As anticipated as recently as yesterday, the next round of U.S. end-game capital proposals will include a significant win for bankers when it comes to residential mortgage origination. Where it comes out on other key mortgage topics is, though, yet to be revealed….
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A new FRB-NY study confirms that 83% of loans from 2000-2022 went to first-time homebuyers, compared to 56% for the GSEs and 57% for private lenders. FHA loans of course have very high LTVs and low scores, with scores improving after 2008 when the PLS market stopped adversely selected FHA even though over half of FHA loans still have scores under 680. FHA sustainability has varied based on these and other factors, but 21.8% of borrowers from 2011-2016 still lost their homes.
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Our most recent analysis of the inter-agency capital proposal focuses on significant changes to the rules for securitization and credit-risk transfer positions. In short, super-traditional securitizations have an easier path to the secondary market, but GSEs still beat banks. Complex ABS face often-formidable obstacles, as does CRT given or taken by banks.
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In this report, we proceed from our assessment of the proposed regulatory capital framework to an analysis of the rules governing credit risk. In addition to eliminating the advanced approach, the proposal imposes higher standards for some assets than under the old standardized approach (SA) via new “expanded” requirements. As detailed here, many expanded risk weightings are higher than current requirements either due to specific risk-weighted assessments (RWAs) or definitions and additional restrictions. This contributes to the added capital costs identified by the banking agencies in their impact assessment, suggesting that lower risk weightings in the expanded approach reflected the reduced risks described in the proposal for other assets and will ultimately have little bearing on regulatory-capital requirements and thus ….
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We’ve much more to do to determine the strategic and policy impact of the new credit-, market-, and operational-risk capital rules singly and collectively – a complex task given the 1,089-page rulemaking made harder by some extremely-arcane language that may either mask what the agencies mean or differ from what they meant to mean. Still, several conclusions about mortgage finance are clear: the rules would be less demanding than those at present for many mid-LTV loans, the GSEs’ risk weighting continue to give them a considerable advantage over bank originators and securitizes, and MI lost the limited luster the banking agencies were forced to concede in 2013.
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In the wake of the 1,089-page capital proposal, debate is waging on well-trod battlegrounds such as whether the new approach will dry up credit and thus stifle growth. I’ve my own view on this, but my initial read of the proposal points to a still more fundamental issue: some of it makes absolutely no sense even if one agrees with the agencies’ goals. Here, I lay out two bedrock assumptions that contradict the rule’s express intent and will have adverse unintended consequences to boot. God knows what lurks in the details.
The first “say what” in the sweeping rules results from the new “higher-of” construct. Credit and operational -risk models are entirely gone and market-risk models are largely eviscerated. Instead, big banks must hold the higher of the old, “general” standardized approach (SA) or the new, “expanded” SA. Each of these requirements is set by the agencies – models mostly never allowed. Further, a new “output floor” – different from Basel’s approach to this model’s constraint – is also mandated as yet another safety net preventing anyone gaining any advantage from any possible regulatory-capital arbitrage.
Why then not just demand that big banks use a standardized weighting the agencies think suffices? Must banks be put through the burden of calculating two ratios when they have no ability to arbitrage requisite capital weights? Do the agencies not even trust themselves to set capital standards that are now sometimes higher, sometimes lower as God gives them to know probability of default …
As we will detail in a forthcoming in-depth report, the banking agencies’ new “guidance” on third-party vendors essentially brings all nonbank counterparties with whom banking organizations deal under the agencies’ enforcement thumb. As a result, nonbank mortgage companies, MIs, credit enhancers, and tech providers and even the GSEs – Home Loan Banks included – will be forced at the least to answer a lot of questions from the banking entities with whom they do pretty much any kind of business. And, if the agencies don’t like the answers, they now assert that they will issue enforcement orders not just against banks, but also nonbank entities to ensure they comply with the full panoply of safety-and-soundness standards referenced in the guidance along with ensuring appropriate consumer protection.
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When Sandra Thompson earlier this year enunciated a new equitable-finance mission, we forecast that Fannie and Freddie would undertake an array of new activities that significantly expand their footprint along with their equity and equality impact. As anticipated, the plans announced yesterday by Fannie and Freddie go beyond FHFA’s reiterated mission statement earlier this week, mirroring in some ways the banking agencies’ broad view of CRA as a community-development and racial-equity instrument as well as the boost to LMI housing on which attention long focused. But, for all the public-good creds these plans engender, several will doubtless promote market angst as the GSEs launch pilots that tread heavily on MI, title-insurer, and servicer toes.
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In our last CRT analysis, we looked at transaction viability under the Basel IV rewrite set for rapid release once key Fed nominees are finally confirmed. Now, we turn to another viability consideration: the extent to which CRT can thrive in spite of these capital obstacles and accomplish a vital purpose spelled out in a recent Urban Institute report: enhance equitable finance as FHFA demands. In short, we hope so, but it won’t be easy.
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