As anticipated as recently as yesterday, the next round of U.S. end-game capital proposals will include a significant win for bankers when it comes to residential mortgage origination. Where it comes out on other key mortgage topics is, though, yet to be revealed….
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Even after the great financial crisis in 2008, the repo meltdown of 2019, a financial-market bailout of unprecedented proportions in 2020, and three bank failures so far this year, the FDIC and Fed are no closer than they were in 2007 to knowing what to do if a medium-size bank fails, a nonbank barrels down on the banking system, or critical financial-infrastructure flickers. Bond markets are back on the brink and geopolitical risk have become a still-greater concern. The agencies may think new capital and resolution rules are an iron dome allowing them to forego agency repair, but history – see the Gaza Strip – provides no comfort – as I hope we don’t have to learn again, fortifications aren’t enough in the absence of effective surveillance and rapid response.
The hard truth is the banking agencies after 2008 did what politicians and lawyers know best: they identified gaps in the law that the agencies self-defensively said barred them from preventing a crisis, asking for and then getting a new rulebook without also meaningfully addressing and then correcting their own structural weaknesses. And so it goes again. Thinking dominated by lawyers and politicians – for every successful public leader is a politician no matter his or her nominal independence – is writing lots and lots more rules. Some fix gaps found in the old law and rule, many pave over problems that could have been fixed under old law and rule, and some are as counter-productive as we’ve noted in …
Our most recent analysis of the inter-agency capital proposal focuses on significant changes to the rules for securitization and credit-risk transfer positions. In short, super-traditional securitizations have an easier path to the secondary market, but GSEs still beat banks. Complex ABS face often-formidable obstacles, as does CRT given or taken by banks.
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Based on our analysis of the inter-agency capital proposal’s framework and its credit-risk provisions, FedFin turns now to the proposed approach to equities as well as to that for securitization exposures (i.e., those that are tranched rather than simple secondary-market issuances of packages of loans or other assets backed as needed by a single credit enhancement). The proposal in some cases liberalizes the current, “general” standardized approach (SA), but more often toughens it to account for elimination of the advanced approach…
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In this report, we proceed from our assessment of the proposed regulatory capital framework to an analysis of the rules governing credit risk. In addition to eliminating the advanced approach, the proposal imposes higher standards for some assets than under the old standardized approach (SA) via new “expanded” requirements. As detailed here, many expanded risk weightings are higher than current requirements either due to specific risk-weighted assessments (RWAs) or definitions and additional restrictions. This contributes to the added capital costs identified by the banking agencies in their impact assessment, suggesting that lower risk weightings in the expanded approach reflected the reduced risks described in the proposal for other assets and will ultimately have little bearing on regulatory-capital requirements and thus ….
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In this report, we continue our policy postmortem of SVB/SBNY and, now, so much more. Prior reports have assessed the overall political context (see Client Report RESOLVE49) and likely changes to FDIC insurance (see Client Report DEPOSITINSURANCE118), with a forthcoming Petrou op-ed in Barron’s focusing on specific ways to reform federal deposit insurance to protect only the innocent. In this report, we look at some key regulatory changes likely as the banking agencies reevaluate the regional-bank capital, liquidity, and the IDI/BHC construct. As noted in our initial assessment and thereafter, we do not expect meaningful legislative action on the Warren, et. al. bill to repeal “tailoring” requirements, but we do expect bipartisan political pressure not just for supervisory accountability (see another forthcoming report), but also regulatory revisions.
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As we noted late last week, FHFA has finalized revisions to its 2020 capital rule that most importantly lighten the GSEs’ capital load and reinvigorate credit risk transfer. Deals from both Fannie and Freddie will come fast, but how furiously will depend also on externalities — i.e., how QT redefines RMBS demand and CRT pricing, what Ukraine does to market risk-on tolerance.
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