#procyclicality – Federal Financial Analytics

4 08, 2023

FedFin on: Credit-Risk Capital Rewrite

Arezou Rafikian2023-08-04T13:41:04-04:00August 4th, 2023|The Vault|

In this report, we proceed from our assessment of the proposed regulatory capital framework to an analysis of the rules governing credit risk. In addition to eliminating the advanced approach, the proposal imposes higher standards for some assets than under the old standardized approach (SA) via new “expanded” requirements. As detailed here, many expanded risk weightings are higher than current requirements either due to specific risk-weighted assessments (RWAs) or definitions and additional restrictions. This contributes to the added capital costs identified by the banking agencies in their impact assessment, suggesting that lower risk weightings in the expanded approach reflected the reduced risks described in the proposal for other assets and will ultimately have little bearing on regulatory-capital requirements and thus ….

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4 08, 2023

CAPITAL231

Eliza Allen2023-08-04T13:40:43-04:00August 4th, 2023|1- Financial Services Management|

Credit-Risk Capital Rewrite

In this report, we proceed from our assessment of the proposed regulatory capital framework to an analysis of the rules governing credit risk. In addition to eliminating the advanced approach, the proposal imposes higher standards for some assets than under the old standardized approach (SA) via new “expanded” requirements. As detailed here, many expanded risk weightings are higher than current requirements either due to specific risk-weighted assessments (RWAs) or definitions and additional restrictions. This contributes to the added capital costs identified by the banking agencies in their impact assessment, suggesting that lower risk weightings in the expanded approach reflected the reduced risks described in the proposal for other assets and will ultimately have little bearing on regulatory-capital requirements and thus on the overall ability of banks to expand into lower-risk areas and compete more effectively with nonbanks and foreign banks. Big banks forced to abandon certain activities may expand others receiving capital discounts in the new rules, increasing their footprint in traditional banking in ways that may increase industry consolidation.

CAPITAL231.pdf…

17 04, 2023

M041723

Eliza Allen2023-04-17T12:01:55-04:00April 17th, 2023|6- Client Memo|

Why FDIC Privatization Isn’t a Pipe Dream

As night follows day, so proposals to privatize the FDIC have again followed bank failures. While debate over deposit-insurance privatization was, is, and will be an ideological tug of war between free-market conservatives and government safety-net progressives, it’s nonetheless an important option that warrants careful analysis as the FDIC yet again faces huge losses, banks are charged crippling and procyclical premiums, and talk turns to still more federal coverage at still greater risk not just to insured banks, but also to taxpayers. Pure FDIC privatization remains impossible, but target risk transfers warrant careful, but quick consideration.

M041723.pdf…

17 04, 2023

Karen Petrou: Why FDIC Privatization Isn’t a Pipe Dream

Eliza Allen2023-04-17T12:02:05-04:00April 17th, 2023|The Vault|

As night follows day, so proposals to privatize the FDIC have again followed bank failures. While debate over deposit-insurance privatization was, is, and will be an ideological tug of war between free-market conservatives and government safety-net progressives, it’s nonetheless an important option that warrants careful analysis as the FDIC yet again faces huge losses, banks are charged crippling and procyclical premiums, and talk turns to still more federal coverage at still greater risk not just to insured banks, but also to taxpayers. Pure FDIC privatization remains impossible, but target risk transfers warrant careful, but quick consideration.

Privatization was last seriously discussed when Congress rewrote FDIC coverage in 2006. This was a halcyon time when the FDIC was so sanguine about all the rules put in place after the S&L and bank crises that its 2007 study confidently predicted that systemic risk was a thing of the past, uninsured deposits would never again be covered, and the Deposit Insurance Fund more than sufficed for any systemic situation.

Of course, the great financial crisis that began later that same year put the lie to all this happy talk. Privatization proposals now aren’t anywhere near as happy nor do they repeat past assertions that, with FDIC privatization, the nation could also dispense with bank regulation. Instead, and for good reason, talk has now returned to private options because, without them, moral hazard seems sure to be embedded in a financial system that is still more shadowy.

A modern rethink of FDIC privatization must …

15 08, 2022

DAILY081522

Eliza Allen2023-01-04T12:03:15-05:00August 15th, 2022|2- Daily Briefing|

FDIC Study Finds Changing Assessment Rates Had Procyclical Effects During the Financial Crisis

A new FDIC staff study tackles an immediate concern in the wake of the FDIC’s proposal to raise DIF premiums (see FSM Report DEPOSITINSURANCE114): procyclicality. In what its authors describe as one of the first studies to provide large-scale empirical evidence on deposit insurance’s procyclical effects, this model-driven study looks at the effect of changing deposit insurance assessment rates during the period between 2009 and 2011. Using credit unions as a control group, it finds a 1.6 percent decrease in bank lending after a 7 bp increase in the assessment rate and a 0.3 increase after a 5-10 bp rate decrease.

Fed Tries to Sooth Payment-Access Critics with New Policy

Doubtless reflecting all the political pressure it’s under regarding payment-system access, the FRB today not only finalized its payment-system access rules, but also made sure to use an e-mail subject line containing the release that these rules are “transparent, risk-based, and consistent.” The board also states that the final standards are consistent with both its 2021 proposal (see FSM Report PAYMENT22) and the 2022 “supplemental” proposal (see FSM Report PAYMENT24) even though the supplemental was considerably more detailed than the initial attempt to give the Reserve Banks broad discretion without the appearance of inconsistent or even insider decision-making.

Daily081522.pdf…

8 08, 2022

m080822

Arezou Rafikian2023-01-04T13:13:40-05:00August 8th, 2022|6- Client Memo|

Procyclical Capital Rules and the Economy’s Discontent

In our recent paper outlining the holistic-capital regime regulators should quickly deploy, we noted that current rules are often counter-productive to their avowed goal of bank solvency without peril to prosperity. However, one acute problem in the regulatory-capital rulebook – procyclicality – does particularly problematic damage when the economy faces acute challenges – i.e., now. None of the pending one-off capital reforms addresses procyclicality and, in fact, several might make it even worse. This memo shows how and then what should be quickly done to reinstate the counter-cyclicality all the regulators say they seek.

m080822.pdf…

8 08, 2022

Karen Petrou: Procyclical Capital Rules and the Economy’s Discontent

Arezou Rafikian2023-01-04T13:14:40-05:00August 8th, 2022|The Vault|

In our recent paper outlining the holistic-capital regime regulators should quickly deploy, we noted that current rules are often counter-productive to their avowed goal of bank solvency without peril to prosperity. However, one acute problem in the regulatory-capital rulebook – procyclicality – does particularly problematic damage when the economy faces acute challenges – i.e., now. None of the pending one-off capital reforms addresses procyclicality and, in fact, several might make it even worse. This memo shows how and then what should be quickly done to reinstate the counter-cyclicality all the regulators say they seek.

Last Thursday, the Fed set new, often-higher risk-based capital (RBC) ratios for the largest banks. The reason for this untimely capital hike lies in the interplay between the RBC rules and the Fed’s CCAR stress test. Packaged into the stress capital buffer (SCB), these rules determine how much RBC each large bank must hold to ensure it can stay in the agencies’ good graces and, to its thinking, better still distribute capital.

Put very simply, the more RBC, the less RWAS – i.e., the risk-weighted assets, against which capital rules are measured. The higher the weighting, the lower a capital-strained bank’s appetite to hold it unless risk is high enough also to offset the leverage ratio’s cost – at which point the bank is taking a lot of unnecessary risk to sidestep another set of unintended contradictions in the capital construct. As a Fed study concludes, all but the very strongest banks sit on their …