#credit risk – Page 2 – Federal Financial Analytics

25 09, 2023

m092523

Arezou Rafikian2023-09-25T09:26:11-04:00September 25th, 2023|6- Client Memo|

How to Right the Raft of New Rules

What struck me most about the HFSC hearing at which I testified last week was how lukewarm Democrats are to the new rules unless they feel compelled to defend the White House or core political objectives. When the partisan spotlight dimmed, more than a few Democrats said that the rules might have both small and even significant perverse consequences. Given that GOP-led repeal of the rules is impossible and court overturn is at best a lengthy process, hard work to get the rules more to the middle is essential. Even if large banks still think the rules are bad, they’ll be better and that’s all to the good.

m092523.pdf…

25 09, 2023

Karen Petrou: How to Right the Raft of New Rules

Arezou Rafikian2023-09-25T09:28:19-04:00September 25th, 2023|The Vault|

What struck me most about the HFSC hearing at which I testified last week was how lukewarm Democrats are to the new rules unless they feel compelled to defend the White House or core political objectives. When the partisan spotlight dimmed, more than a few Democrats said that the rules might have both small and even significant perverse consequences. Given that GOP-led repeal of the rules is impossible and court overturn is at best a lengthy process, hard work to get the rules more to the middle is essential. Even if large banks still think the rules are bad, they’ll be better and that’s all to the good.

What’s the how-to? In short, it’s a concerted campaign to fix the most problematic technical confusions in the massive body of new rules – these are manifest and manifold, focusing hard on obvious flaws and saving raging debates such as those over how big banks should be for another day. I think this approach is best not only because it avoids political landmines, but also because it works.

In the mid-2000s, a group of custody banks with which we worked laid out numerous unintended consequences in the Basel II approach to operational risk-based capital. By the time this landed in the final Basel III rules, it wasn’t great, but it was a lot, lot better in terms of actually capitalizing real risk at savings mounting to billions in what would have been unnecessary regulatory capital.

My testimony lays out a road-map of …

5 09, 2023

DAILY090523

Eliza Allen2023-09-05T17:16:52-04:00September 5th, 2023|2- Daily Briefing|

FSB Considers Resolution Construct Revamp

In addition to calling for full and consistent implementation of the Basel III framework, the FSB head’s letter to the G20 today stresses that this year’s bank failures challenge long-held views about deposit stickiness and the speed of bank runs, leading international standard-setters now to consider unspecified policy changes to the resolution construct.

BIS Study: Fed, FDIC Reassurances Offset Bank Run Risk

Contributing to analysis of viral runs and how to stop them, a new paper from BIS staff concludes that public communication from the Fed on banking system stability and from the FDIC on deposit insurance during crises can mitigate systemwide run risk, while similar statements from political figures such as President Biden are less effective.

IMF: Money Laundering Undermines Financial Stability

The IMF yesterday published a blog post on money laundering’s financial-stability impact, concluding that cross-border illicit payments result in equity-price declines, higher CDS costs, elevated perceived credit risk, and declines in deposits for the individual banks involved. The blog also states that there is a contagion dynamic as a result of spillover effects between targeted banks and other banks within the region.

Daily090523.pdf…

4 08, 2023

Al080723

Eliza Allen2023-08-04T16:31:21-04:00August 4th, 2023|3- This Week|

A Crushing Capital Burden

No, we’re not talking about the proposals – enormous, complex, and in some cases ill-drafted and confusing though they are. We’re talking about how much work it’s taking to go beyond the top-line analyses and section-by-section repeats we’re seeing in so many releases to give you in-depth, strategy, and market-focused analyses of what key parts of the rules say and how they’ll redefine banking as we and the financial system know it. There’s much not to love about the current construct, but the complexity of the new capital framework makes it stunningly difficult not just for us, but we fear also for the regulators, to know if the new framework will prove a Frankenstein. When we finish our read of all the proposals’ sections and that for GSIBs, we’ll release a final, bottom-line strategic conclusion. Until then, it’s critical to understand each key part of the rule and how it defines individual business lines and the markets that depend on them.

Al080723.pdf…

4 08, 2023

FedFin on: Credit-Risk Capital Rewrite

Arezou Rafikian2023-08-04T13:41:04-04:00August 4th, 2023|The Vault|

In this report, we proceed from our assessment of the proposed regulatory capital framework to an analysis of the rules governing credit risk. In addition to eliminating the advanced approach, the proposal imposes higher standards for some assets than under the old standardized approach (SA) via new “expanded” requirements. As detailed here, many expanded risk weightings are higher than current requirements either due to specific risk-weighted assessments (RWAs) or definitions and additional restrictions. This contributes to the added capital costs identified by the banking agencies in their impact assessment, suggesting that lower risk weightings in the expanded approach reflected the reduced risks described in the proposal for other assets and will ultimately have little bearing on regulatory-capital requirements and thus ….

