#SA – Federal Financial Analytics

17 08, 2023

CAPITAL234

Eliza Allen2023-08-17T15:22:40-04:00August 17th, 2023|5- Client Report|

FedFin Assessment: What the Agencies Think the Rules Will do and Why Much of That is Wrong

With this report, we conclude our assessment of the regulatory-capital proposal with analysis of what the sum total of the credit (see FSM Report CAPITAL231), operational (see FSM Report OPSRISK22), and market (see FSM Report CAPITAL233) rules could do in the real world of banks, nonbanks, foreign banks, and complex market interconnections. Our first assessment of the proposal’s framework (see FSM Report CAPITAL230) provided the agencies’ quantitative-impact statement (QIS). Here, we evaluate the QIS, expand on the agencies’ qualitative conclusions, and add our own assessment of what might actually happen in the face of these sometimes-contradictory capital incentives.

CAPITAL234.pdf…

8 08, 2023

FedFin on: Equity and Securitization Capital Standards

Arezou Rafikian2023-08-08T13:44:33-04:00August 8th, 2023|The Vault|

Based on our analysis of the inter-agency capital proposal’s framework and its credit-risk provisions, FedFin turns now to the proposed approach to equities as well as to that for securitization exposures (i.e., those that are tranched rather than simple secondary-market issuances of packages of loans or other assets backed as needed by a single credit enhancement). The proposal in some cases liberalizes the current, “general” standardized approach (SA), but more often toughens it to account for elimination of the advanced approach…

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

8 08, 2023

CAPITAL232

Eliza Allen2023-08-08T10:52:38-04:00August 8th, 2023|1- Financial Services Management|

Equity and Securitization Capital Standards

Based on our analysis of the inter-agency capital proposal’s framework and its credit-risk provisions, FedFin turns now to the proposed approach to equities as well as to that for securitization exposures (i.e., those that are tranched rather than simple secondary-market issuances of packages of loans or other assets backed as needed by a single credit enhancement). The proposal in some cases liberalizes the current, “general” standardized approach (SA), but more often toughens it to account for elimination of the advanced approach. This will have particular bearing on significant aspects of category III and IV bank activities (e.g., credit-card securitizations, MMF funding), but all covered banking organizations will see significant capital increases as many activities now permitted within the banking book would need to move to the trading book under the new market-risk rules. Securitization-related capital standards are generally brought closer to those for underlying assets in simple securitizations, giving banks more balance-sheet flexibility and credit-risk mitigation opportunities if investors accept these structures. The treatment of equity exposures is generally tightened, sometimes so much as to effectively prohibit certain activities – e.g., non-traditional equity investments in covered funds and BHC subsidiaries. The new treatment of investment funds will also have significant implications for banks that fund themselves through prime MMFs or sponsor investment funds through equity positions.

CAPITAL232.pdf…

4 08, 2023

FedFin on: Credit-Risk Capital Rewrite

Arezou Rafikian2023-08-04T13:41:04-04:00August 4th, 2023|The Vault|

In this report, we proceed from our assessment of the proposed regulatory capital framework to an analysis of the rules governing credit risk. In addition to eliminating the advanced approach, the proposal imposes higher standards for some assets than under the old standardized approach (SA) via new “expanded” requirements. As detailed here, many expanded risk weightings are higher than current requirements either due to specific risk-weighted assessments (RWAs) or definitions and additional restrictions. This contributes to the added capital costs identified by the banking agencies in their impact assessment, suggesting that lower risk weightings in the expanded approach reflected the reduced risks described in the proposal for other assets and will ultimately have little bearing on regulatory-capital requirements and thus ….

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

4 08, 2023

CAPITAL231

Eliza Allen2023-08-04T13:40:43-04:00August 4th, 2023|1- Financial Services Management|

Credit-Risk Capital Rewrite

In this report, we proceed from our assessment of the proposed regulatory capital framework to an analysis of the rules governing credit risk. In addition to eliminating the advanced approach, the proposal imposes higher standards for some assets than under the old standardized approach (SA) via new “expanded” requirements. As detailed here, many expanded risk weightings are higher than current requirements either due to specific risk-weighted assessments (RWAs) or definitions and additional restrictions. This contributes to the added capital costs identified by the banking agencies in their impact assessment, suggesting that lower risk weightings in the expanded approach reflected the reduced risks described in the proposal for other assets and will ultimately have little bearing on regulatory-capital requirements and thus on the overall ability of banks to expand into lower-risk areas and compete more effectively with nonbanks and foreign banks. Big banks forced to abandon certain activities may expand others receiving capital discounts in the new rules, increasing their footprint in traditional banking in ways that may increase industry consolidation.

