#MI – Page 2 – Federal Financial Analytics

4 08, 2023

CAPITAL231

Eliza Allen2023-08-04T13:40:43-04:00August 4th, 2023|1- Financial Services Management|

Credit-Risk Capital Rewrite

In this report, we proceed from our assessment of the proposed regulatory capital framework to an analysis of the rules governing credit risk. In addition to eliminating the advanced approach, the proposal imposes higher standards for some assets than under the old standardized approach (SA) via new “expanded” requirements. As detailed here, many expanded risk weightings are higher than current requirements either due to specific risk-weighted assessments (RWAs) or definitions and additional restrictions. This contributes to the added capital costs identified by the banking agencies in their impact assessment, suggesting that lower risk weightings in the expanded approach reflected the reduced risks described in the proposal for other assets and will ultimately have little bearing on regulatory-capital requirements and thus on the overall ability of banks to expand into lower-risk areas and compete more effectively with nonbanks and foreign banks. Big banks forced to abandon certain activities may expand others receiving capital discounts in the new rules, increasing their footprint in traditional banking in ways that may increase industry consolidation.

CAPITAL231.pdf…

1 08, 2023

FedFin on: Capital Winners – GSEs – and Losers – MI

Eliza Allen2023-08-04T09:44:41-04:00August 1st, 2023|The Vault|

We’ve much more to do to determine the strategic and policy impact of the new credit-, market-, and operational-risk capital rules singly and collectively – a complex task given the 1,089-page rulemaking made harder by some extremely-arcane language that may either mask what the agencies mean or differ from what they meant to mean. Still, several conclusions about mortgage finance are clear: the rules would be less demanding than those at present for many mid-LTV loans, the GSEs’ risk weighting continue to give them a considerable advantage over bank originators and securitizes, and MI lost the limited luster the banking agencies were forced to concede in 2013.

The full report is available to subscription clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here.…

31 07, 2023

M073123

Eliza Allen2023-07-31T10:40:52-04:00July 31st, 2023|6- Client Memo|

Two Tenets of the Capital Proposal That Make No Sense No Matter How Much One Might Want to Love The Rest of It

In the wake of the 1,089-page capital proposal, debate is waging on well-trod battlegrounds such as whether the new approach will dry up credit and thus stifle growth. I’ve my own view on this, but my initial read of the proposal points to a still more fundamental issue: some of it makes absolutely no sense even if one agrees with the agencies’ goals. Here, I lay out two bedrock assumptions that contradict the rule’s express intent and will have adverse unintended consequences to boot. God knows what lurks in the details.

M073123.pdf…

31 07, 2023

Karen Petrou: Two Tenets of the Capital Proposal That Make No Sense No Matter How Much One Might Want to Love The Rest of It

Eliza Allen2023-07-31T10:40:41-04:00July 31st, 2023|The Vault|

In the wake of the 1,089-page capital proposal, debate is waging on well-trod battlegrounds such as whether the new approach will dry up credit and thus stifle growth. I’ve my own view on this, but my initial read of the proposal points to a still more fundamental issue: some of it makes absolutely no sense even if one agrees with the agencies’ goals. Here, I lay out two bedrock assumptions that contradict the rule’s express intent and will have adverse unintended consequences to boot. God knows what lurks in the details.

The first “say what” in the sweeping rules results from the new “higher-of” construct. Credit and operational -risk models are entirely gone and market-risk models are largely eviscerated. Instead, big banks must hold the higher of the old, “general” standardized approach (SA) or the new, “expanded” SA. Each of these requirements is set by the agencies – models mostly never allowed. Further, a new “output floor” – different from Basel’s approach to this model’s constraint – is also mandated as yet another safety net preventing anyone gaining any advantage from any possible regulatory-capital arbitrage.

Why then not just demand that big banks use a standardized weighting the agencies think suffices? Must banks be put through the burden of calculating two ratios when they have no ability to arbitrage requisite capital weights? Do the agencies not even trust themselves to set capital standards that are now sometimes higher, sometimes lower as God gives them to know probability of default …

28 07, 2023

GSE-072823

Arezou Rafikian2023-08-14T10:29:36-04:00July 28th, 2023|4- GSE Activity Report|

Capital Winners – GSEs – and Losers – MI

We’ve much more to do to determine the strategic and policy impact of the new credit-, market-, and operational-risk capital rules singly and collectively – a complex task given the 1,089-page rulemaking made harder by some extremely-arcane language that may either mask what the agencies mean or differ from what they meant to mean. Still, several conclusions about mortgage finance are clear: the rules would be less demanding than those at present for many mid-LTV loans, the GSEs’ risk weighting continue to give them a considerable advantage over bank originators and securitizes, and MI lost the limited luster the banking agencies were forced to concede in 2013.

