#resolvability

10 10, 2023

Karen Petrou: The Urgent Financial Reform the Fed and FDIC Hope we Forget

Eliza Allen2023-10-10T11:29:16-04:00October 10th, 2023|The Vault|

Even after the great financial crisis in 2008, the repo meltdown of 2019, a financial-market bailout of unprecedented proportions in 2020, and three bank failures so far this year, the FDIC and Fed are no closer than they were in 2007 to knowing what to do if a medium-size bank fails, a nonbank barrels down on the banking system, or critical financial-infrastructure flickers. Bond markets are back on the brink and geopolitical risk have become a still-greater concern. The agencies may think new capital and resolution rules are an iron dome allowing them to forego agency repair, but history – see the Gaza Strip – provides no comfort – as I hope we don’t have to learn again, fortifications aren’t enough in the absence of effective surveillance and rapid response.

The hard truth is the banking agencies after 2008 did what politicians and lawyers know best: they identified gaps in the law that the agencies self-defensively said barred them from preventing a crisis, asking for and then getting a new rulebook without also meaningfully addressing and then correcting their own structural weaknesses. And so it goes again. Thinking dominated by lawyers and politicians – for every successful public leader is a politician no matter his or her nominal independence – is writing lots and lots more rules. Some fix gaps found in the old law and rule, many pave over problems that could have been fixed under old law and rule, and some are as counter-productive as we’ve noted in …

18 09, 2023

FedFin on: Large-IDI Resolution Plans

Arezou Rafikian2023-09-19T18:09:58-04:00September 18th, 2023|The Vault|

Although a pending FDIC/FRB proposal imposes a raft of new requirements for resolution plans from IDIs with over $100 billion in assets, the FDIC has also issued a freestanding proposal doing the same, also setting information-filing standards for IDIs below $100 billion but above $50 billion. Aspects of the resolution-plan filing standards for large covered IDIs (CIDIs) echo and in some cases allow reliance on aspects of the joint rule with the Fed, but the FDIC notes that this rule is, as required by the Dodd-Frank Act, focused on financial stability. Its own IDI resolution rules now and as proposed instead address how the FDIC is to meet its own statutory requirements (e.g., least-cost resolution). The NPR mandates many new planning or filing requirements to achieve its goals, most notably adding new severability standards that may require new inter-affiliate or -branch firewalls that reduce operating efficiencies and, when it comes to broker-dealer or other entities, lead to indirect resolution requirements not mandated by functional regulators.

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

7 09, 2023

FedFin on: Living-Will Requirements

Arezou Rafikian2023-09-07T16:39:01-04:00September 7th, 2023|The Vault|

In conjunction with proposing a new long-term debt (LTD) requirement for categories II, III, and IV banks, the Fed and FDIC are pursuing other ways to enhance resolvability. Among these is new guidance for large domestic and foreign banking organizations that requires U.S. banking organizations and foreign banking organization (FBO) intermediate holding companies (IHCs) along with all their insured depositories when any is over $100 billion to file resolution plans. These are also redesigned to make the plans much closer in substance to those mandated for GSIBs.

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

27 06, 2023

FedFin on: Failed-Bank Compensation, Resolution

Arezou Rafikian2023-06-27T16:13:11-04:00June 27th, 2023|The Vault|

The Senate Banking Committee has overwhelmingly approved bipartisan legislation to reform executive compensation following larger insured-depository institution (IDI) failures, with parent-company executive compensation also at risk in some circumstances. Unlike previous bipartisan claw-back legislation, this measure is targeted to incentive compensation, not salary, expressly exempts “white knights,” institution-affiliated persons and directors, and gives the FDIC discretion also to allow senior officers to retain affected compensation in certain other circumstances…

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.poor management practice.

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11 04, 2023

FedFin Assessment: Top Brainard, Gruenberg Regulatory Rewrites

Arezou Rafikian2023-04-11T16:52:14-04:00April 11th, 2023|The Vault|

In this report, we drill down on prior forecasts (see Client Report REFORM219) of near-term regulatory action to identify the revisions sure to be prioritized as NEC Director Brainard and FDIC Chairman Gruenberg seek to reverse rules finalized over their objections when they were in the minority. Ms. Brainard does not have a direct role dictating what the Fed will do given central-bank independence, but she has a good deal of influence as evidenced most recently by the White House action list. Acting Comptroller Hsu was not casting formal votes over these years, but he was an influential staff leader in this area and clearly has his own list – see for example his efforts on bank merger and resolution policy (see FSM Report RESOLVE48). We expect he will concur with Vice Chairman Barr and Mr. Gruenberg if they all advance the rewrites to the tailoring rules to which Ms. Brainard and Mr. Gruenberg so strongly objected….

