#supervision

3 12, 2024

FedFin on: Nonbank-Payment Provider Regulation

Eliza Allen2024-12-03T16:48:27-05:00December 3rd, 2024|The Vault|

Continuing its efforts to advance controversial actions before the end of the Biden Administration, the CFPB has finalized proposed supervisory standards for large nonbank providers of general-use digital-payment-platform services. The new standard brings these companies under CFPB supervision as well as regulation and enforcement actions, better aligning their governance with rules applicable to bank payment providers and addressing the Bureau’s deep concerns about digital marketing. However, this new framework depends on voluntary compliance in anticipation of or as the result of rigorous CFPB supervision…

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

23 09, 2024

Karen Petrou: The New Bank-Regulatory Paradigm We Need

Eliza Allen2024-09-23T11:58:35-04:00September 23rd, 2024|The Vault|

On Friday, we posted a client alert to a new Federal Reserve study that, to put it succinctly, overturns received wisdom about what makes banks fail. It is a paradigm-busting analysis based on solid, validated, empirical evidence, not on the models notoriously replete with assumptions that suit a researcher’s fancy or whomever backs the work. This study’s main finding is that, even before the advent of federal deposit insurance, bank failure is due to and reliably predicted by growing bank insolvency – not illiquidity – at otherwise-solvent banks and generally not even by runs at very weak banks. Depositors and, worse, supervisors are demonstrably slow to catch on to emerging risk, with depositors understandably subject to information asymmetries and supervisors inexcusably distracted, confused, or even captive. Policy should not be based on one study, but this one study warrants immediate attention backed as it is by many others and replete with damning data analyzed with a straightforward methodology using records going back to 1986. Now would be a very good time to take heed – banking agencies in 2024 are building yet another regulatory edifice to compensate for yet another round of critical supervisory lapses. This may well prove as doomed as its predecessors unless regulators stop blaming banks after failure for bad behavior well within supervisory sight and reach long before indisposition turned terminal.

Importantly, I am not saying that this study proves there is no need for capital or liquidity regulation just as our new merger-policy study does …

19 08, 2024

Karen Petrou: What the Fed Must Do to Make Monetary Policy Work

Shane Smith2024-08-19T09:22:53-04:00August 19th, 2024|The Vault|

Later this week, monetary-policy disciples – at least those who agree with the Fed – will gather around the campfire atop Jackson Hole to ponder the question set before them: whether monetary-policy transmission has been effective and, since it’s awesomely obvious it hasn’t, what might be done about that. The plan is clearly to float trial balloons in the clear mountain air to see if the Fed’s thinking about the new plan slated for 2025 is any better than that which lay behind its disastrous 2019 monetary-policy rewrite. Those allowed into these August precincts will have much of value to say this time around much as they sought to do the last time the Fed asked for all their views. Odds are, though, that Jackson Hole will not consider three non-econometric phenomena that lie behind recent policy misfires: economic inequality, NBFI migration, and the strong counter-cyclical impact of Fed supervisory policy.

Why do these matter so much?

First to economic inequality. The last time the Fed rewrote its monetary-policy model, it deigned to consider economic inequality, but promptly dismissed any reasons to worry. There were, though, lots of them.

The 2019 inequality exercise suffered from the same problem as most Fed models: reliance on representative-agent, not heterogeneous data showing distributional disparities. This approach thus reaffirmed blithe convictions that anything that keeps employment high and inflation in check is good for lower-wealth and -income households because it’s good for everyone else. See my book for why that’s grievously wrong and recent …

30 05, 2023

FedFin on: Enforcement Policy

Arezou Rafikian2023-05-30T17:09:49-04:00May 30th, 2023|The Vault|

Following a speech earlier this year by the Acting Comptroller arguing that some banks are “too big to manage” and the furor caused by recent failures, the OCC has significantly revised its enforcement policy. The new framework requires examiners promptly to intervene if any of a bank’s CAMELS scores slips to 3 for unsatisfactory or if the bank is what CFPB Director Chopra would call a “repeat offender” of law, rule, or express supervisory actions or found deficient in practices necessary to ensuring safety and soundness.

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…

22 05, 2023

Karen Petrou: How to Ensure That Independent Study of Regulatory Mistakes Leads to Near-Term, Meaningful Redress and Reform

Eliza Allen2023-05-22T11:47:33-04:00May 22nd, 2023|The Vault|

Last week, a moderate Senate Democrat was joined by a Republican in yet another letter demanding an independent investigation of regulatory actions related to recent bank failures. But, as the absence of specifics in any of these letters makes clear, it’s a lot easier to call for independent inquiry than to lay out how to conduct one that might make a meaningful difference. Precedent is not encouraging – for example, Congress created a Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission after 2008, but it was an unqualified waste of time and money. Still, we urgently need an independent assessment of what went so wrong combined with another providing near-term, actionable reforms. Having served on one post-crisis national commission that did a bit of good, I recommend separating the forensic inquiry from the one focused on the future, guarding against conflicts without eliminating expertise, and assessing only a few clear questions suitable for practical answers that can be readily accomplished under current law.

The first decision point determines all the rest: whether the independent analysis is to be forensic – who dropped which heavy ball on whose toes – or focused on the future – what we learned and what to do about it. Many of the proposals for an independent commission, including the Congressional letter noted above, want their commission to do both, but none could do so well and asking for this is thus asking for trouble.

A good forensic analysis will reduce the moral hazard enjoyed by federal supervisors long exempt …

28 03, 2023

FedFin on: Senate Banking Demands Supervisory Accountability, Transparency, Reform

Arezou Rafikian2023-04-03T12:47:49-04:00March 28th, 2023|The Vault|

Today’s Senate Banking hearing was extremely well-attended by senators on both sides of the aisle clearly looking first to understand what precipitated recent bank failures, who is to blame, and what should be done next. Republicans argued that current law gives the Fed considerable discretion without the need for statutory change. Although FRB Vice Chairman Barr initially sought to emphasize the need for new rules without blaming old ones, he ultimately admitted that the Fed indeed could and can govern risky banking organizations regardless of size….

The full report is available to retainer clients. To find out how you can sign up for the service, click here and here.…