#Basel

31 07, 2023

Karen Petrou: Two Tenets of the Capital Proposal That Make No Sense No Matter How Much One Might Want to Love The Rest of It

2023-07-31T10:40:41-04:00July 31st, 2023|The Vault|

In the wake of the 1,089-page capital proposal, debate is waging on well-trod battlegrounds such as whether the new approach will dry up credit and thus stifle growth.  I’ve my own view on this, but my initial read of the proposal points to a still more fundamental issue:  some of it makes absolutely no sense even if one agrees with the agencies’ goals.  Here, I lay out two bedrock assumptions that contradict the rule’s express intent and will have adverse unintended consequences to boot.  God knows what lurks in the details.

The first “say what” in the sweeping rules results from the new “higher-of” construct.  Credit and operational -risk models are entirely gone and market-risk models are largely eviscerated.  Instead, big banks must hold the higher of the old, “general” standardized approach (SA) or the new, “expanded” SA.  Each of these requirements is set by the agencies – models mostly never allowed.  Further, a new “output floor” – different from Basel’s approach to this model’s constraint – is also mandated as yet another safety net preventing anyone gaining any advantage from any possible regulatory-capital arbitrage.

Why then not just demand that big banks use a standardized weighting the agencies think suffices?  Must banks be put through the burden of calculating two ratios when they have no ability to arbitrage requisite capital weights?  Do the agencies not even trust themselves to set capital standards that are now sometimes higher, sometimes lower as God gives them to know probability of default …

13 04, 2023

FedFin Assessment: Implications Of An IRR Capital Charge, New Liquidity Rules

2023-04-13T14:02:25-04:00April 13th, 2023|The Vault|

As we noted yesterday, the head of the Basel Committee has targeted two capital and liquidity  compromises included in the current Basel III construct not addressed in the end-game rules to which the U.S. plans shortly to turn.  Actions whether by Basel or, even without it, the U.S. to return to Basel’s initial proposals have significant strategic consequence.  Thus, this report assesses these options and how the U.S. might act on them.  We conclude that the U.S. will quickly impose a de facto interest-rate risk (IRR) capital charge and tighten LCR assumptions related to uninsured deposits.

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

20 03, 2023

Karen Petrou: Three Fast, Urgent Fixes to U.S. Bank Supervision and One Major Change to End Bailouts

2023-03-20T11:35:24-04:00March 20th, 2023|The Vault|

In the wake of recent bank failures, much has rightly been said about how supervisors failed to act even though warning claxons blared.  Nothing that happened to Silvergate, SVB, or Signature is due to forces beyond supervisory control, but there are deep, structural weaknesses in how banks have long been supervised.  How long?  I went back to my 2001 Senate Banking testimony about what was then the largest-ever failure to find that many of the lessons that should have been learned never sunk in.

Given that this hearing was in 2001, a good deal of what I said about bank capital requirements was about Basel I and is thus long out of date.  However, one key point isn’t:  the capital triggers used to spark prompt corrective action (PCA) were and are an unduly-simplistic way to identify the need for rapid supervisory intervention.

Silvergate, SVB, and Signature were all “well” capitalized right up to the brink of collapse because each of the banks in its own way arbitraged the capital rules to enormous – and obvious – advantage.  Nothing in law or rule bars bank supervisors from stepping in well before PCA ratios sink but nothing seems to stir supervisors to do so.  1991’s PCA requirements were an important advance at the time, but it was outdated only a decade later.  Now, it’s a dangerous supervisory distraction.

What else noted in 2001 remains an urgent fix?  Over two decades ago, I urged the FDIC to reinstate the high-growth early-warning system it …

17 03, 2023

FedFin Assessment: Future of U.S. Bank Capital, Liquidity, Structural Regulation

2023-03-17T16:50:38-04:00March 17th, 2023|The Vault|

In this report, we continue our policy postmortem of SVB/SBNY and, now, so much more.  Prior reports have assessed the overall political context (see Client Report RESOLVE49) and likely changes to FDIC insurance (see Client Report DEPOSITINSURANCE118), with a forthcoming Petrou op-ed in Barron’s focusing on specific ways to reform federal deposit insurance to protect only the innocent.  In this report, we look at some key regulatory changes likely as the banking agencies reevaluate the regional-bank capital, liquidity, and the IDI/BHC construct.  As noted in our initial assessment and thereafter, we do not expect meaningful legislative action on the Warren, et. al. bill to repeal “tailoring” requirements, but we do expect bipartisan political pressure not just for supervisory accountability (see another forthcoming report), but also regulatory revisions.

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

6 03, 2023

Karen Petrou: Why Way-Woke Won’t Work in 2023

2023-03-06T16:31:48-05:00March 6th, 2023|The Vault|

The fact that both the House and Senate passed a Congressional Review Act resolution overturning the Department of Labor’s ESG standards makes it clear that striking an anti-woke blow is deemed good politics by red and purple politicians. The President’s certain veto also makes it clear that a blue man sees matters quite differently, as did 204 House Democrats and 46 of their Senate colleagues. This stalemate will continue for changes to federal law, but it won’t stop Republicans from taking a lot out on financial regulators and big banks that they can’t get into the law books. Thus, anyone deemed even a bit woke-ful will get an earful.

