because the Fed asked for payment powers. Statutory approval was grudging, demanding that the Fed provide payment services only after meeting certain conditions, including calculating a “private-sector adjustment factor” or PSAF to ensure that the central bank didn’t crowd out private payment systems.

However, every calculation of every PSAF ever since 1980 has been a masterful sleight-of-hand that allows the central bank to dominate payments. Nothing about FedNow – whose costs have largely been a closely-guarded secret – suggests its PSAF is anything other than another rationale for the Fed to control payments.

That might …

18 07, 2023

FedFin on: MMF Redemption Fees, Liquidity-Risk Mitigation

Arezou Rafikian2023-07-19T16:52:22-04:00July 18th, 2023|The Vault|

The SEC has significantly revised its proposed MMF-reform standards, eliminating a controversial swing-pricing approach to reduce first-mover advantage in favor of new redemption fees at institutional prime and tax-exempt funds. These and most other funds now also come under stiff new liquidity requirements, which may combine to impose new and costly disciplines that may enhance the relevant appeal of bank deposits without early-redemption risk. Changes in MMF liquidity requirements may also alter demand for commercial paper, municipal obligations, bank debt, and ….

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

10 07, 2023

Karen Petrou: The Bankruptcy of Bank-Merger Policy

Eliza Allen2023-07-10T14:18:07-04:00July 10th, 2023|The Vault|

On Wednesday, a Senate Banking subcommittee will consider bank-merger policy, surely providing a platform for its chair, Sen. Warren’s pronounced views opposing all but the smallest bank mergers and maybe not even those. Many other senators are not as adamant, but even pro-business Republicans – see J.D. Vance – think bank mergers beyond the itty-bitty are at best problematic. The politics of this debate is obvious; the substance not so much. As with many other questions, bank-merger policy is best set with a keen understanding of recent, objective research and what it actually says about concentration as it occurs outside the gaze of those fearful only of still bigger big banks.

That there is undue market power in a financialized economy that brings a raft of woes is all too clear. I thus hoped that Assistant Attorney General Kanter’s remarks last month would be a meaningful update of the Department of Justice’s anachronistic 1995 policy. It helped, but only a bit because Mr. Kanter focused principally on enforcement, leaving “broader” questions solely to the banking agencies.

They in turn have long promised a transparent merger policy, but it’s still deal-by-deal, case-by-case, crisis-by-crisis. More than a few mid-sized banks will wither away as deliberations continue because the sheer uncertainty and delays of most bank mergers undermine their economic value, particularly at a time of high interest rates, slow or no growth, tough new rules, and withering competition.

Recent antitrust research does not substantiate easy, blanket assertions about the benefits or …

3 07, 2023

Karen Petrou: The Unintended Consequence Of Capital Hikes Isn’t Less Credit, It’s More Risk

Eliza Allen2023-07-03T12:08:54-04:00July 3rd, 2023|The Vault|

As was evident throughout Chairman Powell’s most recent appearances before HFSC and Senate Banking, conflict between capital and credit availability characterizes what is to come of the “end-game” capital rules set for imminent release. The trade-off is said to be between safer banks and a sound economy, but this is far too simple. As we’ve seen over and over again as capital rules rise, credit availability stays the same or even increases. What changes is who makes the loans and what happens to borrowers and the broader macro framework, which in the past has been irrevocably altered. The real trade-off is thus between lending from banks and the stable financial intermediation this generally ensures and lending from nonbanks and the risks this raises not just to financial stability, but also to economic equality.

As post-2008 history makes clear, banks do not stop lending when capital requirements go up; they stop taking certain balance-sheet risks based on how the sum total of often-conflicting risk-based, leverage, and stress-test rules drives their numbers. That all these rules push and pull banks in often-different directions is at long last known to the Fed based on Vice Chair Barr’s call for a “holistic review”. Whether it plans to do anything about them and their adverse impact on the future of regulated financial intermediation remains to be seen. Until something is done, banks will look across the spectrum of capital rules, spot the highest requirement, and then figure out how best to remain profitable …

20 06, 2023

Karen Petrou: Our Baffled, Befuddled Central Bank

Eliza Allen2023-06-20T14:47:39-04:00June 20th, 2023|The Vault|

After SVB failed, Jay Powell told his monthly press conference that he found this “baffling” even though the Fed was the lead bank supervisor and the only one charged with its BHC’s oversight. At Wednesday’s presser, Mr. Powell took a different, but still-indefensible tack avoiding responsibility for a looming threat by stoutly denying his ability to do anything about nonbank financial-stability risk. However, the Board has an express mandate under the Dodd-Frank Act to address it. To be sure, the Fed does not have direct regulatory authority over nonbanks as it now remembers it did over SVB. But to say that the Fed’s only power is over banks as he Wednesday did is at best befuddled. A baffled, befuddled central bank is a national – indeed global – hazard.