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

28 03, 2023

FedFin Assessment: Policy Implications of FDIC-Resolution Innovations

Arezou Rafikian2023-04-03T12:48:36-04:00March 28th, 2023|The Vault|

As noted yesterday, the FDIC’s recent rescues have had several unusual features with implications not only for future policy, but also for pending special assessments to replenish the DIF for the $22.5 billion estimated costs to the Deposit Insurance Fund. Analyzed here, new tools – e.g., voluntary liquidation, equity-appreciation rights, lines of credit – have determine the extent to which this estimate holds, how FHLB advances are treated in future resolutions, and the role the FDIC may play in companies that acquire failed IDIs….

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

22 03, 2023

FedFin Assessment: GSIB Rules Set For Post-CS Rewrite

Arezou Rafikian2023-03-22T16:34:58-04:00March 22nd, 2023|The Vault|

In this report, we assess the implications of recent events on two assumptions underlying current U.S. and global policy affecting GSIBs and those considered domestic SIBs: first, all are likely to be well insulated from illiquidity and/or insolvency and, when this is not the case, then orderly resolution without taxpayer bailout can be readily deployed. Credit Suisse’s failure and subsequent, subsidized acquisition is just one of the “Minsky moments” rattling regulators and other policy-makers, with the conclusions drawn from all of them surely to lead to significant reevaluation of each of these assumptions. To be sure, CS was an outlier in terms of idiosyncratic culture-and-control problems, but the Swiss regulatory and resolution system is considered reasonably robust, thus making the bank’s failure…

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.

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20 03, 2023

FedFin Analysis: Possible Cures for a Viral Run

Eliza Allen2023-03-20T16:12:34-04:00March 20th, 2023|The Vault|

Among the most vexing issues in the wake of SVB’s failure is the extent to which social media may have led to the first “viral run,” a run akin to the meme-stock volatility that lead the SEC and others to fear a new form of “flash-crash” risk. In this report, we assess current policy options related to deposit runs resulting from social media, an issue cited frequently by HFSC Chairman McHenry (R-NC) as a top priority as he begins work on post-SVB financial standards. We note some remedies – e.g., a ban on deposit-related communication were they permissible under various constitutional and statutory free-speech edicts.

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

20 03, 2023

FedFin on: The Collateral Damage of the Banking Crisis

Eliza Allen2023-03-20T14:30:07-04:00March 20th, 2023|The Vault|

In this report, we build on FedFin’s in-depth reports about recent bank failures to detail new risks for all of the innocent bystanders in the U.S. mortgage market along with a not so-innocent bystander: the Federal Home Loan Banks. We note also some take-aways FHFA may draw from the crisis with regard to GSE regulation, resolution, and supervision. In short, things will be different assuming they don’t get worse and then still more of a paradigm shift.

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

20 03, 2023

Karen Petrou: Three Fast, Urgent Fixes to U.S. Bank Supervision and One Major Change to End Bailouts

Eliza Allen2023-03-20T11:35:24-04:00March 20th, 2023|The Vault|

In the wake of recent bank failures, much has rightly been said about how supervisors failed to act even though warning claxons blared. Nothing that happened to Silvergate, SVB, or Signature is due to forces beyond supervisory control, but there are deep, structural weaknesses in how banks have long been supervised. How long? I went back to my 2001 Senate Banking testimony about what was then the largest-ever failure to find that many of the lessons that should have been learned never sunk in.

Given that this hearing was in 2001, a good deal of what I said about bank capital requirements was about Basel I and is thus long out of date. However, one key point isn’t: the capital triggers used to spark prompt corrective action (PCA) were and are an unduly-simplistic way to identify the need for rapid supervisory intervention.

Silvergate, SVB, and Signature were all “well” capitalized right up to the brink of collapse because each of the banks in its own way arbitraged the capital rules to enormous – and obvious – advantage. Nothing in law or rule bars bank supervisors from stepping in well before PCA ratios sink but nothing seems to stir supervisors to do so. 1991’s PCA requirements were an important advance at the time, but it was outdated only a decade later. Now, it’s a dangerous supervisory distraction.

What else noted in 2001 remains an urgent fix? Over two decades ago, I urged the FDIC to reinstate the high-growth early-warning system it …