Even if all these excoriations are only rhetorical, they will prove meaningful because even federal regulators immune from the appropriations process are susceptible to political influence – as well they should be if they are not also to be unaccountable. That anti-wokeness is already making its mark is evident in many ways, most recently in the inter- agency crypto-liquidity risk statement at great pains to refute any Republican suggestion that tough new standards amount to a blanket ban on engaging in any form of legal cryptoasset activity. In essence, the new statement says, “banks can do crypto if it’s legal, but they almost surely shouldn’t do crypto because it’s way risky and we’re watching.”

To be sure, anything crypto isn’t always toxic. Another way the agencies will handle accusations that they are conducting a stealth-woke anti-crypto campaign is to make it …

21 02, 2023

Karen Petrou: FSOC’s NBFI Plans Will Cost Big Banks Dearly

2023-02-21T11:15:33-05:00February 21st, 2023|The Vault|

Although the always-inscrutable FSOC’s read-out of its last meeting was clear only with respect to approval of prior meeting minutes, the brief mention of ongoing U.S. work to address nonbank financial intermediation (NBFI) was so tantalizing that we ventured down darkened corners of key agencies to get a read-out of our own.  Two conclusions came to light:  the U.S. will take tough action on limiting bank/NBFI interconnections in its pending bank capital rewrite and FSOC is fine with the SEC’s recent MMF and open-end fund proposals even if pretty much no one else is.

First to the capital rewrites and how costly they could be.  In its most recent NBFI review, the FSB took sharp issue with the extent to which the U.S. has taken sufficient steps to curb the inter-connected risks to NBFIs evident even before the 2020 market collapse.  We expect the banking agencies not only to issue the end-game rules discussed in my last memo, but also to make good on the U.S. promise to Basel well before the game nominally ended with the 2017 revisions.

This means new capital standards costing banks big when it comes to bank equity investments in funds and higher risk weightings for exposures to unregulated financial institutions.  It also means new capital requirements absorbing “step-in” risk – i.e., the extent to which reputational risk forces banks to stand by their off-balance sheet funds, SIVs, or other instrumentalities.  Two banks in fact supported affiliated funds in MMFs during the 2020 …

6 02, 2023

Karen Petrou: It’s Game-On for End-Game Capital Regulation

2023-02-06T10:56:45-05:00February 6th, 2023|The Vault|

Many rules determine the terms of combat in key financial markets, but none is as fundamental as bank-capital standards because every decision a bank makes first factors capital costs or benefits.  These are axiomatic because, even if every other business assumption a company makes is good, a financial product or service will still prove unprofitable if capital requirements are high enough to doom returns sufficient for insatiable investors.  Said by some only to be a tidy Basel III clean-up, the Basel IV “end-game” capital rules set to come in the next month or so are actually a substantive recalibration of which businesses make banks how much money compared to all the competitors empowered over the years by the happy – if highly risky – absence of like-kind requirements.  It’s thus no wonder that it’s already game-on for the future of the end-game regulations.

As we’ve noted in recent client updates, Rep. Andy Barr (R-KY) now chairs the HFSC subcommittee with power over both financial-institution regulation and monetary policy.  Although one of his first bills in this Congress deals only with loosening capital rules for de novo banks (H.R. 758), he has made it very clear that he fears that the new big-bank capital construct will prove unduly costly and anti-competitive.  Senate Banking Ranking Member Tim Scott (R-SC) said the same thing in more guarded tones when he released his priorities, making it clear that the GOP has its eyes on the new capital rules.

No coincidence, conservative critics are …

4 01, 2023

FedFin on: Bank Crypto Safety-and-Soundness Standards

2023-01-06T10:38:42-05:00January 4th, 2023|The Vault|

The Basel Committee has finalized its second try at global standards governing bank cryptoasset exposures,1 laying out a path that U.S. agencies plan quickly to implement even as Congress continues to wrestle with this fast-changing sector. In general, the final Basel approach allows banks both to undertake cryptoasset activities and hold exposures in this sector. However, the conditions applied to all but the most straightforward digital assets issued by regulated entities and to all stablecoins are extensive and costly…..

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.

 

 …

22 06, 2022

FedFin: Fed Comes Under Heightened Political Pressure

2023-01-25T15:58:37-05:00June 22nd, 2022|The Vault|

As we expected, today’s Senate Banking session with Chairman Powell is a preview of broader national debate ahead of the midterm election.  Democrats generally sought to emphasize their understanding of inflation’s costs without lambasting the Fed and, indirectly, the Biden Administration.   Still, Sens. Ossoff (D-GA) and Warnock (D-GA) pressed Mr. Powell on the Fed’s failure to begin to tighten last summer.  Republicans were strongly united in lambasting….

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

22 06, 2022

FedFin on: Climate Risk Management

2023-01-26T11:37:39-05:00June 22nd, 2022|The Vault|

The Basel Committee has finalized its proposed climate-risk management principles largely unchanged from its proposal, establishing over-arching goals at which both banks and their supervisors are asked to aim.  Much in the final standards echoes proposed OCC risk-management standards proposed in a slightly different form by the FDIC and likely soon to be taken up by the Federal Reserve in inter-agency U.S. goals.  Neither Basel’s standards nor these U.S. principles are…..

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.

Go to Top