GSE-072823.pdf…

18 07, 2023

GSE-071823

Eliza Allen2023-07-18T11:42:19-04:00July 18th, 2023|4- GSE Activity Report|

40 Percent!?

Reuters is reporting today and other sources are echoing three regulatory sources saying that the impending capital rewrite will propose risk weighted assessments (RWAs) between 40 and 90%, up from the minimum 20 and 70% Basel standards. The rationale according to Reuters is a desire not to set big-bank RWAs lower than those applicable to smaller banks. However, the rule could also amend smaller-bank RWAs if regulators are or become so inclined.

GSE071823.pdf…

8 06, 2023

GSE-060823

Arezou Rafikian2023-06-14T16:20:36-04:00June 8th, 2023|4- GSE Activity Report|

Under Their Thumb and What a Big Thumb It Is

As we will detail in a forthcoming in-depth report, the banking agencies’ new “guidance” on third-party vendors essentially brings all nonbank counterparties with whom banking organizations deal under the agencies’ enforcement thumb. As a result, nonbank mortgage companies, MIs, credit enhancers, and tech providers and even the GSEs – Home Loan Banks included – will be forced at the least to answer a lot of questions from the banking entities with whom they do pretty much any kind of business. And, if the agencies don’t like the answers, they now assert that they will issue enforcement orders not just against banks, but also nonbank entities to ensure they comply with the full panoply of safety-and-soundness standards referenced in the guidance along with ensuring appropriate consumer protection.

https://fedfin.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/GSE-060823.pdf…

8 06, 2023

FedFin on: Under Their Thumb and What a Big Thumb It Is

Arezou Rafikian2023-06-14T16:20:52-04:00June 8th, 2023|The Vault|

As we will detail in a forthcoming in-depth report, the banking agencies’ new “guidance” on third-party vendors essentially brings all nonbank counterparties with whom banking organizations deal under the agencies’ enforcement thumb. As a result, nonbank mortgage companies, MIs, credit enhancers, and tech providers and even the GSEs – Home Loan Banks included – will be forced at the least to answer a lot of questions from the banking entities with whom they do pretty much any kind of business. And, if the agencies don’t like the answers, they now assert that they will issue enforcement orders not just against banks, but also nonbank entities to ensure they comply with the full panoply of safety-and-soundness standards referenced in the guidance along with ensuring appropriate consumer protection.

The full report is available to subscription clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here.

…

17 05, 2023

DAILY051723

Eliza Allen2023-05-17T17:44:04-04:00May 17th, 2023|2- Daily Briefing|

Bipartisan Senate Consensus Demands Structural Change To Fed IG

At today’s Senate Banking Subcommittee on Economic Policy hearing on Fed accountability, Chairwoman Warren (D-MA) was unsparing in her criticism of the Fed and its current IG, Mark Bialek. She elicited the fact that he is the Fed’s highest-paid employee and, while he may be dismissed only by two-thirds of the Board, she argued that he is essentially captive and thus cannot be relied upon to investigate ethics challenges, bank failures, and internal operations.

HFSC GOP Demands LLPA Changes No Matter FHFA’s RFI

As anticipated, Chairman Davidson (D-OH) reiterated GOP demands that the FHFA rescind the entirety of its LLPA proposal at today’s HFSC Subcommittee on Housing and Insurance hearing, despite FHFA conceding to some Republican demands and issuing an RFI on the Enterprises’ single-family pricing framework earlier this week. Mr. Davidson also pushed back on FHFA’s assertion that LLPA pricing must be set with regard to private mortgage insurance, saying that MI does not reduce taxpayer risk or GSE capital even though it is required for risk reduction and captured in the GSE capital standards.

Daily051723.pdf…

6 04, 2023

GSE-040623

Eliza Allen2023-04-06T10:33:08-04:00April 6th, 2023|4- GSE Activity Report|

Extra Equitable?

FHFA, Fannie, and Freddie yesterday updated the sometimes-controversial equitable-finance plans FHFA approved last year. Notably, Fannie’s new plan no longer focuses exclusively on Black households, a feature that garnered vitriolic Wall Street Journal criticism and negative Republican reactions. Freddie’s plan delays and may even back away from efforts to set MI and title insurance pricing.

GSE-040623.pdf…