Of course, perhaps Mr. Powell isn’t befuddled and instead wants to ensure that a crisis he claims the Fed can’t avert isn’t one that damages its already-scant credibility. This wouldn’t be the first time the Fed defended itself at the expense of sound policy, but that makes it no less inexcusable. I’ll have more to say about this in a talk on the 28^th, but last week’s memo looks at just one threat to financial stability and what the Fed could readily do to combat it.

The threat comes from the $1.4 trillion private-credit market’s ambition to use its regulatory-arbitrage advantage to morph into a $40 trillion fixed-income sector. Mr. Powell says all he can do …

22 05, 2023

Karen Petrou: How to Ensure That Independent Study of Regulatory Mistakes Leads to Near-Term, Meaningful Redress and Reform

Eliza Allen2023-05-22T11:47:33-04:00May 22nd, 2023|The Vault|

Last week, a moderate Senate Democrat was joined by a Republican in yet another letter demanding an independent investigation of regulatory actions related to recent bank failures. But, as the absence of specifics in any of these letters makes clear, it’s a lot easier to call for independent inquiry than to lay out how to conduct one that might make a meaningful difference. Precedent is not encouraging – for example, Congress created a Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission after 2008, but it was an unqualified waste of time and money. Still, we urgently need an independent assessment of what went so wrong combined with another providing near-term, actionable reforms. Having served on one post-crisis national commission that did a bit of good, I recommend separating the forensic inquiry from the one focused on the future, guarding against conflicts without eliminating expertise, and assessing only a few clear questions suitable for practical answers that can be readily accomplished under current law.

The first decision point determines all the rest: whether the independent analysis is to be forensic – who dropped which heavy ball on whose toes – or focused on the future – what we learned and what to do about it. Many of the proposals for an independent commission, including the Congressional letter noted above, want their commission to do both, but none could do so well and asking for this is thus asking for trouble.

A good forensic analysis will reduce the moral hazard enjoyed by federal supervisors long exempt …

15 05, 2023

Karen Petrou: How An Ill-Designed Special Assessment Is Sure To Scramble The Structure Of Federal Deposit Insurance

Eliza Allen2023-05-15T11:52:36-04:00May 15th, 2023|The Vault|

As our forthcoming in-depth analysis will detail, the FDIC’s proposed special assessment raises a raft of policy problems not contemplated by the FDIC despite a steep price tag warranting careful thought at a time of financial instability and recessionary risk. The FedFin analysis will detail the proposal, what the FDIC thinks, and what the proposal might do to whom, but here’s my opinion: the FDIC’s decision to allocate blame for SVB and Signature’s failures to a select group of surviving larger banks is a politically-expedient violation of the principal of insurance and a terrible precedent for the future of federal deposit coverage.

First problem: the FDIC assigns blame to a large group of bigger banks even though its own analysis of the SVB and SBNY failures points to a different underlying reason for the systemic designation. In the proposal, the FDIC targets large holdings of uninsured deposits even though both its post-mortem and the Fed’s of the two systemic failures cites bad management as the most important cause of death. Both agencies do note the new risks posed by social-media runs that hastened the banks’ passing, but each also makes it clear that these new-age runs are an endemic challenge to bank resilience, not a risk unique to SVB and Signature or other banks with large amounts of uninsured deposits. The FDIC proposal contains no explanation of why uninsured-depositories are the systemic rescue’s fall guys even though these deposits aren’t the cause of the two bank failures and the risks …

26 04, 2023

FedFin on: Systemic-Risk Determinations

Arezou Rafikian2023-04-26T16:59:28-04:00April 26th, 2023|The Vault|

Rejecting the Trump Administration’s hands-off approach to designating systemically-important nonbank financial institutions or activities and practices, the Biden Administration’s FSOC has bifurcated this construct with one proposal on designating entities and another that lays out an analytical approach to identifying systemic risk that would then guide firm and activity designation as well as Council staff coordination with primary federal regulators leading to new rules, product or service prohibitions/restrictions, or firm-specific supervisory action. If the final framework is as comprehensive as this proposal and FSOC is as actively engaged as its plan requires, then U.S. systemic standards could extend far more widely than is now the case even if firm-specific nonbank designations are few and far between…

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…