CAPITAL231.pdf…

31 07, 2023

M073123

Eliza Allen2023-07-31T10:40:52-04:00July 31st, 2023|6- Client Memo|

Two Tenets of the Capital Proposal That Make No Sense No Matter How Much One Might Want to Love The Rest of It

In the wake of the 1,089-page capital proposal, debate is waging on well-trod battlegrounds such as whether the new approach will dry up credit and thus stifle growth. I’ve my own view on this, but my initial read of the proposal points to a still more fundamental issue: some of it makes absolutely no sense even if one agrees with the agencies’ goals. Here, I lay out two bedrock assumptions that contradict the rule’s express intent and will have adverse unintended consequences to boot. God knows what lurks in the details.

M073123.pdf…

31 07, 2023

Karen Petrou: Two Tenets of the Capital Proposal That Make No Sense No Matter How Much One Might Want to Love The Rest of It

Eliza Allen2023-07-31T10:40:41-04:00July 31st, 2023|The Vault|

In the wake of the 1,089-page capital proposal, debate is waging on well-trod battlegrounds such as whether the new approach will dry up credit and thus stifle growth. I’ve my own view on this, but my initial read of the proposal points to a still more fundamental issue: some of it makes absolutely no sense even if one agrees with the agencies’ goals. Here, I lay out two bedrock assumptions that contradict the rule’s express intent and will have adverse unintended consequences to boot. God knows what lurks in the details.

The first “say what” in the sweeping rules results from the new “higher-of” construct. Credit and operational -risk models are entirely gone and market-risk models are largely eviscerated. Instead, big banks must hold the higher of the old, “general” standardized approach (SA) or the new, “expanded” SA. Each of these requirements is set by the agencies – models mostly never allowed. Further, a new “output floor” – different from Basel’s approach to this model’s constraint – is also mandated as yet another safety net preventing anyone gaining any advantage from any possible regulatory-capital arbitrage.

Why then not just demand that big banks use a standardized weighting the agencies think suffices? Must banks be put through the burden of calculating two ratios when they have no ability to arbitrage requisite capital weights? Do the agencies not even trust themselves to set capital standards that are now sometimes higher, sometimes lower as God gives them to know probability of default …

26 07, 2023

CAPITAL229

Eliza Allen2023-07-26T14:30:18-04:00July 26th, 2023|5- Client Report|

FedFin Assessment: What to Watch in the Regulatory-Capital Rewrite

As promised, we plan in-depth coverage of the Fed and FDIC meetings tomorrow as well as of the capital rewrites they are set to propose no matter all the warning shots from Congressional Republicans. In this report, we provide an overview of each of the rules the agencies will propose based on key issues in the Basel end-game standards they will finally advance. We do not focus on details or how the U.S. may adapt these rules except where public releases have provided advance insight. Instead, we highlight key issues to provide vital background and context of tomorrow’s actions as well as key decision points on which comment and political advocacy are sure to center.

CAPITAL229.pdf…

15 09, 2021

FedFin on: GSEs Get a New, If Familiar, Gig

Arezou Rafikian2023-08-03T14:58:42-04:00September 15th, 2021|The Vault|

As noted yesterday, Treasury and the FHFA pulled the Trump PSPA’s plug, although importantly and widely overlooked is that this is true only when it comes to near-term asset-purchase considerations. Still, with this action atop all the others redefining Fannie and Freddie since Sandra Thompson took over, the GSEs are being reconfigured into agents of Administration policy in concert with being still more critical agencies for housing finance.

The full report is available to subscription clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here.…

15 09, 2021

GSE-091521

Arezou Rafikian2023-08-03T14:58:54-04:00September 15th, 2021|4- GSE Activity Report, Uncategorized|

GSEs Get a New, If Familiar, Gig

As noted yesterday, Treasury and the FHFA pulled the Trump PSPA’s plug, although importantly and widely overlooked is that this is true only when it comes to near-term asset-purchase considerations. Still, with this action atop all the others redefining Fannie and Freddie since Sandra Thompson took over, the GSEs are being reconfigured into agents of Administration policy in concert with being still more critical agencies for housing finance.

GSE-091521.pdf…