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

4 08, 2023

CAPITAL231

Eliza Allen2023-08-04T13:40:43-04:00August 4th, 2023|1- Financial Services Management|

Credit-Risk Capital Rewrite

In this report, we proceed from our assessment of the proposed regulatory capital framework to an analysis of the rules governing credit risk. In addition to eliminating the advanced approach, the proposal imposes higher standards for some assets than under the old standardized approach (SA) via new “expanded” requirements. As detailed here, many expanded risk weightings are higher than current requirements either due to specific risk-weighted assessments (RWAs) or definitions and additional restrictions. This contributes to the added capital costs identified by the banking agencies in their impact assessment, suggesting that lower risk weightings in the expanded approach reflected the reduced risks described in the proposal for other assets and will ultimately have little bearing on regulatory-capital requirements and thus on the overall ability of banks to expand into lower-risk areas and compete more effectively with nonbanks and foreign banks. Big banks forced to abandon certain activities may expand others receiving capital discounts in the new rules, increasing their footprint in traditional banking in ways that may increase industry consolidation.

CAPITAL231.pdf…

31 07, 2023

M073123

Eliza Allen2023-07-31T10:40:52-04:00July 31st, 2023|6- Client Memo|

Two Tenets of the Capital Proposal That Make No Sense No Matter How Much One Might Want to Love The Rest of It

In the wake of the 1,089-page capital proposal, debate is waging on well-trod battlegrounds such as whether the new approach will dry up credit and thus stifle growth. I’ve my own view on this, but my initial read of the proposal points to a still more fundamental issue: some of it makes absolutely no sense even if one agrees with the agencies’ goals. Here, I lay out two bedrock assumptions that contradict the rule’s express intent and will have adverse unintended consequences to boot. God knows what lurks in the details.

M073123.pdf…

31 07, 2023

Karen Petrou: Two Tenets of the Capital Proposal That Make No Sense No Matter How Much One Might Want to Love The Rest of It

Eliza Allen2023-07-31T10:40:41-04:00July 31st, 2023|The Vault|

In the wake of the 1,089-page capital proposal, debate is waging on well-trod battlegrounds such as whether the new approach will dry up credit and thus stifle growth. I’ve my own view on this, but my initial read of the proposal points to a still more fundamental issue: some of it makes absolutely no sense even if one agrees with the agencies’ goals. Here, I lay out two bedrock assumptions that contradict the rule’s express intent and will have adverse unintended consequences to boot. God knows what lurks in the details.

The first “say what” in the sweeping rules results from the new “higher-of” construct. Credit and operational -risk models are entirely gone and market-risk models are largely eviscerated. Instead, big banks must hold the higher of the old, “general” standardized approach (SA) or the new, “expanded” SA. Each of these requirements is set by the agencies – models mostly never allowed. Further, a new “output floor” – different from Basel’s approach to this model’s constraint – is also mandated as yet another safety net preventing anyone gaining any advantage from any possible regulatory-capital arbitrage.

Why then not just demand that big banks use a standardized weighting the agencies think suffices? Must banks be put through the burden of calculating two ratios when they have no ability to arbitrage requisite capital weights? Do the agencies not even trust themselves to set capital standards that are now sometimes higher, sometimes lower as God gives them to know probability of default …

28 07, 2023

Al073123

Eliza Allen2023-07-28T17:05:25-04:00July 28th, 2023|3- This Week|

Few Surprises, Much Consternation

There is little in the new capital framework we did not forecast for new capital rules after the March bank failures (see Client Report REFORM219) and what we missed was later presaged in Vice Chair Barr’s recent speech (see Client Report CAPITAL228). However, as we’ve also said many times, many devils lurk in regulatory-capital details. We know the agencies’ capital-impact bottom line because the FDIC and Fed each outlined this at contentious meetings approving the proposal for public comment. We also know that Republicans really don’t like the rule even if they haven’t read it and that key decision-makers – most notably Chair Powell – are hedging their affirmative votes for releasing the proposal with careful caveats of what they want to see in a final rule. Thus, careful analytics are essential to effective assessments of winners and losers as a result of this complex package, especially if one looks – as FedFin will – at big-picture implications – i.e., those for the economy, financial system, and economic equality – as well as at sector- and institution-specific provisions not just in key asset classes based on specific risk weightings.

Al073123.pdf…

28 07, 2023

DAILY072823

Eliza Allen2023-07-28T17:09:55-04:00July 28th, 2023|2- Daily Briefing|

FSOC Considers Nonbank Systemic Risk, Credit-Based LIBOR Replacements

At today’s FSOC meeting, participants as usual said nothing about the closed-door agenda, which notably featured more discussion of the systemic risk that may be posed by nonbank mortgage servicers. Different agencies presented their work to address this risk, which was also flagged when FSOC finalized its new approach to identifying systemic risk (see FSM Report SYSTEMIC95). Whether FSOC as a whole is satisfied with FHFA and Ginnie actions and even if these agencies think their work to date suffices will determine the extent to which FSOC intervenes, but the session reinforced the systemic importance accorded to nonbank mortgage firms and the potential for additional action.

Agencies Take Action to Enhance Emergency Liquidity, Whitewash Discount Window

As presaged at Chair Powell’s press conference earlier this week, the banking agencies today issued liquidity-planning guidance designed both to ensure adequate preparation for acute liquidity stress and take the stigma off discount-window draws. The guidance deals only with liquidity planning and thus does not alter the treatment of discount-window funding for purposes of the LCR, admonishing banks to take account of the hard lessons of the March bank failures and prepare for runs and other extreme-stress scenarios.

Daily072823.pdf…